Is a liberal framework of individual rights sufficient to make
sense of the harms of wrongful discrimination, and can such a
framework provide effective remedies for those harms?
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Abstract
Liberalism holds that each of us is entitled to certain rights necessary for our freedom and autonomy, including rights protecting our property and person, a right to deliberative freedom, and to freedom of association. A liberal understanding of wrongful discrimination (‘discrimination’) is predicated on a rights-based analysis of what discrimination is. Thus anti-discrimination law is characterised as an interference with deliberative freedom, and a failure to respect autonomy. A rights-based response to discrimination is cast in terms of the protection and enforcement of rights, but a liberal concern with rightsconflict
and unjustified state coercion is used to defend the limited scope of anti-discrimination law. I argue that anti-discrimination law fails to protect the victims of discrimination in the exercise of their rights, or otherwise to remedy the harms of discrimination.
I rely on Hohfeld’s conceptual account of the form of rights, noting the basic two-party jural relationship, the strict correlativity between specific rights and
duties, the powers associated with rights, and the distinction between in rem and in personam remedies. I argue that a liberal framework of individual rights
does not provide a conceptual or practical basis for a remedial response to discrimination. I question the enforcement of moral rights that have no legal
rights analogue, but argue in any event that anti-discrimination rights-remedies – legal or moral – are generally only compensatory rather than remedial. They
do not put a rights-holder who suffers discrimination in the same position as a rights-holder who is not discriminated against, and is able to enjoy her rights
freely, subject only to permissible interference. I argue that discrimination requires a remedial response based on a causal rather than a simply moralised, rights-based analysis of its harm