Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011.1 Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deploy- ments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building activities over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less defini- tive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of military force. This paper explores those in light of the last ten years of counterinsurgenc
