Three Essays on the Political Determinants of Public Policy in the U.S. States

Abstract

This dissertation consists of three articles that seek to understand policy developments related to the death penalty, same-day registration, and felon voting rights in the American states, respectively. Leveraging annual estimates of state death penalty opinion, the first paper proposes, and finds, that direct democracy strengthens the connection between public preferences and policy and, in doing so, is partly responsible for the continued widespread existence of capital punishment in the U.S. I proceed to demonstrate, however, that the representation-enhancing effect of direct democracy does not extend to the punishment’s application, as measured by states’ issuances of death sentences, suggesting that the policy effects of these institutions can, in certain instances, be primarily symbolic in nature. In the second paper, I examine whether the Democratic (Republican) Party’s support of (opposition to) same-day registration is driven by strategic electoral considerations. I find that states have an increased probability of enacting the reform when legislative Democrats are in the precarious position that comes with having just experienced minority status in one or both chambers. Relatedly, I show that the presence of a Republican legislature does not make adoption less likely until the size of the Black population reaches a certain threshold. In fact, provided the Black population is small enough, Republican control of the legislature encourages reform. The third paper applies the overarching theory that politicians pursue electoral reform with the goal of manipulating the racial and, relatedly, partisan composition of the electorate to explain the introduction and adoption of felon voting rights legislation. As predicted by the racial threat explanation, lawmakers in states with larger Black populations propose more anti-felon voting rights bills. Further, in a sign that lawmakers view felon voting reform as a tool for solidifying their hold on power, I find that switches to Democratic (Republican) control are associated with higher numbers of pro- (anti-) felon voting rights bill introductions. A pooled event history analysis of state adoptions of three liberalizing reforms similarly confirms that the positive effect of Democratic control is limited to the party’s first year of rule over a state.Doctor of Philosoph

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