This thesis examines German and Soviet operations in the Kuban area of southern Russia
during January – October 1943. As the bulk of German Army Group A withdrew from the
Caucasus in early 1943 to avoid encirclement following the Soviet counter-offensive at
Stalingrad, Seventeenth Army was ordered to hold a bridgehead on the Kuban Peninsula as
a jumping-off point for a future resumption of the German offensive into the Caucasus.
In early February, the Soviets attempted to eliminate the German bridgehead through a
combined amphibious and ground operation. The ground operation did not achieve any
significant gain, and the main amphibious landing operation was a catastrophic failure, but a
secondary landing succeeded in gaining a foothold in the southern suburbs of the port city of
Novorossiysk that was quickly expanded and became known as Malaya Zemlya (The Small
Land).
Early April saw the launch of Operation Neptune, a German effort to eliminate the Malaya
Zemlya beachhead. This failed utterly due to the weakness of the German assault groups
and the tenacious Soviet defence. The Soviets then launched a series of attempts through
the spring and summer to break the German line, with minimal success. The final phase of
operations in the Kuban was the withdrawal of Seventeenth Army by sea and air across the
Kerch Strait to the Crimea. Almost a quarter of a million men and the bulk of their equipment
were successfully evacuated, with very light losses.
The thesis examines some factors that contributed to the success or failure of these
operations and also considers why a region that was of key strategic interest in both German
and Soviet planning in the first period of the war quickly diminished in importance and has
been largely neglected in the published history of the war
