Review of  A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918  by Mark Osborne Humphries

Borys, David

English

Wilfrid Laurier University

Canadian Military HistoryVolume 28 | Issue 2 Article 410-2-2019Review of "A Weary Road: Shell Shock in theCanadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918" byMark Osborne HumphriesDavid BorysThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian MilitaryHistory by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.Recommended CitationBorys, David (2019) "Review of "A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918" by Mark OsborneHumphries," Canadian Military History: Vol. 28 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.Available at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/46 Book ReviewsMark Osborne Humphries. A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018. Pp. 461.Mark Osborne Humphries in A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 delivers a ground-breaking contribution to the understanding of the Canadian First World War experience. He delivers a painstakingly researched exploration into the treatment of ‘shell shock’ within the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) while also providing a window into how ‘shell shock’ became enmeshed within a developing and unique trench culture. Humphries effectively challenges long-held beliefs that the Great War was a watershed moment in the history of psychiatry as well as in the treatment of operational stress injuries (OSIs) and clearly argues that these beliefs (perpetuated initially by the very medical specialists that treated ‘shell shock’ during the war) do not stand up to academic scrutiny. There was, in fact, very little success in the treatment of OSIs during the war and, for the most part, military medical specialists manipulated their reports both during the war and afterwards to falsely claim success in treating OSIs and returning men to active duty. By the war’s end, any inability by the medical profession to treat OSIs was attributed to physiological defects within the patient himself and not with the treatment methods being used.Humphries begins his study by clarifying how ‘nervous illness’ entered the medical and cultural lexicon in the nineteenth century as a psycho-somatic disease, effectively meaning a combination of psychological and physiological factors. Certainly by the eve of the First World War, Humphries describes, the British military was aware of ‘nervous illness’ (due to experiences in South Africa and observed cases during the Russo-Japanese War) but deemed it to be relatively insignificant in terms of concerns over manpower wastage. The belief was that most cases had been managed effectively and a fairly efficient system was already in place to deal with future cases. As Humphries explains, however, some prescient observers highlighted the potential for widespread ‘nervous illness,’ especially in the case of a lengthy conflict requiring the conscription of civilians into the military ranks. Thus, while acknowledged as a reality of the modernising battlefield, OSIs were simply not a major concern for British high command.1Borys: Review of "A Weary Road" by Mark Osborne HumphriesPublished by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019  7C A N A D I A N  M I L I TA RY  H I S T O RY Humphries then moves on to the core of his book by tracing the evolution of ‘shell shock’ treatment within the CEF. The story of the CEF’s treatment of ‘shell shock’ is heavily influenced by policy set at British Expeditionary Force (BEF) senior command, thus Humphries adeptly weaves his study through a chronological exploration of changing BEF policy and how this policy was carried out at the sharp end within the CEF itself. Humphries shows that in 1914 and 1915 concerns over ‘nervous illness’ (or what was now starting to be widely called ‘shell shock’) were never significant enough to warrant any serious attention by senior command. It was not until the ‘shell shock’ crisis of 1916 (directly linked to the unprecedented carnage of the Somme Offensive) that the system practiced within the BEF, and in turn the CEF, was suddenly revealed as wholly inefficient in dealing with the growing number of ‘shell shock’ cases. At this point the loss in manpower from OSIs became a serious concern for Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and other senior commanders within the BEF. However, instead of focusing on the development of more effective treatment methods, BEF policy changes were geared towards returning men to active duty as quickly as possible. Many senior commanders felt that British military medical professionals (particularly the ones that were civilians prior to the war) were too lenient with ‘shell shock’ cases and steps were taken to delegitimise ‘shell shock’ as a wound, effectively trying to shame soldiers into not reporting symptoms while pressuring military doctors to actively stem the increasing casualty counts. From 1916 onwards then, a whole series of policy directives, treatment and triage centres, evacuation procedures, and classification systems were adopted, discarded, and manipulated in order to try and reduce the growing casualty numbers from OSIs. However, as Humphries clearly explains, none of this effectively dealt with the root problem: how to prevent, mitigate and cure OSIs. In fact, “[t]he actual health and well-being of soldiers was never part of the equation” as keeping men on active duty was the paramount objective (p. 319). By the end of the war, while more elaborate treatment methods were practiced and a broader support infrastructure had been established, the understanding and treatment of ‘shell shock’ had barely progressed. More concerning was that by 1918 victim blaming became all too common. Specialists argued that soldiers who were unable to heal simply lacked the appropriate (masculine) characteristics to do so. Effective treatment of OSIs 2Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 4https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/48 Book Reviewswould continue to pose problems for military medicine through the remainder of the twentieth century and quite frankly still do today.While the literature on ‘shell shock’ in Britain and the United States is voluminous, Canadian studies on the subject are few and far between. Humphries is arguably already the most well-versed academic exploring this topic and thus his book stands as the culmination of a number of his own previous studies. Humphries’ book also fits within the growing body of work by historian Tim Cook, who has delved deep into explorations of trench culture. As Humphries shows, ‘shell shock’ quickly became a part of trench culture and was used by doctors, officers and ordinary soldiers to describe a variety of reactions to combat. At the same time, the use of ‘shell shock’ was flexible, “capturing a range of symptoms or behaviours that could be seen as legitimate in one context or illegitimate in another – in one instance it could be a synonym for cowardice and in another a mark of bravery” (p. 314). Thus, the idea of ‘shell shock’ and the use of the term became important components of trench culture.A Weary Road is a crucial addition to Canadian military historiography. It is the most comprehensive study on the subject and is a must-read for any student of the Canadian First World War experience. The only minor critique of the book is that this reviewer was left wanting to know more about the post-war literature that spawned so many myths about the treatment of ‘shell shock.’ Because Humphries seeks to challenge much of what these texts say, and how they laid the groundwork for significant misunderstanding throughout the twentieth century, some review of the major works would have been helpful. However, it is recognised that this might have made the book too unwieldy as it is already fairly dense. Overall, a well-researched and well-written work that stands with the strongest of the newest First World War literature seeking to shed greater light on the Canadian war experience.david borys, langara college3Borys: Review of "A Weary Road" by Mark Osborne HumphriesPublished by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019

