Breitmoser Y

Tan JHW

Zizzo DJ

The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether subjects adapt beliefs when gaining experience, and if so whether they take the QRE or the level-k learning path. We estimate transitions between level-k and QRE belief rules using Markov-switching rule learning models. The analysis reveals that subjects take the level-k learning path and that they advance gradually, switching from level 1 to 2, from level 2 to equilibrium, and reverting to level 1 after observing opponents deviating from equilibrium. The steady state therefore contains a mixture of behavioral rules: levels 0, 1, 2, and equilibrium with weights of 2.9%, 16.6%, 37.9%, and 42.6%, respectively

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On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-<em>K</em>

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On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-<em>K</em>

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