Koji Murata

English

Academic Research Repository at the Institute of Developing Economies

Part 1 : Chapter 3 - The United States andAsia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 / Institute of DevelopingEconomies, Japan External Trade Organization(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jpjournal orpublication titleYearbook of Asian Affairs 2006page range 25-32year 2007URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010514On January 20, 2005, George W. Bush was inaugurated for his secondterm as president of the United States. However, from the outset, inforeign relations he faced the Iraq problem and in domestic affairs hefaced an enormous budget deficit. The president’s approval rating fellimmediately after the start of the Iraq War from 70 percent to 51 percent. In the president’s Inauguration Address on January 20 and in his Stateof the Union Address on February 2, he advocated the promotion of free-dom and democracy in the United States and overseas, with the basic ide-ology of opposing the extremist ideas of the terrorists. Given the growingdoubts about the justness of the Iraq War, he took a stance that morestrongly emphasized coordination with allies and friendly countries,adhering to the policy goals from his first term. In fact, he made activeefforts to improve relations with Europe, such as a visit to Europe inFebruary. Even so, when Condoleezza Rice was transferred from the position ofnational security advisor to secretary of state, there were 13 Senate votesin opposition, the second highest opposition in history. In public opinionand in the Congress, the degree of partisan friction increased. When Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state, and James Kelly,assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, resignedaccompanying Colin Powell’s resignation as secretary of state, the toppositions in the Department of State under Rice were filled by Europespecialists, including Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of state, andNicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, andChristopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and PacificThe United States andAsia: Under Pressureof Domestic AffairsKOJI MURATAChapter 325affairs. At the end of 2005, the Japan specialist Michael Green, seniordirector of Asia on the National Security Council (NSC), also retired,causing an apparent dearth of Asia specialists in important positions inthe second Bush administration. In 2005, the Bush administration faced one difficulty after the other indomestic affairs. First was the delayed response to Hurricane Katrinawhich struck the southern United States in late August, resulting in severecriticism from the victims and the Democratic Party. At this time, thepresident’s approval rating plummeted to around 40 percent. Moreover,in October Lewis Libby, the vice president’s chief of staff, was indicted forperjury in relation to the leakage of information concerning a CIA opera-tive, and he was forced to resign. There is a possibility that future investi-gation will extend to persons at the center of the administration, such asVice President Cheney and Karl Rove, presidential advisor. Furthermore,high oil prices are fanning the dissatisfaction of voters.Under these circumstances, President Bush made a round of visits toJapan, South Korea, China, and Mongolia in November, but his Asiapolicy overall only maintained the status quo and was reactive rather thanproactive.Conditions on the Korean PeninsulaOn February 10, 2005, in a statement by the foreign ministry of theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), it was declaredthat it had produced nuclear weapons for self-defense and that its partic-ipation in the six-party talks was suspended indefinitely. The UnitedStates was seen to respond negatively, consistent with its plans heretoforefor “regime change” in North Korea, given that Secretary of State Ricestated that the United States supported the oppressed people of Cuba,Myanmar, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and Zimbabwe at the Senate nomi-nation hearings mentioned above. However, North Korea’s statement alsomentioned that there was no change in its fundamental standpoint ofresolving problems through dialogue and entente or in its ultimate goal ofa nonnuclear Korean Peninsula, thus suggesting hope for negotiationswith the United States.China also actively acted as diplomatic mediator, and from late July toSeptember 19, six-party talks were held four times, with recesses inbetween, in Beijing. At the talks, with the United States’ insistence in prin-ciple on “complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear dismantling” andNorth Korea’s insistence on provision of light water reactors, there was no26 | MAIN TOPICSsign of making headway. However, the United States responded activelyto the bilateral contact between the United States and North Korea andwas successful in incorporating into a joint statement a phrase mention-ing abandonment of all nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear plans.Meanwhile, the United States indicated that it would discuss the problemof provision of light water reactors if North Korea completely abandonedall nuclear plans, returned to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty(NPT), and accepted security measures of the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA). However, there was a large difference in the positions of the UnitedStates and North Korea concerning the order of North Korea’s abandon-ment of nuclear plans and the provision of light water reactors. The Bushadministration, which faced an accumulation of domestic issues such asthe Hurricane Katrina problem, wanted at least to avoid the breakdown ofthe six-party talks. So, the Bush administration imposed full-scale con-trols on counterfeiting and drug exporting by North Korea and boostedpressure to induce North Korea to attend the next six-party discussion. Meanwhile in South Korea, in his address on the state of the nationaladministration in February 2005, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyunproposed the so-called “balancer theory” where South Korea is positionedas the “balancer” in Northeast Asia, thereby distancing South Korea fromthe United States and Japan. In fact in April, the South Korean militarysought to cancel the Strategy Plan 5029 for emergencies on the KoreanPeninsula that was suggested by the US military on the grounds that itwould lead to limitation