Abazi, V.

Tauschinsky, E.

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl)UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential NegotiationsAbazi, V.; Tauschinsky, E.Publication date2015Document VersionFinal published versionLink to publicationCitation for published version (APA):Abazi, V. (Author), & Tauschinsky, E. (Author). (2015). Willing to Trust? : On GreekReferendum and Confidential Negotiations. Web publication or website, BlogActiv.https://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s)and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an opencontent license (like Creative Commons).Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, pleaselet the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the materialinaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letterto: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Youwill be contacted as soon as possible.Download date:11 Nov 2022Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations | ACELGhttps://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/[12-10-2016 17:19:10]About Newsletter Create your Blog Support LoginJuly 3, 2015Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum andConfidential NegotiationsIn the recent news about Greece, there is one issuethat keeps on resurfacing: trust. News reports willstate that there is a ‘trust gap’ between Greece andthe Troika, that creditors don’t trust Greece’s plansand the breakdown of the talks was ultimately causedby a lack of trust between the negotiating parties. Inan article we just published, we go more into thedetails of what trust is and how it works. Focusing onpublic access to information, we explain how a ‘trust’approach differs from the ‘control’ approach oftentaken, and how a regime catering for better access tomotivational information would do better on the trust axis. Motivational information means information ondecision makers, not only decisions; about what they want, not only what they do. These points are worthrecalling in the current European financial debate.By Vigjilenca Abazi and Eljalill TauschinskyOn Sunday 5 July, Greek citizens are faced with a key decision not only for their own fate but also for thedestiny of Europe. But what will they be saying No or Yes to? Since meetings mostly took place behindclosed doors, we know more about the blame–game between Brussels and Athens than the specificdecisions to be taken. Do we actually know the proposals at the negotiation table? Besides the legal andfinancial facts, do we know the motives of the main actors?As we have argued before, without transparency and clarity on who does what, when and how, it becomesdifficult for citizens to decipher how decisions that profoundly affect their lives are taken or what are thedecisive motives behind them.And this brings us full circle back to the news on Greece and trust. How are we to understand the allegedlack of trust in the confidential negotiations on the Greek crisis?The first thing to remember is that neither trust nor distrust are unchangeable facts. Trust might be morequickly destroyed than built, but it can be built and it can be destroyed.The second thing, and this is something we also emphatically stress in our article mentioned above, is thatno amount of control or factual information can build trust. Knowledge about past behaviour might helpWilling to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations | ACELGhttps://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/[12-10-2016 17:19:10]create or suspend suspicion, but it is not determinate for the creation of trust.Especially in the current volatile context, past behaviour is not necessarily the right tool to predict futuresuccess. Instead, the creation of trust is based on the willingness from the decision-makers to believe in thecharacter, ability, strength, and truth of the opposing negotiating party.In current European political leadership it is this willingness to trust which is core.But at the heart of the referendum lays even a harder choice: Given too little information, the Greek citizensare asked to take the leap of faith without knowing whether European responsibility will meet them. Vigjilenca Abazi is a senior researcher at the Maastricht Centre for European Law. Eljalill Tauschinsky is aPhD researcher at the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance.Author : acelg Print Institutions, Member States, Policy developments, transparency , Greek referendum No commentsLeave a ReplyYou must be logged in to post a comment.0 0 1ACELGProvides insights on European Law from an academic perspective. Discusses the latestdevelopments in the context of the surrounding legal and political systems as well as widerstructures of (global) governanceAdvertisement

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Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations

Maastricht University Research Portal

Willing to trust?: On Greek referendum and confidential negotiations

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl)UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential NegotiationsAbazi, V.; Tauschinsky, E.Publication date2015Document VersionFinal published versionLink to publicationCitation for published version (APA):Abazi, V. (Author), & Tauschinsky, E. (Author). (2015). Willing to Trust? : On GreekReferendum and Confidential Negotiations. Web publication or website, BlogActiv.https://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s)and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an opencontent license (like Creative Commons).Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, pleaselet the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the materialinaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letterto: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Youwill be contacted as soon as possible.Download date:15 Apr 2023Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations | ACELGhttps://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/[12-10-2016 17:19:10]About Newsletter Create your Blog Support LoginJuly 3, 2015Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum andConfidential NegotiationsIn the recent news about Greece, there is one issuethat keeps on resurfacing: trust. News reports willstate that there is a ‘trust gap’ between Greece andthe Troika, that creditors don’t trust Greece’s plansand the breakdown of the talks was ultimately causedby a lack of trust between the negotiating parties. Inan article we just published, we go more into thedetails of what trust is and how it works. Focusing onpublic access to information, we explain how a ‘trust’approach differs from the ‘control’ approach oftentaken, and how a regime catering for better access tomotivational information would do better on the trust axis. Motivational information means information ondecision makers, not only decisions; about what they want, not only what they do. These points are worthrecalling in the current European financial debate.By Vigjilenca Abazi and Eljalill TauschinskyOn Sunday 5 July, Greek citizens are faced with a key decision not only for their own fate but also for thedestiny of Europe. But what will they be saying No or Yes to? Since meetings mostly took place behindclosed doors, we know more about the blame–game between Brussels and Athens than the specificdecisions to be taken. Do we actually know the proposals at the negotiation table? Besides the legal andfinancial facts, do we know the motives of the main actors?As we have argued before, without transparency and clarity on who does what, when and how, it becomesdifficult for citizens to decipher how decisions that profoundly affect their lives are taken or what are thedecisive motives behind them.And this brings us full circle back to the news on Greece and trust. How are we to understand the allegedlack of trust in the confidential negotiations on the Greek crisis?The first thing to remember is that neither trust nor distrust are unchangeable facts. Trust might be morequickly destroyed than built, but it can be built and it can be destroyed.The second thing, and this is something we also emphatically stress in our article mentioned above, is thatno amount of control or factual information can build trust. Knowledge about past behaviour might helpWilling to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations | ACELGhttps://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/07/03/willing-to-trust-on-greek-referendum-and-confidential-negotiations/[12-10-2016 17:19:10]create or suspend suspicion, but it is not determinate for the creation of trust.Especially in the current volatile context, past behaviour is not necessarily the right tool to predict futuresuccess. Instead, the creation of trust is based on the willingness from the decision-makers to believe in thecharacter, ability, strength, and truth of the opposing negotiating party.In current European political leadership it is this willingness to trust which is core.But at the heart of the referendum lays even a harder choice: Given too little information, the Greek citizensare asked to take the leap of faith without knowing whether European responsibility will meet them. Vigjilenca Abazi is a senior researcher at the Maastricht Centre for European Law. Eljalill Tauschinsky is aPhD researcher at the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance.Author : acelg Print Institutions, Member States, Policy developments, transparency , Greek referendum No commentsLeave a ReplyYou must be logged in to post a comment.0 0 1ACELGProvides insights on European Law from an academic perspective. Discusses the latestdevelopments in the context of the surrounding legal and political systems as well as widerstructures of (global) governanceAdvertisement

Willing to Trust? : On Greek Referendum and Confidential Negotiations

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International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

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International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

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