We analyze the implications of two-tier unemployment compensation systems with nonautomatic eligibility in an equilibium matching model with Nash bargaining. As eligibility for UI does not automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. The parameters of the model are estimated for France, and the model is also calibrated for Denmark and the
U.S. Re-entitlement effects are shown to be sizeable for all three countries. For France, reentitlement effects lower by 15% the rise in the wage and by 25% the rise in unemployment
following a 10% increase in the benefit level. Finally, we show that in all three countries the optimal compensation system is characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibility for UI, with higher levels of both UI and UA benefits, a smaller decrease
in benefits over time, and a longer employment duration required for UI eligibility than in the current system
