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A tool for implementing privacy in Nano
Authors
Paul Andrew Crocker
Rui Morais
Simão Melo De Sousa
Publication date
1 January 2020
Publisher
'Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)'
Doi
Cite
Abstract
© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.We present a work in progress strategy for implementing privacy in Nano at the consensus level, that can be of independent interest. Nano is a cryptocurrency that uses an Open Representative Voting (ORV) as a consensus mechanism, a variant of Delegated Proof of Stake. Each transaction on the network is voted on by representatives, and each vote has a weight equal to the percentage of their total delegated balance. Every account can delegate their stake to any other account (including itself) and change it anytime it wants. The goal of this paper is to achieve a way for the consensus algorithm to function without knowing the individual balances of each account. The tool is composed of three different schemes. The first is a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem for polynomial rings [1] and it's used to generate, in a distributed way, a secret that will be a private key of an additive ElGamal cryptosystem over elliptic curves (EC-EG) [2], which is additive homomorphic. The second scheme is the polynomials commitment scheme presented in [3] and is used to make the previous scheme verifiable, i.e., without the need of a trusted dealer. Finally, the third scheme is used to decrypt a ciphertext of the EC-EG cryptosystem without reconstructing the private key and, because of that, can be used multiple times.IEEEinfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersio
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