Review of Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 by Lise Namika

Bertosa, Brian

English

Wilfrid Laurier University

Canadian Military HistoryVolume 25 | Issue 2 Article 511-4-2016“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo,1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise NamikasBrian BertosaThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian MilitaryHistory by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.Recommended CitationBertosa, Brian (2016) "“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise Namikas," CanadianMilitary History: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 5.Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5  9c a n a d i a n  m i l i ta ry  h i s t o ryReview of Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). Pp. 350.Between 30 June 1960, when the Congo formally gained its independence from Belgium, and 24 November 1965, when Joseph Mobutu—better known as Mobutu Sese Seko—began his thirty-two-year kleptocracy, the Congo was one of the world’s foremost trouble spots.  The outgoing Belgians had done virtually nothing to prepare their colony for independence, all the better to argue against it in the first place, and, when the République du Congo became a fait accompli, to argue for their continued indispensability to the new state.  The result was a disaster by any standard.  By the end of the first week the Force publique, soon to be renamed the Armée nationale congolaise, had mutinied, disintegrating into armed bands that, among other things, menaced the remaining Europeans.  The Belgians reacted by sending in troops starting on July 10.  On the eleventh, the mineral-rich province of Katanga in the south-east of the country seceded, taking with it approximately eighty per cent of the nation’s tax revenue.  On the fourteenth, in response to what the new Congolese leaders called Belgium’s “aggression” but also to the growing lawlessness on the ground, the United Nations Security Council, in the first of many resolutions on the Congo, approved a peacekeeping mission, onus (Organisation des Nations unies au Congo), that would end up staying almost four years.  And all of this took place in just the first two weeks of independence.As the anarchy spread, a dizzying number of intersecting lines of cleavage—some present, barely suppressed, under the Belgians, some new—became apparent between competing politicians, political parties, ethnicities, and regions, playing on a stage that never remained static for long.  One of these conflicts, however, stands out for its importance.  On the one hand were the followers of Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the new nation and the only politician who could even come close to claiming a national following.  Dynamic and articulate, Lumumba’s pro-independence stance necessarily put him at odds with Belgium, who in turn painted him as an enemy of the West.  Among the many in the Congo who opposed Lumumba were those who, although by no means secessionist—Katanga had very close ties to the Belgians—were nevertheless wary of the stridency of Lumumba’s anti-Western 1Bertosa: Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 201610 Book Reviewsrhetoric.  Sharing little in the way of a concrete political program save for a quick return to order, this group soon coalesced around the figure of Joseph Mobutu, at this time a colonel in the Armée nationale congolaise.  Within the specifically Congolese context, this rivalry could scarcely be described as an East-West conflict at all—arguably, what divided these two groups the most was the nature of the continued relationship, if any, the new nation was to have with Belgium.  Nevertheless, within the context of the Cold War in 1960, nothing more than this was needed to prompt the United States and the Soviet Union to quickly take sides in this new arena for their ongoing ideological conflict.Published as part of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project, Battleground Africa by Lise Namikas is an impressively researched study of the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union towards the Congo from the period just before independence to Mobutu’s 1965 coup, at which time the Soviets realized they could have no further influence there.  As such, it offers a much greater chronological range than the many books dealing with this period that focus, understandably, on the figure of Patrice Lumumba, in many ways an African version of Chile’s Salvador Allende. Lumumba’s assassination in January 1961 marks the point at which these books generally stop.1  Another important aspect to be noted is the author’s use of newly available archival material from Germany, the United States, and particularly Russia, providing the most thorough account yet of the specifically Cold War aspects of the Congo crisis.On the American side, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was furious over the “loss” of Cuba to communism, and with the new republics of Guinea and Ghana leaning heavily to the left, Eisenhower saw Lumumba as another Castro.  