We study a very small three player poker game (one-third street Kuhn poker), and a simplified version of the game that is interesting because it has three distinct equilibrium solutions. For one-third street Kuhn poker, we are able to find all of the equilibrium solutions analytically. For large enough pot size, P, there is a degree of freedom in the solution that allows one player to transfer profit between the other two players without changing their own profit. This has potentially interesting consequences in repeated play of the game. We also show that in a simplified version of the game with P>5, there is one equilibrium solution if 5Pβ. This may be the simplest non-trivial multiplayer poker game with more than one distinct equilibrium solution and provides us with a test case for theories of dynamic strategy adjustment over multiple realisations of the game.
We then study a third order system of ordinary differential equations that models the dynamics of three players who try to maximise their expectation by continuously varying their betting frequencies. We find that the dynamics of this system are oscillatory, with two distinct types of solution. We then study a difference equation model, based on repeated play of the game, in which each player continually updates their estimates of the other players' betting frequencies. We find that the dynamics are noisy, but basically oscillatory for short enough estimation periods and slow enough frequency adjustments, but that the dynamics can be very different for other parameter values
