After years of neglect, Lebanon is facing the consequences of a struggling water sector. Existing water networks are deficient; water supply continuity is low; most wastewater is discharged into rivers or the Mediterranean Sea without adequate treatment; and inter-agency coordination remains weak and fragmented. In 2000, the government together with international donor agencies initiated a reform process to re-structure the water sector, merging local water authorities into four regional Water Establishments and giving more weight to the Ministry of Water and Energy. The water sector reforms pushed for good governance and the marketization of water services. The implementation process of the reforms, however, has been contested, modified and transformed by different political actors. This thesis takes a closer look at the water sector reforms in Lebanon, mapping key actors, their roles and responsibilities, their interests and interrelationships, and their influence in the sector. It seeks to understand the dynamics that underpin the institutional and policy set-up in the sector. For this purpose, the thesis makes use of an analytical framework for political economy analysis, contextualizing the reforms in the broader political and economic context. What drives and what constrains changes in water governance in Lebanon? A particular focus is put on the World Bank and other donor agencies, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and the municipalities. They are key actors in the water sector and yet they have been largely disregarded by the reforms. The thesis explores how these actors interact and influence decision-making processes in the Lebanese sector. The Foucauldian notion of governmentality thereby serves as a method of inquiry, explaining how forms of political rationality inscribe themselves in practices, and by extension, in the political economy