of South Korea’s sovereignty. Given these circumstances, the United States steadily pushed forwardthe reorganization of US forces in South Korea and resolved long-standingproblems such as the relocation of the Yong San military base and the spe-cial agreement on defense cost sharing. At the US–South Korea Summitmeeting (held in Washington, D.C.) in June, US President Bush empha-sized that the two countries shared the goal of a nonnuclear KoreanPeninsula and were of the same voice on important problems. Inresponse, South Korean President Roh, while saying that they were incomplete agreement on basic principles, also maintained a certain dis-tance as before, stating one or two problems remained, but it was possibleto fully resolve them through dialogue.However, when US President Bush visited South Korea in November, itwas decided to launch “strategic talks for an allied partnership relation-ship,” and in January 2006 agreement was reached on “strategic flexibility”The United States and Asia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs | 27to use the US troops in South Korea outside of the Korean Peninsula. Thiswas stimulated by the reorganization of US troops in Japan. South Koreawas swaying between its desire to be independent of the United States andmaintenance of the US–South Korean alliance. US President Bush res-ponded to this in a practical manner, and made an effort to bring the NorthKorean policy into line.US-China RelationsOn March 14, 2005, Anti-secession Law was ratified by the StandingCommittee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The law wasdesigned to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity by “non-peaceful and other necessary means” against “secessionist forces” thataimed for an “independent Taiwan.” In response, the conservative fac-tion within the United States reacted strongly, and the Bush administra-tion indicated concern that this would cause tension in China-Taiwanrelations. In August, China implemented its first joint military exercisewith Russia, Mission for Peace 2005, on Shandong peninsula, and thereis a strong opinion that this was done with a military advance intoTaiwan in mind. Nearly 10,000 Chinese and Russian troops participatedin the exercise.However, as stated above, China has played an important role as amediator in the six-party talks, and it is conspicuously increasing itsimpact both politically and economically in the East Asian region. So, theBush administration must also maintain good relations with China. At the special summit meeting at the UN General Assembly inSeptember, US President Bush held talks with Chinese Premier WenJiabao. In Beijing, the six-party talks had resumed, and both leaders agreedto cooperate to advance those talks. Meanwhile, regarding the fact that theChinese government had revalued the renminbi by approximately 2 per-cent, President Bush said it was a good first step but that more flexibilitywas needed. This was because pressure was building in the US Congress.In response, Premier Wen showed consideration for the United States andmentioned expanding imports of US goods and strengthening protection ofintellectual property rights. With regard to the Taiwan problem, whenPremier Wen sought understanding of China’s position, President Bushresponded that the United States would not permit any attempt to changethe current situation, and moreover, it did not support independence.In November, President Bush visited Beijing. At this time, Chinaannounced that it would purchase 70 passenger jets from the US28 | MAIN TOPICScompany, Boeing, and at the summit meeting, Premier Wen downplayedthe idea that China was a threat, saying China was peaceful, open, andcooperative in its development. President Bush also said that the US-Chinese partnership was important, but at the same time, he soughtgreater political and religious freedom from China and suggested theimprovement of relations between Japan and China. In a policy addressprior to this in Kyoto, President Bush indicated the understanding that ifthe door of freedom begins to open as a result of economic reform, even ifonly a little, it will not be able to close again.Guiding China so that it fills a constructive role in international soci-ety as a responsible stakeholder—this is the Bush administration’s basicstance. However, there are persistent concerns over the increase inChina’s military power. According to the Annual Report to Congress:Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005 released by the USDepartment of Defense in July, China’s defense expenditure is estimatedat US$60 to US$70 billion, placing it second in the world after the UnitedStates. The report also points out that, if the modernization of the Chinesemilitary continues long term, it may be a threat to other modern militarypowers (namely, the United States) deployed in East Asia. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the US Departmentof Defense on February 3, 2006, is more direct, stating that China is thegreatest potential competitor, in military terms, for the United States.Moreover, in the State of the Union Address that year, President Bushnamed China and India as possible economic rivals to the United States.“Responsible stakeholder” or military threat? These two images of Chinaare competing in the minds of those in the Bush administration, the USCongress, and the media, and this situation seems likely to continue forthe time being.US-Japan RelationsUS-Japan relations are extremely good superficially. In February 2005,after President Bush’s election to a second term, the first US-JapanSecurity Consultative Committee (two plus two) was held in Washington,D.C., and 13 joint strategic objectives were announced. In particular,attention was on the item that called for promotion of a peaceful resolu-tion through dialogue on the Taiwan Straits problem, which was includedat the strong request of the United States. It was also decided to reach adecision within several months on the issue of reorganization of US forcesin Japan.The United States and Asia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs | 29At the US-Japan ministerial meeting in May, US Secretary of State Ricesuggested that the discussion be deepened at the high-ranking officiallevel while spearheading the US-Japan strategic dialogue at the Cabinetlevel, and in June in London the first high-ranking official meeting washeld. That same month, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and DirectorGeneral of the Japanese