Wireless network technologies offer ubiquitous broadband access to millions of users at an affordable cost. However, the broadband nature of the wireless medium make these networks vulnerable to a number of attacks. Malicious interference at the physical layer, and extended packet collisions at the medium access layer can cause significant DoS attacks. In this work, we show how off-the-shelf hardware can be used to create devastating DoS attacks in a IEEE 802.11 network. Moreover, we present two algorithms for attack detection that are based on the cumulative sum algorithm. © 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

Askoxylakis, Ioannis

Chatziadam, P.

Fragkiadakis, A.G.

Bournemouth University Research Online

Denial-of-Service Attacks in Wireless Networksusing off-the-shelf HardwareAlexandros Fragkiadakis?, Ioannis Askoxylakis, Panos ChatziadamInstitute of Computer Science, Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas(FORTH)P.O. Box 1385, GR 711 10 Heraklion, Crete, Greece{alfrag,asko,panosc}@ics.forth.grAbstract. Wireless network technologies offer ubiquitous broadbandaccess to millions of users at an affordable cost. However, the broad-band nature of the wireless medium make these networks vulnerable toa number of attacks. Malicious interference at the physical layer, andextended packet collisions at the medium access layer can cause signifi-cant DoS attacks. In this work, we show how off-the-shelf hardware canbe used to create devastating DoS attacks in a IEEE 802.11 network.Moreover, we present two algorithms for attack detection that are basedon the cumulative sum algorithm.1 IntroductionNetwork proliferation has been remarkable, especially during the last decade.Technology advancements in the area of network communications have offeredhigh performance improvement and ubiquitous Internet access. From the era ofthe early-stage communication protocols (e.g. Aloha) through the active net-works [1], and software-defined networks [2], ubiquitous network access has beenachieved thanks to the advances in wireless technologies. A number of commu-nication protocols (IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.16, etc.) enable en-ergy efficient communications in relatively large distances. Thousands of smartphones and other wireless clients can now enjoy any-time any-where Internetconnectivity.Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium make wirelesscommunications susceptible to a number of threats. Adversaries can cause se-vere Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) by exploiting a number of vulnerabilities.DoS attacks pose a major threat in every communication system, often withcatastrophic results as wireless communications are nowadays used in many ap-plications (e.g. smart cards [3]). At the physical layer, adversaries can gener-ate malicious interference resulting in heavy packet loss in the network. At themedium access (MAC) layer, malicious users can create extended packet colis-sions, causing severe DoS attacks in the wireless network. Throughout this workwe refer to adversaries and malicious users as jammers.? Corresponding authorOur contribution focuses on showing how off-the-shelf equipment can be usedto create DoS attacks at the physical, and medium access layers. We also presenttwo algorithms for the detection of these attacks. The rest of this paper is orga-nized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic components of our off-the-shelfjammer. Section 3 describes how malicious interference can be used to create DoSattacks. In Section 4 we demonstrate how extended packet colissions are easilycaused by jammers, and how greedy behaviors affect network’s performance. Sec-tion 5 presents two algorithms for attack detection based on the cumulative-sumalgorith. Finally, conclusions appear in Section 6.2 Off-the-shelf hardware for malicious purposesAs mentioned in the previous section, wireless networks, due to their broad-cast nature, are susceptible to a number of threats. A major threat referred asphysical-layer jamming refers to interference created by a malicious node. Thereis a number of commercial devices that can be used for this purpose (e.g. [4–6]).Nevertheless, as we show in this paper, off-the-shelf hardware can be successfullyused to launch severe DoS attacks in a wireless network.Our jamming equipment is based on a mini-ITX board (Fig. 1) carrying 512MB of RAM with a 80 GB disk. The wireless interface cards are based on theAtheros 802.11a/b/g CM9-GP mini-PCI card. Furthermore, Ath5k [7], an opensource IEEE 802.11 driver is used, on Gentoo Linux.Fig. 1: Off-the-shelf jamming deviceThe software part of the jammer is shown in Fig. 2. This consists of severalcomponents implemented in both the kernel and user spaces of the Linux op-erating system. At user-space, the command repository contains all the attackcharacteristics. These define a detailed adversary model to be used against awireless network. Such a typical model can describe, for example, the wirelesschannel to be attacked, the attack intensity in terms of packet rate, transmis-sion power, attack duration, etc. Commands are propagated through the netlinksocket interface to kernel-space, stored in the command trace collection modulethat provides buffering capabilities. Finally, the characteristics of the adversarymodel are used to setup several parameters of the Ath5k driver in order to makean attack feasible.CommandRepositoryUnix TimeCommand Trace CollectionNetlink Socket InterfaceAth5K DriverKernel SpaceUser SpaceFig. 