Permission for redistribution granted by the publisher

Seligmann, M

English

Brunel University Research Archive

205                                  Jon  Tetsuro  Sumida.  In  Defence  of  NavalSupremacy:  Finance,  Technology  andBritish  Naval  Policy,  1889-1914.Annapolis,  MD:  Naval  Institute  Press,www.nip.org, 2014. (First published 1989.)xx+377 pp.,  illustrations,  tables,  appendix,bibliography,  index.  US  $39.95,  paper;ISBN 978-1-59114-803-6.This book is a re-issue (entirely unamended,apart from a new three-page preface) of avolume that first appeared in 1989.  When itwas first published, the book was greeted asa  pioneering  attempt  to  offer  a  freshexplanation of British naval policy, one thattook  as  its  central  theme  the  influence  offinancial  and,  more  especially,  oftechnological  developments  on  theunfolding  of  new  policy  directions.   Theparticular peg on which the author hung hisanalysis was the British Admiralty’s interestin,  and  ultimate  rejection  of,  a  new  firecontrol  system  invented  and  developedprivately  by  Arthur  Hungerford  Pollen.According  to  the  author,  the  promisedcapabilities  of  the  Pollen  system played  amajor role in the introduction of new capitalship types, especially the battle cruiser, andon all  the policies  – tactical,  strategic  andfinancial  –  that  flowed  from  such  designand procurement decisions.   Similarly,  therejection  of  this  system  in  favour  of  anallegedly  inferior  but  cheaper  rival,  theDreyer Table, condemned the Royal Navy,or  so  it  is  argued,  to  failure  in  the  keysurface fleet action of the First World War,the battle of Jutland.There is no denying the originalityof the thesis, which has in the past exercisedenormous influence, despite the narrownessof the core topic that informs the argument–one,  ultimately  rejected,  fire  controlsystem.   Unfortunately,  while  some booksare  destined  to  remain  classics  –  forexample,  Arthur  Marder’s  From  theDreadnought to Scapa Flow,  which is stillthe bedrock of the discipline more than halfa century after publication – this book hasnot aged all  that  well.   When it  was firstreleased,  the  author  benefitted  from  analmost  total  absence  of  other  scholarsworking on, or even equipped to commenton, what was undoubtedly a very technicalarea.   Thus,  if  doubts  existed  aboutSumida’s  analysis  or  the  broaderconclusions  he drew from it,  few had  theinclination or ability to express them.  Thisall changed, however, with the entry into thefield  of  John  Brooks,  who  combinedprofessional  expertise  in  engineeringBook Reviews206alongside his skills as a historian.  Brooks,who examined many of the same issues asSumida,  but  from a wider angle  and on abetter-balanced  evidential  base,  drew verydifferent conclusions.  His forensic analysis,while unfailingly polite and always willingto  acknowledge  the  pioneering  role  thatSumida  had  played,  could  not  but  fail  tohint  that  a thesis  about the Pollen system,written  largely to  vindicate  Sumida’s  heroPollen, analyzing events from the point  ofview of  Pollen,  drawing heavily upon thePollen papers and enjoying the support  ofthe Pollen family, might lack objectivity andbe  drawn,  as  a  result  of  its  partiality,  toconclusions that  would look suspect  whenseen  from  a  broader  perspective.  Bycontrast,  Brooks’ more  judicious  analysis,drawing extensively on records that Sumidahad marginalized,  and using a  wider lens,strongly  suggested  that,  if  considerationwere given to  the Admiralty’s  agenda,  therejection of the Pollen system was not thetravesty  that  Pollen  believed  and  Sumidaendorsed, but an entirely logical one, giventhat the Dreyer Table better suited the RoyalNavy’s  proclaimed  tactical  requirements.This  conclusion,  being  totally  at  variancewith  Sumida’s  core  position,  inevitablyshone a critical light on some of Sumida’sother judgements, which now appeared outof place and inconsistent with the evidence.In  particular,  the  argument  that  Fisher’srevolutionary  advances  in  warship  designhad been driven by a belief that the RoyalNavy would, courtesy of Pollen, soon havea  monopoly  of  instruments  that  wouldenable  them  alone  to  practice  long  rangegunnery  looked  especially  suspect,  all  themore so as no evidence was presented thatFisher knew about the Pollen system at thetime  he  conceived  his  new  warshipprogramme.Since  Brooks  opened  Sumida’sideas up to scrutiny, several other aspects ofthis book have been shown to be wanting.In most cases, this is because the argumentsadvanced  run  ahead  of  the  documentaryevidence presented.  The hypothesis that thebattle  cruiser  was  designed  to  counterFrench and Russian armoured cruisers is acase in point.  Mountains of evidence thatthe  Naval  Intelligence  Department  wasunimpressed  by  the  capabilities  of  theseforeign vessels and did not believe that theFrench and Russian programmes would becompleted as planned get no mention.  Whatis  presented  instead  is  an  argument  basedupon extrapolation.  Fisher, as C-in-C of theMediterranean  Fleet  before  1902,  wasworried  about  these  vessels;  therefore,  hemust have been similarly worried by themin  1904-5.   The  fact  that  there  are  nodocuments presented to sustain this link andthat Russia’s armoured cruisers had been allbut annihilated before a single British battlecruiser had been laid down is not allowed tostand  in  the  way  of  the  hypothesis.   AsSumida  and  others  have  subsequentlyasserted on the authority of  this  book, theagenda  behind  Fisher’s  reforms  waspreparing  the  Royal  Navy  for  a  globalcruiser war.  The fact that this book actuallyoffers scant proof for the assertion needs tobe stressed.All in all, the reissue of this book isto be welcomed as the financial data in theappendices  remains  useful.   The  re-issuewill also enable those who wish to do so toreview the state of the historiography as itexisted  in  the  late  1980s.   Given  that  noeffort  has  been  made  to  incorporatesubsequent  scholarship  in  this  re-issue,however, anyone who wishes to read an up-to-date analysis of the fire control questionis  advised  to  refer  to  John  Brooks’Dreadnought  Gunnery  and  the  Battle  ofJutland:  The  Question  of  Fire  Control(London: Routledge 2005).Matthew S. SeligmannLondon, UKThe Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord

Review of Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914

http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/9968/1/FullText.pdf

Review of Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Brunel University Research Archive