The author of the paper presented the views of theoreticians and commanders
of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (WPRA) for city fighting and conquering, since the
uprising Red Army in February 1918 until the end of World War II. He discussed how the senior
officers of the Red Army viewed the issue of the specificity of combat in an urbanized area
– which is nowadays referred to as the black tactic. He also presented the problem – always
important for commanders of both infantry, armored weapons, artillery and aviation – whether
to capture cities from the front or rather encircle – forcing the enemy to withdraw his forces.
The author discussed it mainly on the basis of the battles in Stalingrad and Berlin. The battles
in the latter city are called the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation in the Soviet historiography.
He also described the circumstances of the attack on Bobruisk during Operation
Bagration. In the latter case, a dispute arose between Joseph Stalin, who was a supporter
of a massive attack on this city, and Konstanty Rokossowski, who insisted on concentrically
attacking along both banks of the Berezina. Interestingly, in this dispute, the Generalissimo
finally agreed with K. Rokossowski. The author also presented the unsuccessful attempt to
capture Kołobrzeg from the 45th Armored Brigade of the Guard of Col. Mikołaj Morgunow from
the composition of the 1st Panzer Army of General Col. Mikhail Katukov and the successful
campaign to capture Częstochowa from the march. The paper presents the views of the most
important Soviet commanders of the Second World War: Grigory Zhukov, Konstanty Rokossowski,
Ivan Koniev, Ivan Bagramian, Vasily Chukov, Grigory Nadysiew, and the German ones:
Erich von Mannstein and Heinz Guderian