2: Jammer software layout3 Physical-layer attacksA major threat in wireless networks is interference that is caused by signal emis-sions in neighboring channels. In general, interference can be characterized asmalicious or non-malicious, depending on the incentives of the interferer. Non-malicious interference can be caused by nearby legitimate nodes that operatein neighboring channels ([8]). Malicious physical-layer interference (jamming) iscreated by signal emissions in neighboring channels. This affects both the trans-mitters and the receivers of a wireless network. IEEE 802.11 transmitters sensethe wireless medium before any transmission takes place. If the measured noiseis above a threshold, they refrain from transmission for some random time. So,if a jammer is present, the transmission operations of the legitimate nodes canbe heavily disrupted, hence DoS attacks become feasible. On the other hand,legitimate receivers cannot correctly detect and decode incoming packets in thepresence of jammer. This is due to the excessive noise generated in their vicin-ity that leads to an extensive packet loss. Moreover, as packets are lost in thenetwork, further retransmissions by the transmitters take place causing severenetwork disruption.In order to demonstrate the effects of physical-layer jamming we use a singleoff-the-shelf jammer with characteristics as described in Section 2. The specifictype of jammer does not follow any rules of the IEEE 802.11 protocol, so itfreely performs jamming even if legitimate transmissions are taking place. Wesetup a network of four legitimate nodes: Sender, Receiver, Monitor1, and Mon-itor2. Packets flow from Sender to Receiver, while periodic jamming using thefrequency of the neighboring channel is taking place. Receiver, Monitor1, andMonitor2 record the packets that belong to the legitimate traffic, and for everyrecorded packet, the SINR (Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio) is computed,taking into account the power leakage in the neighboring channels as describedin [9]. Fig. 3 shows how SINR substantially drops during the jamming attacks(symbolized by the orthogonal boxes at the bottom of each graph).0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 120001020304050Time (secs)SINR(db)Receiver0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 120001020304050Time (secs)SINR(db)Monitor20 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 120001020304050Time (secs)SINR(db)Monitor1AttacksFig. 3: SINR variations during the jamming attacksWhen SINR significantly drops, a wireless receiver often becomes unableto detect and further decode a transmitted packet. This results to packet loss,throughput degradation, as well as energy waste, as transmitters keep re-transmittingpackets. Fig. 4 shows the retry attempts of the transmitter (Sender), the through-put at the Receiver, and the total packet loss in the network when a jammer ispresent. Retry attempts increase up to five times during jamming, while through-put drops to about 1 Mbps (from 15 Mbps when no jamming takes place), andpacket loss increases over 60%.0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 12000481216Time (secs)Throughput (Mbps)0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200020406080Time (secs)Packet loss (%)0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200012345Time(secs)RetriesAttacksFig. 4: Performance degradation during the jamming attacks4 MAC layer attacksIEEE 802.11 is a CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple access with collision avoid-ance) based medium access protocol. Each potential transmitter has to first sensethe wireless medium, and if it is free, transmission takes place. However, if themedium is occupied, it has to enter a back-off stage where it waits for someamount of time before repeating the same procedure (sensing, etc) [10].4.1 Denial-of-service attacks through packet collisionsAttackers can exploit the CSMA/CA mechanism of IEEE 802.11 by emitting en-ergy when the wireless medium is occupied by a legitimate node. At this point,jammer emits energy on the same channel legitimate nodes use for communica-tion, aiming to cause packet collisions and to degrade network’s performance.Packet collisions refer to captured packets that mainly suffer from CRC (cyclicredundancy check) errors. Fig. 5 shows the ratio of the corrupted packets (CRCerrors) over the correctly decoded ones, captured in a single receiver when aperiodic jammer is present. Jammer operates on the same channel used for thelegitimate communication. Observe that the ratio exceeds 60% when jammingtraffic is emitted. This is a severe DoS attack as corrupted packets are essentiallylost packets that the sender will attempt to re-transmit up to a number of times(retry limit).Next, we demonstrate how jamming on the same channel affects the perfor-mance of video transmission in the wireless network. For this reason, we set up0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 30001020304050607080Time (secs)Corrupted packets/correctly decoded (%)Fig. 5: Ratio of corrupted packets over the correctly decoded onesa testbed consisting of a video server, a video client and the jammer describedin Section 2. Encoded MPEG-4 video is transmitted from server to client us-ing RTP/UDP packets. Periodic jamming takes place in the network. We mea-sure video’s performance using PSNR (Peak-Signal-to-Noise Ratio), an objectivequality metric widely used to measure video performance. Supposing there aretwo m×n images S and D, where S is the original image and D the reconstructedimage, the PSNR of this image is given by:PSNR = 20× log10 Vpeak√MSE(1)where V peak is its maximum value (e.g. 255 for 8-bit encoding), and MSEis the mean squared error given by:MSE =1m× nm−1∑i=0n−1∑j=0[S(i, j)−D(i, j)]2 (2)Fig. 6 [11] shows the PSNR for each received video frame, and for two exper-iments: (i) when no jamming is used (No Jam), and (ii) when jammer is activeperiodically for a duration of 80 seconds (Jam). Observe that PSNR significantlydrops when jamming is taking place.4.2 Greedy behaviorThe CSMA/CA mechanism of IEEE 802.11 requires that potential transmittersshould wait for some time when the wireless medium is busy in order to decreasethe colission probability. The waiting time (back-off time) is chosen uniformlyFig. 