Despite views to the contrary, 'action' is not a
concept alien to ordinary ways of thinking, hence the
significance of the philosophical problem of action, which
demands that we ground this concept in some real difference
between actions and other occurrences. I argue that of the
two likely candidates, the causal and the volitional
theories of action, the causal approach will not suffice
because it is unable to cope with instances of wayward
causality.My concern is principally with the volition theory of
which the views of James and Prichard are discussed at
length. James's account of the will is deemed unacceptable
by virtue of its emphasis upon introspection. While Prichard
appears to offer good reasons for believing that willing is
fundamental to action, his identification of action with
volition is rejected. Subsequently, detailed consideration
is given to the relation of volition to action, and I
suggest that volition be regarded neither as action nor
cause of action. Instead, actions are best understood as
causings, which embrace both volitions and their effects.
This analysis of action is extended through the concept of
'basic action', and it emerges that there is a clear sense
in which willing is not intentional.The suggestion that 'trying' is crucial to the concept
of action is discussed and it is argued that willing may
constitute trying in every instance of action, although it
never counts as action in its own right.Volition is faced with with criticisms from Ryle. I
defend the view that volitions may be regarded as
essentially voluntary, although we may do better to construe
it as involuntary. The problem of descriptive deficiency and
the logical connection argument are the next challenges met
by my account of volition. Several remaining objections to
my account of action are dismissed before I demonstrate
that, unlike the causal approach, the volition theory meets
the rigours of wayward causality.In conclusion, we have an account of action which harks
back to the suggestion of J.S. Mill, that action is 'not one
thing but a combination of two'. By thus supposing that
volition plays an essential role in action, we can
adequately resolve the problem of action with which we
began