He also had no intention of alienating Belgium, a key nato ally in Europe.2  His successor, John F. Kennedy, was more willing to risk this, wanting to demonstrate an openness to the aspirations of emerging nations in Africa and Asia.  Lyndon B. Johnson, on the other hand, wanted as little to 1   Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015) is the most recent work on the assassination, containing much else besides. Its “Essay on Sources” discusses everything of importance in English, French, and Dutch. 2   A Belgian, Paul-Henri Spaak, served as secretary general of NATO from 1957 to 1961.2Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5  11c a n a d i a n  m i l i ta ry  h i s t o rydo with Africa as possible.  But despite these differences of style, the substance of American policy in the Congo remained remarkable consistent from Eisenhower onwards.  This comprised, on the one hand, a concerted push to get rid of Lumumba, and when this in fact proved to have changed little, continued opposition to his followers. On the other was the promotion, wherever possible, of the fortunes of Colonel Mobutu.  Inasmuch as Mobutu eventually emerged triumphant, it can be said that the Americans achieved their Cold War aims in the Congo.The Soviets viewed the request for aid they received from the new Congolese government as an opportunity to gain a foothold in a place where they essentially had none.  Helping Lumumba, who was already viewed worldwide on the left as an anti-imperialist crusader, would help cement their role as the foremost source of aid and encouragement to decolonizing peoples around the world—important at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was growing ever wider.  Premier Nikita Khrushchev was quick to bluster on the world stage about Western aggression in the Congo, but in reality was reluctant to commit anything very substantial in terms of aid.  The Soviet Union was relatively poor, there were much more important priorities closer to home, and, above all, there was no guarantee that the effort would prove worthwhile.  The Soviets were very much the underdog in that part of the world and they knew it; whatever aid they provided could end up a dead loss in the event that Western interests prevailed and that is exactly what happened.  Recently released documents from Russia reveal just how little Khrushchev was willing to gamble in the Congo in terms of money, material, and personnel, but Belgian exaggeration and American paranoia consistently made it out to be vastly greater than it was.This period of the Congo’s history is extremely complex and it is impossible to examine its purely Cold War aspects without discussing a great deal else.  Namikas does an excellent job of first taking apart all the important strands of this tapestry, examining each of them in turn, and then showing how they all go back together.  She is particularly strong on Lumumba, which was arguably not strictly necessary here due to the large amount of material available on 3Bertosa: Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 201612 Book Reviewshim, even including a feature film.3  Despite its title, Battleground Africa deals entirely with politics; armed engagements are described in summary fashion and what is examined are their results, not the details.  Among the few weaknesses of this book, one of the most noticeable is the author’s use—on her own account, not in quotations from Soviet or Chinese sources—of terms like “the imperialists,” “imperialist aggression,” and “reactionary figures,” rather than more neutral and precise terms such as “right-wing,” “anti-communist,” or even “friendly to the us.”  A couple of the photo captions are not quite right: the worst is figure 4.2, “United Nations Forces in the Congo, July 27, 1960” (p. 75), depicting in reality a well-attended parade of troops marching through what can only be Dublin on a wet day (the Irish provided an important contingent to onuc). The overall presentation is very much a document-based approach, with the narrative tone of a dispassionate observer at a remove of decades from the events described.  Had the author taken the opportunity for some lengthy quotations from the many sources available to her to put the reader “in the shoes” of some of the protagonists, the account would certainly have been livelier.  That being said, the author writes as if she intends the book to become the work of record for this subject for a long time to come, and I believe it should.  While no single-volume work could possibly do justice to all the many actors in this drama—and many, of necessity, are only mentioned in passing4—for anyone wishing to go beyond January 1961 in the Congo Battleground Africa is essential reading.brian bertosa, independent researcher3  Lumumba (2000), by the Haitian director Raoul Peck, is a riveting account of its protagonist’s rise and fall and a visually stunning evocation of that time period, highly recommended to those who may not have the time to devote to an entire book on the subject.  4  This includes a few fleeting mentions of Canada.4Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5

