Stone, Jim

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1Cogito Ergo SumDescartes' dictum "I am thinking, therefore I am" looks likean argument, and many philosophers take it to express anenthymeme: Whatever is thinking exists, I am thinking, thereforeI exist. But this interpretation is vulnerable to objections.Descartes writes: "When someone says 'I am thinking, therefore Iam, or I exist', he does not deduce existence from thought bymeans of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evidentby a simple intuition of the mind."1 Further, Descartes issupposing himself in the grip of an Evil Demon capable of makinghim go wrong whenever he computes; but any complex argument is acomputation so, if the cogito is an enthymeme, Descartes cannotrely upon it.2 Other problems arise if we construe the cogito as animmediate inference. So taken, the argument is formally invalid:what licenses the inference from cogito to sum?  Descartesattempts an answer: he "learns it from experiencing in his owncase that it is impossible that he should think withoutexisting."3 But this response appears to take us back to anenthymeme: "It is impossible that I think without existing, I amthinking, therefore, I exist." Also, it repeats withoutexplaining the claim that "I am thinking" entails "I am." (What,one wonders, does Descartes learn from experience in his own casethat warrants the inference?) Further, in The MeditationsDescartes restates the cogito (or something very much like it) ina wholly non-inferential form: "So after considering everything2very thorougly, I must finally conclude that this proposition 'Iam, I exist' is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by meor conceived by my mind."4 Descartes himself seems unhappy withconstruing the cogito as an inference. I believe "I am thinking, therefore I am" does not expressan argument but rather a proposition for which Descartes cannotfind an appropriate idiom. He resorts to, then abandons, thelanguage of argument and inference as he shifts about trying toexpress this deeper truth. I certainly do not deny that anargument can be extracted from the language of the cogito;however I believe the "simple intuition of the mind" discoverssomething non-inferential that justifies the inference fromcogito to sum, that explains why it is impossible that Descartesshould think without existing, as well as why "I am" isnecessarily true whenever he conceives it. In what follows, Iwill offer a non-inferential reading of "I am thinking, thereforeI am."5 What is the deeper truth the cogito expresses?Let's start with another question: Why does Descartesbelieve "I am" is indubitable whenever he conceives it? Also, whyis "I am thinking" indubitable? Plainly "I am" and "I amthinking" are incorrigible for me in the sense that I cannotfalsely believe them, but so arguably is "I am in violent painnow." Yet the incorrigibility of the first two propositionsappears to flow from a different source. Both "I am" and "I amthinking" have the feature that if I stand in any propositionalattitude (e.g, doubt, hope, fear, regret) toward them, they must3be true. Obviously this is not the case for "I am in violent painnow." Further, "I am" and "I am thinking" share the interestingfeature that they must be true if I stand in a propositionalattitude toward any proposition. Let's say that proposition p issuper-incorrigible for S just in case "S stands in apropositional attitude toward any proposition" entails p. "I amthinking" and "I am" are both incorrigible and super-incorrigiblefor me (obviously if p is super-incorrigible for me, it must beincorrigible for me as well); but "I am in violent pain" is atbest incorrigible for me.But this does not yet explain the indubitability of "I amthinking" and "I am." For every necessary truth is super-incorrigible (hence incorrigible) for me, and many of these aredubitable. The response that "I am" and "I am thinking" arecontingent super-incorrigible propositions is unsatisfying, forit explains nothing. Descartes believes "I am thinking" and "Iam" have some feature that makes their truth especiallyaccessible; their contingency may have something to do with thatfeature, but it does not reveal it.Perhaps we can address our problem by asking yet anotherquestion:  Why are "I am" and "I am thinking" incorrigible? Andwhy are they super-incorrigible? (Their super-incorrigibilityentails without explaining their incorrigibility, for it needsexplaining too.) Necessary truths are incorrigible because theycannot be false, and my attentive belief that I am in pain isincorrigible because there is simply no way for me to be4mistaken. But "I am" and "I am thinking" are incorrible for avery different reason: My believing either of these propositionsis sufficient to constitute the fact that satisfies its truthcondition. This needs explication. What is "constitution"?A statue is constituted by the lump of bronze out of whichit is cast. What does this mean?  