The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of
social phenomena, and to determine (with particular reference to
economics) the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the
contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena
can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive
character and status as social phenomena.
In chapter I it is argued that the most important
difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the
former have to employ intentional criteria to identify their
explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are
intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in
the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails
in the physical.
In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the
task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences
of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic
explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended
consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of
social phenomena (apart from those of single actions) should adopt.
In chapter III the contention that the social sciences
deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended,
and the main implications of this contention for social analysis
are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle
predictable is discussed.
In chapter IV the structural properties of formal
scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's
famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed
and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements
formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being
studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle
of rationality', are discussed.
In chapter V the central questions behind the
methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are
brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is
not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can
successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is
argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology (in
the form developed by Merton) is consistent with methodological
individualism. Finally, it is claimed that (apart from a few
minor exceptions) the principle of methodological individualism
does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal
phenomena.
In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running
through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief
summary of the most important points raised by this thesis
