The question is posed, what does it mean to be oneself?
It is argued that to look for an answer in the psycho-physical
characteristics of the individual himself does not take account of
man's restless refusal to be content with what he is. The starting
point of the inquiry is that an understanding of what makes man himself
must take account of the 'beyond' in terms of which he seeks to define
himself. It is this preliminary assumption which explains how Heidegger
and Buber come to be considered together, for both philosophers share
the view that man is an ec-static being, one who 'stands out' from
himself in some way. However, it is precisely when Heidegger and
Buber are juxtaposed that the problem of the thesis is set, for their
views seem mutually exclusive. In Heidegger's understanding a. man is
only himself when he steps forth towards his own possibility of non¬
existence. In contrast for Buber it is the relation of love which
enables a person to be himself. The purpose of the comparison is to
attempt to face the reality of death for each person with its effect
on identity, and also the reality of the love of another person freeing
one to be oneself.The argument is presented that man's relation with man as
Buber presents it requires a radical reconstruction of Heidegger's
analysis of existence. It is suggested that through the reality of love
which resists the world 'as it is', including the power of death, the
boundaries of existence need to be redefined. If love is accepted as
an ontological phenomenon, then its appearance does not seem to be
explicable within Heidegger's ontology of Being-towards-death. It is
noted, on the other hand, that if it is possible to build an alternative
ontology on love, the final possibility of death cannot be sidestepped.
It is here that Heidegger can be used to strengthen Buber's notion of
relation, for Buber seems to ignore the finitude of man, and the threat
it poses to the 'I-Thou' relation as an ontological category.In the final section of the thesis, it is argued that the
phenomenon of love cannot have its roots in this dying world. It is
suggested that an explanation of the reality of love and its power to
create personal Being requires an eschatological perspective. Only
from such a perspective, with its refusal to accept death as a condition
of man being himself, can an alternative ontology to Heidegger's be
found.The conclusion reached is that the concept of God is
implicit in the view of selfhood developed in the thesis. In accordance
with that conclusion, in the final chapter some theological implications
of a relational view of the self are outlined. In particular, the
question is asked whether Persons-in-Trinity can be viewed as the
ultimate resource for personhood. Pinally, requirements for a
Christological anthropology consistent with a relational selfhood, are
considered