The statue is nothing more thanthe lump of bronze; it is not ontologically extra, it is not yetanother thing. Given the lump of bronze in that configuration,the statue must exist, and this is because the statue just is thelump of bronze in that configuration. Talk about the statue, wemight say, is talk about the lump of bronze in different words.Nonetheless the statue is not identical to the lump of bronze;for one thing, the lump preceded the statue and may survive it.The lump and the statue have different identity conditions.Again, the 9th Regiment, which fought in the world war, isconstituted by a particular collection of soldiers. The regimentis not something over and above that collection of soldiers.Looking at the soldiers standing at attention on the parade fieldis looking at the regiment. But the regiment preceded and maysurvive the collection of soldiers that now constitutes it, so itcannot be identical to the collection.6Similarly, one fact can be constituted by another fact.7Fact A is the fact that there is at least one circle on thispage. Here is circle D:5Fact B is the fact that D is on this page. The fact that there isat least one circle on this page is nothing more than the factthat D is on this page. To use Parfit's phrase, fact A is not a"deep further fact"; it is not something over and above fact B. Nonetheless fact A is not identical to fact B; for if we erased Dand instantaneously replaced it with another circle somewhereelse on the page, B would cease to be a fact but A would not.Fact A is constituted by fact B, but it could be constituted byother facts. Now suppose that we keep D and add several othercircles as well. Perhaps it would now be wrong to say that fact Ais constituted by fact B. Still it would be true that fact B issufficient to constitute fact A, for if circle D were the onlycircle on this page, fact B would constitute fact A.8 How does this pertain to the propositions "I am thinking"and "I am"? Suppose it is a fact that I am thinking "This verymental event is a thought." (Call this fact "F.") But then itmust also be a fact that I am thinking. (Call this fact "G.") Fentails G, but why?9 Note that the fact that I am thinking isnothing more than my believing "This very mental event is athought." Nonetheless F is not identical to fact G. For if Icease to think "This very mental event is a thought" butimmediately I begin thinking that 2+2=4, G continues to be a factbut F does not. The fact that I am thinking can be constituted byother facts, as the regiment can be constituted by othersoldiers. I submit that the argument "I believe that I think,therefore I think" is valid because the fact expressed by the6conclusion is constituted by the fact expressed by the premiss. Right now I believe that I am. Supposing that this were theonly fact about me (except the facts that it constitutes), itwould constitute the fact of my existence. My existing would benothing more than my believing that I exist. But the fact that Iexist is not identical to the fact that I believe that I exist.For if I cease to believe that I am and instead it becomes a factthat I hope the sun is shining, the fact of my existence would beconstituted by this new fact. There are plenty of facts about meright now; nonetheless the fact that I believe that I exist issufficient to constitute the fact that I exist. For if it werethe only fact about me, it would constitute the fact of myexistence. The argument "I believe I exist, therefore I am" isvalid because the fact expressed by the premiss is sufficient toconstitute the fact of my existence. The logical relation between"I think I exist" and "I exist" is explained by the ontologicalrelation between the facts these propositions express.Let's take stock of where we are. I have explained the claimthat my believing "I am thinking" and my believing "I am" is, foreach proposition, sufficient to constitute the fact thatsatisfies its truth condition. This is why it is impossible forme to falsely believe either proposition. Having explained theirincorrigibility, can we explain their super-incorrigibility too?Let's say that a proposition p is attitude-constituted for mejust in case my standing in a propositional attitude to anyproposition is sufficient to constitute the fact that p. "I am7thinking" and "I exist" are super-incorrigible for me becausethey are attitude-constituted for me. Further, contingent super-incorrigibles are so because they are attitude-constituted. (Itfollows a fortiori that if I stand in any cognitive attitude tothe propositions "I am" or "I exist" they must be true.)Ultimately, "I am" and "I think" are incorrigible because theyare attitude constituted.But not all incorrigible propositions for me are attitudeconstituted. Necessary truths like "1=1" are incorrigible (andsuper-incorrigible), but it is not the case that my regrettingthat I have sinned is sufficient to constitute the fact that 1=1.The fact that 1=1 is something over and above the fact that Iregret my sins and even the fact that I believe that 1=1. Onemark of this is that when fact X is constituted by fact Y, X canbe explained by Y. The fact that the regiment is on the field isexplained by the fact that the collection of soldiers thatconstitutes the regiment is there. But the fact that 1=1 can inno way be explained by the fact that I believe that 1=1; to thecontrary, I believe that 1=1 because it is a fact. Again, "I amin pain now" is incorrigible for me; but it is not the case thatmy believing that I am in pain constitutes the fact that I am inpain. Indeed, the fact that I believe that I am in pain is causedby the fact that I am in pain; the direction of explanation runscounter to that of constitution. "I am thinking" and "I exist" are special, then, becausethey are attitude-constituted; this explains their corrigibility8and their super-incorrigibility. It also explains why Descartesbelieves I have special access to their truth. For as I amacquainted with my own concious mental states, I am acquaintedwith facts that are sufficient to constitute their truth. If Ibelieve or doubt or hope or regret that I am thinking, thisconstitutes the fact that I am thinking. If I believe or doubt orhope or regret that I exist, this is sufficient to constitute thefact of my existence; hence the proposition "I exist" isnecessarily true whenever it is conceived by my mind. And if Ishould go so far as to doubt that I believe or doubt or hope orregret that I exist, this is a) sufficient to constitute the factthat I exist and