This thesis explores the factors that explain varying degrees of coherence in
European Union (EU) crisis management and draws implications for its role as an
international security actor. The analysis starts from the assumption that coherence is
a function of competing and conflicting interests and norms. The influence and
interaction of these factors across governance levels are viewed through two
theoretical lenses: liberal intergovernmentalism and sociological institutionalism.
Derived hypotheses are evaluated through a comparative case study design, focused
on three instances of crisis management in Africa, namely Libya (2011), Somalia
(2011-2012), and Mali (2012-2013). The analysis traces the activities and interaction
of EU institutional actors and member states, with a focus on France, the United
Kingdom (UK), and Germany. It suggests that the degree of coherence in EU crisis
management is contingent on the congruence of domestic economic and electoral
interests, as well as national threat perceptions. But it also depends on the extent to
which EU-level coherence norms resonate with national norms on the use of force
and preferred modes of multilateral cooperation. The study identifies scope
conditions for the interaction of interests and norms: if economic and electoral stakes
are high and calculable, interest-based calculation prevails. If, instead, decision-makers
are faced with low stakes and uncertainty, embedded national norms are
more likely to shape their behaviour. The Union thus represents a rather
unpredictable security actor, whose multi-level coherence depends on the context-specific
balance between domestically defined interests, stakes, and salient norms
