RECOGNIZING ATTACKS OF PACKET DROPPING WITHIN WIRELESS SYSTEMS

Abstract

We build up an effective algorithm for detection of selective packet drops made by insider attackers and it moreover provides a truthful as well as publicly verifiable decision statistics as a proof to maintain detection decision. In our work we are interested to find out whether the losses are due to link errors or else by the collective effect of malicious drop and link errors during the observation of the packet losses within the network. Identifying attacks of selective packet-dropping is particularly not easy in an extremely active wireless environment. The difficulty comes from prerequisite that we need to not only distinguish the place of packet dropping, but moreover to recognize whether the drop is planned or unintended. For improvisation of the accuracy of detection we recommend to utilize the correlations among lost packets and for ensuring of these correlations calculations, we build up a homomorphic linear authenticator based structure of public auditing allowing the detector to confirm truth of packet loss data reported by nodes.  This structure is collusion proof, privacy preserving, and incur low communication as well as storage overheads.  Our proposed system considers cross-statistics between lost packets to make a additional informative decision, and as a result is in sharp difference to conventional methods that depend only on distribution of number of lost packets

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