How does uncertainty about future rent tax
liability affect the competitive supply pattern for
an exhaustible resource? Historically, changes in
tax and regulatory clauses have been a frequent
occurrence in the Petroleum industry, and appear to
have contributed to the climate of uncertainty
about future rent appropriation. This paper
develops a generally applicable framework to tackle
this question.
The analysis modifies the classic Hotelling
problem of exhaustible resource management to
embody producer risk-aversion in terms of the
underlying portfolio allocation behaviour of firms'
owners, using a simple mean-variance approach. The
construct is then used to derive equilibrium price
profiles for the resource under a number of
different methods of characterizing the risk,
including a "continuous" variety under which mean-variance
analysis gives general results.
By and large, the results suggest that this
type of uncertainty promotes excessively rapid
depletion. Important exceptions arise where rent
variability (i) does not increase the more distant
the horizon; and (ii) exhibits a negative
correlation with dominant sources of risk in
investors' portfolios