This thesis is concerned with the problems met by the administrative enforcers of the Antimonopoly Law (the AML 2007) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during its public enforcement. It provides solutions to some of these problems with reference to EU competition law and US antitrust law. Although the thesis cannot solve all the problems once for all, it does provide effective solutions to the three following important issues: 1. how to establish and improve transparency of Chinese merger control procedure; 2. how to allocate public enforcement power of the AML 2007 between the Central and Provincial enforcers; and, 3. how to improve the protection of right of concerned parties during the AML 2007’s public enforcement.
Chinese Antimonopoly Law’s public enforcement is still immature and experiencing further challenges for development. In order to establish a more effective, transparent and fair public enforcement regime, the thesis chooses EU competition law and US antitrust law to compare. Not only because they are more advanced, but also, because the AML 2007 is heavily influenced by the two regimes (especially the EU competition law regime). However, it is noteworthy that the experience from EU and US cannot solve all problems met by Chinese administrative enforcers; especially those are caused by Chinese political and economic structure which both EU and US do/did not have. Nevertheless, by solving the problems met in the above three aspects, the thesis has contributed to a more effective, transparent and fair public enforcement procedure for Chinese Antimonopoly Law.
Translations of titles, authors, and publishers from Chinese works are unofficial, and the laws in this thesis are up to date at December 2012