Logical relativism is the claim that different cultures may think according to
different logical laws. For example, it is often argued that whereas ‘we’ (Westerners)
operate according to the law of the excluded middle, ‘they’ (e.g., the Chinese or the
Azande) may not. In this article, we question whether logical relativism is an empirical
thesis, i.e., a thesis that is substantiated through anthropological examples.
We distinguish two forms of logical relativism, both of which try to account for alleged
contradictions in the beliefs of other cultures. The ‘alternative logic’ approach suggests
that contradictions only appear if we judge beliefs according to classical logic, but do not
exist if we judge them according to an alternative (non-standard) logic. The ‘symmetric
treatment’ suggests that whether there is a contradiction or not is itself a culture-specific
matter, such that what may be a contradiction ‘for them’ may not be a contradiction ‘for
us’ and vice versa. We question whether either of these arguments really involves
relativism and show that problems arise in the treatment of the examples, firstly, in terms
of questionable preconceptions made about the status of logic as a standard of
comparison and, secondly, in the ways in which relevant beliefs are formulated