Scholars Commons

Canadian Military History
Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 4
10-2-2019
Review of "A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918" by
Mark Osborne Humphries
David Borys
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Borys, David (2019) "Review of "A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918" by Mark Osborne
Humphries," Canadian Military History: Vol. 28 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/4
6 Book Reviews
Mark Osborne Humphries. A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2018. Pp. 461.
Mark Osborne Humphries in A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 delivers a ground-breaking 
contribution to the understanding of the Canadian First World War 
experience. He delivers a painstakingly researched exploration into 
the treatment of ‘shell shock’ within the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (CEF) while also providing a window into how ‘shell shock’ 
became enmeshed within a developing and unique trench culture. 
Humphries effectively challenges long-held beliefs that the Great 
War was a watershed moment in the history of psychiatry as well 
as in the treatment of operational stress injuries (OSIs) and clearly 
argues that these beliefs (perpetuated initially by the very medical 
specialists that treated ‘shell shock’ during the war) do not stand 
up to academic scrutiny. There was, in fact, very little success in the 
treatment of OSIs during the war and, for the most part, military 
medical specialists manipulated their reports both during the war 
and afterwards to falsely claim success in treating OSIs and returning 
men to active duty. By the war’s end, any inability by the medical 
profession to treat OSIs was attributed to physiological defects within 
the patient himself and not with the treatment methods being used.
Humphries begins his study by clarifying how ‘nervous illness’ 
entered the medical and cultural lexicon in the nineteenth century 
as a psycho-somatic disease, effectively meaning a combination of 
psychological and physiological factors. Certainly by the eve of the 
First World War, Humphries describes, the British military was 
aware of ‘nervous illness’ (due to experiences in South Africa and 
observed cases during the Russo-Japanese War) but deemed it to be 
relatively insignificant in terms of concerns over manpower wastage. 
The belief was that most cases had been managed effectively and 
a fairly efficient system was already in place to deal with future 
cases. As Humphries explains, however, some prescient observers 
highlighted the potential for widespread ‘nervous illness,’ especially 
in the case of a lengthy conflict requiring the conscription of civilians 
into the military ranks. Thus, while acknowledged as a reality of the 
modernising battlefield, OSIs were simply not a major concern for 
British high command.
1
Borys: Review of "A Weary Road" by Mark Osborne Humphries
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
  7C A N A D I A N  M I L I TA RY  H I S T O RY 
Humphries then moves on to the core of his book by tracing the 
evolution of ‘shell shock’ treatment within the CEF. The story of the 
CEF’s treatment of ‘shell shock’ is heavily influenced by policy set at 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) senior command, thus Humphries 
adeptly weaves his study through a chronological exploration of 
changing BEF policy and how this policy was carried out at the 
sharp end within the CEF itself. Humphries shows that in 1914 and 
1915 concerns over ‘nervous illness’ (or what was now starting to be 
widely called ‘shell shock’) were never significant enough to warrant 
any serious attention by senior command. It was not until the ‘shell 
shock’ crisis of 1916 (directly linked to the unprecedented carnage 
of the Somme Offensive) that the system practiced within the BEF, 
and in turn the CEF, was suddenly revealed as wholly inefficient 
in dealing with the growing number of ‘shell shock’ cases. At this 
point the loss in manpower from OSIs became a serious concern 
for Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and other senior commanders 
within the BEF. However, instead of focusing on the development of 
more effective treatment methods, BEF policy changes were geared 
towards returning men to active duty as quickly as possible. Many 
senior commanders felt that British military medical professionals 
(particularly the ones that were civilians prior to the war) were too 
lenient with ‘shell shock’ cases and steps were taken to delegitimise 
‘shell shock’ as a wound, effectively trying to shame soldiers into 
not reporting symptoms while pressuring military doctors to actively 
stem the increasing casualty counts. From 1916 onwards then, a whole 
series of policy directives, treatment and triage centres, evacuation 
procedures, and classification systems were adopted, discarded, and 
manipulated in order to try and reduce the growing casualty numbers 
from OSIs. However, as Humphries clearly explains, none of this 
effectively dealt with the root problem: how to prevent, mitigate and 
cure OSIs. In fact, “[t]he actual health and well-being of soldiers 
was never part of the equation” as keeping men on active duty was 
the paramount objective (p. 319). By the end of the war, while more 
elaborate treatment methods were practiced and a broader support 
infrastructure had been established, the understanding and treatment 
of ‘shell shock’ had barely progressed. More concerning was that 
by 1918 victim blaming became all too common. Specialists argued 
that soldiers who were unable to heal simply lacked the appropriate 
(masculine) characteristics to do so. Effective treatment of OSIs 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 28 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol28/iss2/4
8 Book Reviews
would continue to pose problems for military medicine through the 
remainder of the twentieth century and quite frankly still do today.
While the literature on ‘shell shock’ in Britain and the United 
States is voluminous, Canadian studies on the subject are few and 
far between. Humphries is arguably already the most well-versed 
academic exploring this topic and thus his book stands as the 
culmination of a number of his own previous studies. Humphries’ book 
also fits within the growing body of work by historian Tim Cook, who 
has delved deep into explorations of trench culture. As Humphries 
shows, ‘shell shock’ quickly became a part of trench culture and was 
used by doctors, officers and ordinary soldiers to describe a variety 
of reactions to combat. At the same time, the use of ‘shell shock’ was 
flexible, “capturing a range of symptoms or behaviours that could be 
seen as legitimate in one context or illegitimate in another – in one 
instance it could be a synonym for cowardice and in another a mark 
of bravery” (p. 314). Thus, the idea of ‘shell shock’ and the use of the 
term became important components of trench culture.
A Weary Road is a crucial addition to Canadian military 
historiography. It is the most comprehensive study on the subject 
and is a must-read for any student of the Canadian First World War 
experience. The only minor critique of the book is that this reviewer 
was left wanting to know more about the post-war literature that 
spawned so many myths about the treatment of ‘shell shock.’ Because 
Humphries seeks to challenge much of what these texts say, and how 
they laid the groundwork for significant misunderstanding throughout 
the twentieth century, some review of the major works would have 
been helpful. However, it is recognised that this might have made 
the book too unwieldy as it is already fairly dense. Overall, a well-
researched and well-written work that stands with the strongest of 
the newest First World War literature seeking to shed greater light 
on the Canadian war experience.
david borys, langara college
3
Borys: Review of "A Weary Road" by Mark Osborne Humphries
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019


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Review of A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 by Mark Osborne Humphries

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