6: PSNR per framein the interval [0 − CW ], where CW is the contention window size. Initially,CW equals CWmin, that is the minimum contention window. Each time a nodefinds the wireless medium busy, it doubles CW up to CWmax. When a sucessfultransmission takes place, CW redudes to CWmin.This mechanism can be exploited by a malicious (or greedy) node assigninga very small value to its CWmin. With a small CWmin, the malicious node canmonopolize the medium and make the legitimate nodes entering the back-offstage repeatedly. Fig. 7 shows the throughput achieved by four wireless nodeswhen all attempt to transmit a UDP flow of 200 Kbytes to a single access point,without the presence of a greedy node.Next, Node1 becomes greedy by periodically assigning a very small value toits CWmin. Repeating the same experiment, in Fig. 8 we show that Node1’sthroughput increases from about 200 Kbytes/sec to 350 Kbytes/sec while thethroughput of the rest of the nodes falls almost to 100 Kbytes/sec. Node1 be-comes greedy every 10 seconds for a duration of 10 seconds. After that period,it stops behaving greedy by assigning a proper value to its CWmin.Such greedy behaviors negatively affect legitimate nodes performance reduc-ing the fairness of the wireless system. Fairness is related to the ability of theMAC layer to equitably share a common channel between a number of contend-ing nodes [12]. Jain’s fairness index [13] is widely used as a metric to measurethe fairness of a system. Assuming that N is the number of competing flows andγi the fraction of packets from node i that arrived within a time window, Jain’sindex is defined as follows:0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node20 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Time (secs)Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node40 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node3Fig. 7: Throughput with the absence of a greedy node0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node20 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node30 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200100200300400Time (secs)Throughput (Kbytes/sec)Node4GreedyGreedy Greedy Greedy GreedyGreedyFig. 8: Throughput with the presence of a greedy node (Node1)F =(N∑i=1γi)2N ×N∑i=1γ2i(3)When F = 1 perfect fairness is achieved, while when F = 1N absolute unfairnessis achieved.Fig. 9a shows how the fairness of the network drops when one of the nodesbecomes greedy. Observe that as the number of flows decreases, the drop infairness increases. This is because less nodes content for the medium, hence it iseasier for the greedy node to monopolize it by selecting a small CWmin value.On the other hand, if no greedy node is present, fairness increases, for all flows(Fig. 9b).0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200.70.750.80.850.90.951Time (secs)Fairness  16 flows 8 flows 4 flows(a) When a greedy node is present0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1200.70.750.80.850.90.951Time (secs)Fairness  16 flows 8 flows 4 flows(b) When a greedy node is absentFig. 9: Fairness for a different number of flows5 Attack detectionIn this section we describe techniques for the detection of physical-layer jamming,and collisions at the MAC layer. As shown in Fig. 3, jamming causes extendedSINR drops. Based on this, we deploy a cumulative-sum (cusum) algorithm [14]able to detect abrupt changes of the SINR. In previous works [15, 11, 16, 17] weshow that maximum performance, in terms of false alarms/detection probability,is achieved when considering the maximum minus the minimum values of SINRwithin a short and long windows. Cusum is defined as:yn ={yn−1 + Zn − a if yn ≥ 00 if yn < 0(4)Zn is the expectation of a specific metric that changes whenever jamming takesplace (in our case the SINR-based metric), and a ∈ R+ controls its drift. Fur-thermore, Zn is given by Zn = D(n)− D¯(n), whereD(n) = maxn−K+1<i≤nxi − minn−K+1<i≤nxi ,andD¯(n) =∑ni=n−M+1D(i)M,During the jamming attacks, cusum’s output increases as shown in Fig. 10, andwhen it exceeds a predefined threshold, an alarm is raised.0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200050100150200250300Time (secs)Cusum’s outputAttacksFig. 10: Cusum’s outputWe use the same technique for the detection of MAC layer attacks in caseswhere an adversary causes packet colissions in the network. Rather than usingthe SINR as metric for the cusum, we consider the ratio of the corrupted packetsover the correctly decoded ones (Fig. 4). Cusum’s output increases similarly asin Fig. 10 indicating the attack.6 ConclusionsIn this paper we demonstrated how commodity hardware can be used as jammerand severely affect network’s performance. At the physical layer, jammer can cre-ate malicious interference that substantially degrades network performance. Atthe MAC layer, jammer can create extended packet collisions by energy emis-sion when legitimate wireless traffic is being transmitted. Furthermore, a greedynode by exploiting the back-off mechanism of IEEE 802.11, can monopolize themedium, restricting network resources to the non-misbehaving nodes.Efficient detection of these attacks is feasible by considering an SINR-basedmetric at the physical layer, and the ratio of the corrupted packets over thecorrectly decodes ones at the MAC layer. 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