Du, Guozhen

Lu, Bin

Wei, Huilan

Wu, Xianglian

English

University of Kentucky

University of Kentucky UKnowledge International Grassland Congress Proceedings XXI International Grassland Congress / VIII International Rangeland Congress To Fence or Not to Fence—An Economic Study on the Decision‐Making Behavior of Herders in Gannan Prefecture, Gansu Province Huilan Wei Lanzhou University, China Guozhen Du Lanzhou University, China Xianglian Wu Lanzhou University, China Bin Lu Lanzhou University, China Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/igc  Part of the Plant Sciences Commons, and the Soil Science Commons This document is available at https://uknowledge.uky.edu/igc/21/18-1/29 The XXI International Grassland Congress / VIII International Rangeland Congress took place in Hohhot, China from June 29 through July 5, 2008. Proceedings edited by Organizing Committee of 2008 IGC/IRC Conference Published by Guangdong People's Publishing House This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Plant and Soil Sciences at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Grassland Congress Proceedings by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 　 Multifunctional Grasslands in a Changing World 　 Volume Ⅱ 　 瞯 ]925　 瞯Grasslands/Rangelands People and Policies——— Policy Issues for Grasslands/RangelandsTo Fence or Not to Fence — an economic study on the decision‐making behavior of herders inGannan prefecture , Gansu provinceHuilan Wei1 ,Guoz hen Du2 ,X ianglian Wu ,Binlu11 Center f or Rural Development & Biodiversity Protection , L anz hou University ,China730000 , E‐mail : huilanw＠ v ip .163 .com ; 2 School o f L i f e Science , L anz hou UniversityKey words : economic study , decision‐making behavior , Household Contracted Responsibility System , fencing , herdersIntroduction Government has mandated the institution of the Household Contracted Responsibility System ( HCRS) in China摧sextensive pasture areas , in part to prevent or arrest grassland degradation . Fencing is the measure taken to enforce household‐based property rights and increase grassland protection . However , our research has indicated that some areas in which propertyrights are clearly demarcated are still experiencing grassland degradation , yet some un‐fencing areas remain in good condition .This situation appears to contradict traditional economic analysis .Materials and methods Our research takes the case of a natural village of １１ households of herders . The herders did noteliminate the ambiguities of the pastures with different property rights through fencing . However , their grasslands are wellprotected , without grassland degradation or over‐stocking , and they have maintained economics of scale though jointoperations . Using the perspective of new institutional economics , we adopted analytical methods from anthropology , sociologyand institutional economics to understand the full transaction costs involved in different institutional arrangements , particularlyrecognizing the abilities of resources‐users to engage in self‐organization , community forms of operation and to apply indigenousknowledge and practices .Results Absence of fencing did not automatically result in a�T ragedy of the Commons" situation . On the contrary , the assumedinefficiencies of collective action actually resulted in transaction cost savings under some conditions , and also remainedcompatible with the goal of protecting the grassland . The reason is because the herders living in the same area have stronghomogeneous characteristics due to their common history and culture . Therefore they can better understand the importance ofprotecting the grassland and have a shared ecological knowledge of rangeland management . This can be demonstrated by twoobservations : firstly the social agreements between herders reduced the execution cost of certain actions ; secondly , theyachieved the goal of sustainable use of the grassland .Conclusions Pastoral fencing in pursuit of clear property rights may not be the best institutional arrangement . It can be deducedfrom the study that the benefits derived from the pursuit of clear property rights over pasture are overestimated ; in fact , theopportunity costs of fencing are seriously neglected . Therefore , ignoring the regional diversity and complexity , neglecting thedifferent characteristics between the cropped land and the pasture , and mandatory implementation of the household contractresponsibility system in grassland areas will possibly lead to economic and ecological inefficiency .ReferencesTony Banks( ２００３ ) . Property Rights Reform in Rangeland China : Dilemmas On the Road to the Household Ranch . WorldDevelopment . Vol . ３１(１２ ) ,２１２９‐２１４２ .Peter Ho(２０００) .China摧s Rangelands under Stress : A Comparative Study of Pasture Commons in the Ningxia Hui AutonomousRegion . Development and Change . Vol . ３１ ,３８５‐４１２ .

To Fence or Not to Fence—An Economic Study on the Decision‐Making Behavior of Herders in Gannan Prefecture, Gansu Province

https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3831&context=igc

To Fence or Not to Fence—An Economic Study on the Decision‐Making Behavior of Herders in Gannan Prefecture, Gansu Province

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

University of Kentucky