“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise Namikas

Scholars Commons

Canadian Military History
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 5
11-4-2016
“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo,
1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise Namikas
Brian Bertosa
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Bertosa, Brian (2016) "“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise Namikas," Canadian
Military History: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5
  9c a n a d i a n  m i l i ta ry  h i s t o ry
Review of Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the 
Congo, 1960–1965 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). Pp. 350.
Between 30 June 1960, when the Congo formally gained its 
independence from Belgium, and 24 November 1965, when Joseph 
Mobutu—better known as Mobutu Sese Seko—began his thirty-two-
year kleptocracy, the Congo was one of the world’s foremost trouble 
spots.  The outgoing Belgians had done virtually nothing to prepare 
their colony for independence, all the better to argue against it in 
the first place, and, when the République du Congo became a fait 
accompli, to argue for their continued indispensability to the new 
state.  The result was a disaster by any standard.  By the end of 
the first week the Force publique, soon to be renamed the Armée 
nationale congolaise, had mutinied, disintegrating into armed bands 
that, among other things, menaced the remaining Europeans.  The 
Belgians reacted by sending in troops starting on July 10.  On the 
eleventh, the mineral-rich province of Katanga in the south-east of 
the country seceded, taking with it approximately eighty per cent 
of the nation’s tax revenue.  On the fourteenth, in response to what 
the new Congolese leaders called Belgium’s “aggression” but also to 
the growing lawlessness on the ground, the United Nations Security 
Council, in the first of many resolutions on the Congo, approved 
a peacekeeping mission, onus (Organisation des Nations unies au 
Congo), that would end up staying almost four years.  And all of this 
took place in just the first two weeks of independence.
As the anarchy spread, a dizzying number of intersecting lines 
of cleavage—some present, barely suppressed, under the Belgians, 
some new—became apparent between competing politicians, political 
parties, ethnicities, and regions, playing on a stage that never 
remained static for long.  One of these conflicts, however, stands out 
for its importance.  On the one hand were the followers of Patrice 
Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the 
new nation and the only politician who could even come close to 
claiming a national following.  Dynamic and articulate, Lumumba’s 
pro-independence stance necessarily put him at odds with Belgium, 
who in turn painted him as an enemy of the West.  Among the many 
in the Congo who opposed Lumumba were those who, although by no 
means secessionist—Katanga had very close ties to the Belgians—
were nevertheless wary of the stridency of Lumumba’s anti-Western 
1
Bertosa: Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
10 Book Reviews
rhetoric.  Sharing little in the way of a concrete political program 
save for a quick return to order, this group soon coalesced around 
the figure of Joseph Mobutu, at this time a colonel in the Armée 
nationale congolaise.  Within the specifically Congolese context, this 
rivalry could scarcely be described as an East-West conflict at all—
arguably, what divided these two groups the most was the nature of 
the continued relationship, if any, the new nation was to have with 
Belgium.  Nevertheless, within the context of the Cold War in 1960, 
nothing more than this was needed to prompt the United States and 
the Soviet Union to quickly take sides in this new arena for their 
ongoing ideological conflict.
Published as part of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International 
History Project, Battleground Africa by Lise Namikas is an 
impressively researched study of the policies of the United States 
and the Soviet Union towards the Congo from the period just before 
independence to Mobutu’s 1965 coup, at which time the Soviets 
realized they could have no further influence there.  As such, it offers 
a much greater chronological range than the many books dealing 
with this period that focus, understandably, on the figure of Patrice 
Lumumba, in many ways an African version of Chile’s Salvador 
Allende. Lumumba’s assassination in January 1961 marks the point 
at which these books generally stop.1  Another important aspect to 
be noted is the author’s use of newly available archival material from 
Germany, the United States, and particularly Russia, providing the 
most thorough account yet of the specifically Cold War aspects of 
the Congo crisis.
On the American side, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was 
furious over the “loss” of Cuba to communism, and with the new 
republics of Guinea and Ghana leaning heavily to the left, Eisenhower 
saw Lumumba as another Castro.  He also had no intention of 
alienating Belgium, a key nato ally in Europe.2  His successor, John 
F. Kennedy, was more willing to risk this, wanting to demonstrate 
an openness to the aspirations of emerging nations in Africa and 
