This paper examines the existence of financial statement manipulation in the U.S. during a time period when many of the current motivations did not exist. The study looks for types of manipulations that would be motivated by the pre-SEC operating environment. To examine this issue, a sample of U.S. firms from the 1915 Moody\u27s Analyses of Investments is divided into industrial firms, railroads, and utilities. The railroad and utility companies faced rate regulation during this time period, providing incentives to manipulate the financial reports so as to maximize the rate received. Industrial firms were not regulated. These companies wanted to attract investors, motivating manipulations to increase income and net assets. To determine if manipulations are occurring, a Benford\u27s Law analysis is used. This analysis examines the frequency of numbers in certain positions within an amount to determine if the distribution of the numbers is similar to the pattern documented by Benford\u27s Law. Some manipulations consistent with expectations are found