Mixed oligopolies are characterized by private and public enterprises.
Entry into these markets was restrictive, but has now been relaxed by deregulations;
as a result, private firms have entered mixed oligopolies.
An increase in the number of private firms increases competition among private firms
and reduces the profit of incumbent private firms,
given the privatization policy remains unchanged.
However, an increase in the number of private firms may in turn affect privatization policy,
and thus, indirectly affect private firms' profits.
Therefore, the overall effect on private firms' profit is ambiguous.
In this study, we thus investigate how the number of private firms affects
the profit of each private firm in mixed oligopolies.
For this end, we use a linear-quadratic production cost function,
which covers two popular model formulations in the mixed oligopoly literature.
We show that, if the degree of privatization is exogenous,
the profit of each private firm is decreasing in the number of private firms.
However, if the degree of privatization is endogenous,
the relationship between the number of private firms and profit takes an inverted-U shape
under a plausible range of cost parameters.
Our results imply that there can exist multiple equilibria
in free-entry markets with different degrees of privatization