Asia.  Lyndon B. Johnson, on the other hand, wanted as little to 
1   Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice 
Lumumba (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015) is the most recent work 
on the assassination, containing much else besides. Its “Essay on Sources” discusses 
everything of importance in English, French, and Dutch. 
2   A Belgian, Paul-Henri Spaak, served as secretary general of NATO from 1957 
to 1961.
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5
  11c a n a d i a n  m i l i ta ry  h i s t o ry
do with Africa as possible.  But despite these differences of style, 
the substance of American policy in the Congo remained remarkable 
consistent from Eisenhower onwards.  This comprised, on the one 
hand, a concerted push to get rid of Lumumba, and when this in fact 
proved to have changed little, continued opposition to his followers. 
On the other was the promotion, wherever possible, of the fortunes 
of Colonel Mobutu.  Inasmuch as Mobutu eventually emerged 
triumphant, it can be said that the Americans achieved their Cold 
War aims in the Congo.
The Soviets viewed the request for aid they received from the 
new Congolese government as an opportunity to gain a foothold in a 
place where they essentially had none.  Helping Lumumba, who was 
already viewed worldwide on the left as an anti-imperialist crusader, 
would help cement their role as the foremost source of aid and 
encouragement to decolonizing peoples around the world—important 
at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was growing ever wider.  Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev was quick to bluster on the world stage about 
Western aggression in the Congo, but in reality was reluctant to 
commit anything very substantial in terms of aid.  The Soviet Union 
was relatively poor, there were much more important priorities closer 
to home, and, above all, there was no guarantee that the effort would 
prove worthwhile.  The Soviets were very much the underdog in that 
part of the world and they knew it; whatever aid they provided could 
end up a dead loss in the event that Western interests prevailed and 
that is exactly what happened.  Recently released documents from 
Russia reveal just how little Khrushchev was willing to gamble in 
the Congo in terms of money, material, and personnel, but Belgian 
exaggeration and American paranoia consistently made it out to be 
vastly greater than it was.
This period of the Congo’s history is extremely complex and it is 
impossible to examine its purely Cold War aspects without discussing 
a great deal else.  Namikas does an excellent job of first taking apart 
all the important strands of this tapestry, examining each of them 
in turn, and then showing how they all go back together.  She is 
particularly strong on Lumumba, which was arguably not strictly 
necessary here due to the large amount of material available on 
3
Bertosa: Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
12 Book Reviews
him, even including a feature film.3  Despite its title, Battleground 
Africa deals entirely with politics; armed engagements are described 
in summary fashion and what is examined are their results, not the 
details.  Among the few weaknesses of this book, one of the most 
noticeable is the author’s use—on her own account, not in quotations 
from Soviet or Chinese sources—of terms like “the imperialists,” 
“imperialist aggression,” and “reactionary figures,” rather than more 
neutral and precise terms such as “right-wing,” “anti-communist,” 
or even “friendly to the us.”  A couple of the photo captions are not 
quite right: the worst is figure 4.2, “United Nations Forces in the 
Congo, July 27, 1960” (p. 75), depicting in reality a well-attended 
parade of troops marching through what can only be Dublin on a wet 
day (the Irish provided an important contingent to onuc). 
The overall presentation is very much a document-based 
approach, with the narrative tone of a dispassionate observer at a 
remove of decades from the events described.  Had the author taken 
the opportunity for some lengthy quotations from the many sources 
available to her to put the reader “in the shoes” of some of the 
protagonists, the account would certainly have been livelier.  That 
being said, the author writes as if she intends the book to become the 
work of record for this subject for a long time to come, and I believe 
it should.  While no single-volume work could possibly do justice to 
all the many actors in this drama—and many, of necessity, are only 
mentioned in passing4—for anyone wishing to go beyond January 
1961 in the Congo Battleground Africa is essential reading.
brian bertosa, independent researcher
3  Lumumba (2000), by the Haitian director Raoul Peck, is a riveting account of 
its protagonist’s rise and fall and a visually stunning evocation of that time period, 
highly recommended to those who may not have the time to devote to an entire book 
on the subject.  
4  This includes a few fleeting mentions of Canada.
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/5


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“Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (Book Review)” by Lise Namikas

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