Social partners’ bargaining strategies in Germany and Spain after the introduction of the Euro: a morphogenetic perspective on corporate agency

Abstract

This article addresses how far wage imbalances in the Eurozone can be imputable to intentional agency by collective bargaining organisations. Using Archer’s morphogenetic approach, we explain the agentic role of social partners in core (Germany) and periphery (Spain) cases, in relation with the respective collective bargaining regimes. We show that the capacity of macro- and meso-level organisations to effect wage-setting practices can be constrained inadvertently by contextual influences with morphostatic properties, generating constrained modes of corporate agency. Yet wage moderation is best understood as a form of agency itself, functioning ‘by being’ rather than ‘doing’, which over time can become more innovative. We contrast this finding with the less constrained capacity of more institutionalized corporate agents, such as transnational business corporations and central state agencies

    Similar works