Current UK abortion law has been subjected to extensive feminist critique because of
the relationships that it constructs between healthcare professionals (HCPs) and
women with unwanted pregnancies. The law allows HCPs to opt out of abortion
provision on the grounds of conscience, implying that it is not something which they
have an automatic duty to provide to their patients. It also gives doctors the authority
to decide whether an abortion can legally take place, thus suggesting that women’s
reproductive decisions should be regulated by medical ‘experts’. However, little is
known about how HCPs who are involved in twenty-first century UK abortion
provision define their relationships with their patients in practice. My thesis makes
an important empirical contribution by responding to this gap in the literature and
exploring the subjectivities which these HCPs construct for themselves and their
pregnant patients.
I address this issue by analysing Scottish HCPs’ interview accounts of their
involvement in (or conscientious objection to) abortion provision, using conceptual
tools provided by Science and Technology Studies (STS) and feminist theory. I begin
by utilising HCPs’ discussions of the practice of ‘conscientious objection’ as a means
of exploring how they define the boundaries of their professional responsibilities for
abortion provision. I then move on to address HCPs’ accounts of their interactions
with women requesting abortion, and analyse how they define legitimate or ‘expert’
knowledge in this context.
A key conclusion of the thesis is that HCPs do concede some authority to women
with unwanted pregnancies; this is revealed by their reluctance to suggest that they
have the right to prevent individual women from accessing abortion. At the same
time, I argue that the legitimacy granted to pregnant women by HCPs is limited. My
analysis reveals that, in constructing knowledge claims about the use of abortion,
HCPs co-produce troubling definitions of femininity, socio-economic class, age and
ethnicity. I develop a strong critique of this process, and highlight its potential
implications for women’s experiences in the abortion clinic. However, I conclude
that this situation cannot be addressed by simply attacking the practices of HCPs as
individuals. Rather, it is necessary to understand and critique the limitations of the
discursive context in which HCPs are working, because this context shapes the
subjectivities available to pregnant women and HCPs