Defense Agency Isao Ono met in Singapore, andconfirmed that they would compile an interim report as quickly as possi-ble on the reorganization of US forces in Japan and reach a conclusion bythe end of the year. A plan was set forth for joint development of a missileself-defense system using next-generation interceptor missiles based onthe Aegis destroyer.Subsequently in Japan there was political disorder due to the privatiza-tion of the postal system, the dissolution of the Lower House, and a gen-eral election, but following the overwhelming victory of the LiberalDemocratic Party, attention again turned in September to the issue ofreorganization of US forces in Japan. In particular, there was a differencein opinion over the relocation of the Futenma Base between the JapaneseSelf-Defense Forces and the US Department of Defense. However, the USside made concessions and agreement was reached on coastal area ofCamp Schwab. On October 29, the Two Plus Two meeting was held againin Washington, D.C., and an interim report on reorganization of US forcesin Japan was presented. The report advocated reduction of the burdenplaced on the local area while simultaneously outlining the strengtheningof cooperation between the respective headquarters of the US forces inJapan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces as well as the joint usage ofmilitary bases. Through this, the environment was prepared for PresidentBush’s visit to Kyoto in November. At the US-Japan Summit meeting in Kyoto, the domestic positions ofeach of the leaders were in contrast. This was because, whereas asJapanese Prime Minister Koizumi has won an overwhelming victory in theLower House elections, US President Bush was suffering from a decliningapproval rating. First, both leaders agreed on the early realization of reor-ganization of US forces in Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi made a de factodeclaration that the period of stay of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces inIraq, which was due to finish in December, would be extended; moreover,he made it clear that there was a prospect of lifting the ban and resumingimports in December of US beef which had been halted due to BSE(bovine spongiform encephalopathy). This was a summit meeting thatactively produced US-Japan accord. 30 | MAIN TOPICSHowever, US-Japan relations were not at all tranquil. During the sum-mit meeting in Kyoto, it is said that President Bush privately expressedconcern about the US-Japan relationship being stressed due to theYasukuni problem, etc., and immediately following the resumption of USbeef imports to Japan, imports were again banned due to mismanagementon the US side. Moreover, the Koizumi cabinet did not receive the activesupport of the Bush administration regarding Japan’s securing of a perma-nent seat on the UN Security Council.Prime Minister Koizumi is scheduled to step down in September 2006,and in November, interim elections will be held in the United States.What has been called the “golden age” in US-Japan relations may be in fora change.Southeast AsiaLed by the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) and the countries of Japan, China, and South Korea, the conceptof the East Asian Community is taking shape. In December 2005, the firstEast Asia Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur.However, the Bush administration is cautious lest this movement is ledby China and the United States is excluded. In the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC), the United States is also a major member, but thereis a possibility that APEC will become a dead institution in the concept ofthe East Asian Community. The Bush administration favored the partic-ipation of India, Australia, and New Zealand as constituent members ofthe East Asia Summit, in part to help restrain China, and with Japan’scooperation, this was achieved. The intent behind the Bush administra-tion’s emphasis on the values of freedom and democracy is to counterbal-ance this kind of regionalism.South AsiaIn July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visitedWashington, D.C., for the US-India Summit with President Bush. Bothleaders emphasized their countries’ “strategic partnership” and agreed topursue cooperation in the nuclear field. Before Prime Minister Singh vis-ited the United States, agreement was reached on a New Framework forUS-India Defense Cooperation. Naturally, this agreement was made withthe rise of China in mind. Keeping pace with the cooperative relationshipbetween the United States and India, Pakistan’s Musharraf administrationalso pursued the path of “multiple dialogue” with India. The United States and Asia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs | 31However, the Bush administration did not support India’s acquisitionof a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and in his State of theUnion Address in January 2006, President Bush stated that India maybecome an economic rival, together with China. Thus, there are bothcooperation and friction in US-India relations.Issues in 2006In 2006 the Bush administration is likely to pour its energy in the interimelections in November. This is because, if defeated, its last days will bespent as a lame duck administration. Given this, the United States’ Asiapolicy is likely to be even more affected by domestic affairs. Already, tradeand energy issues have become serious points of friction between theUnited States and China. With visible unease in US-China and US–South Korea relations, theBush administration’s expectations of Japan are growing. The question iswhether the post-Koizumi Japanese administration is capable of respond-ing to these expectations. If Japan continues to create friction with neigh-boring countries due to the Yasukuni problem, etc., it will be a negativefactor for the United States, and the agreement on the relocation of theFutenma Base will lead to US disappointment if the implementation of therelocation in Japan is delayed. Moreover, as stated at the beginning, thereis a shortage of the experts on Japan who supported the Bush administra-tion during its first term. US-Japan relations are headed toward a newphase in the future.32 | MAIN TOPICS

Part 1 : Chapter 3 - The United States and Asia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs

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Part 1 : Chapter 3 - The United States and Asia: Under Pressure of Domestic Affairs

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