b) sufficient to constitute the fact that I amthinking, which is sufficient to constitute the fact that Iexist. My believing an attitude-constituted proposition issufficient to know its truth because my believing is the factthat constitutes its truth. Doubting that I believe an attitude-constituted proposition is sufficient to know its truth, fordoubting that I believe it is sufficient to constitute its truth.Standing in a propositional attitude toward any proposition issufficient to constitute the truth of an attitude-constitutedproposition; hence, where p is attitude constituted, even if Idoubt that I doubt that I doubt ad infinitum that p, I can neverreach a stage that does not constitute its truth.Now we can explicate the cogito. "I am thinking therefore Iam" means "My thinking this very thought is sufficient toconstitute the fact that I exist." This proposition is not an9argument, for there is no inference; it entails that I existwithout asserting that I do. Rather it expresses a simpleintuition of the mind: my existence need be nothing more than mythinking this very thought. That is what Descartes learns fromexperience in his own case that explains why it is impossible forhim to think without existing, why cogito entails sum; it is thisparticular insight that justifies the general principle "Whateverthinks exists." To clearly and distinctly perceive the truth ofthis proposition is to know that I exist. Here I want to consider an objection, namely, that the factthat I exist is most certainly a deep further fact, obviouslyextra to the fact that I believe I exist. Indeed, the fact that Ibelieve that I exist is explained by the fact that I exist: Ibelieve that I exist because I recognize that I do. The directionof explanation runs counter to that of constitution. It is highlyparadoxical to maintain that my existing is nothing more than mybelieving that I exist. What do I believe if the proposition "Iexist" does not express a deep further fact? But if the fact thatI exist is ontologically extra to the fact that I am thinking, itcannot be attitude constituted; consequently our reading of thecogito must fail.Remember, however, that Descartes is embarked upon a programof radical doubt: he will reject as false any dubitable belief.If the fact that Descartes exists is indeed a deep further factsubstantially underlying and explaining the fact that he thinks(as a substance underlies its attributes), then he has no direct10access to it. Hence his belief that he exists is intractablydubitable--perhaps there is no deep further fact--and he mustreject it as false. The best Descartes could do to get to sumfrom cogito would be to introduce a highly dubitable metaphysicalpremiss like "Thought must inhere in an underlying substance,"which would, in any case, turn the cogito into an enthymeme uponwhich he could not rely. So if the fact that he exists is extrato the fact that he thinks, Descartes can never get from cogitoto sum. Descartes has no choice but to reduce the fact that heexists to an indubitable fact with which he is acquainted: thisis the only way he can be certain it obtains.Let me respond to the question: "What does the proposition'I exist' assert if it does not express a deep further fact?" Theproposition "I exist" asserts that there is something which isme. So when I believe that I exist I believe that there issomething which is me. (The claim that my existing is nothingmore than my believing I exist is simply the claim that therebeing something which is me is nothing more than my believingthere is something which is me.) The proposition that there issomething which is me is wholly noncommittal about the nature ofthat something, whether it is a substance or something reducibleto other things or something that only exists because we talkabout it, like the Big Dipper. The only constraint is that thissomething must be able to survive any particular thought. Now thefact that I am thinking is a very deep fact if I am a very deepthing; hence the fact that I exist, which it constitutes, is11itself as thick or as thin as I turn out to be. This is as itshould be, for Descartes must establish by honest toil what sortof thing he is. The cogito now becomes: "There being somethingwhich is me need be nothing more than the fact that something isthinking this very thought."  Now we can simplify our account of the cogito. As we justnoted, Descartes has rejected all dubitable beliefs; he issupposing there is no world, that he has no body, and so on.Consequently there is no fact left to constitute his existenceexcept the attitude-constituted fact that he is thinking; thisalone is indubitable. In the context of the program of radicaldoubt (which is, of course, the context in which it appears), thecogito reads simply: "My thinking this very thought constitutesthe fact that I exist" (or "My existing is nothing more than mythinking this very thought"). This has an interestingconsequence: "Sum res cogitans" follows directly from the cogito.For if my existing is nothing more than my thinking this verythought, then it follows immediately that I am a thingconstituted by the fact of its thinking. Of course, the fact thatI exist can survive this particular thought. However my existencemust be constituted by new facts about my thinking; no otherfacts are left to constitute it. "I am, then, in the strict senseonly a thing that thinks..."10121. Second Replies in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,Volume II, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff andDugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 100. This will be abbreviated "CSM II" henceforth.2. This is worth emphasizing, for it undercuts the position ofcommentators who maintain that the cogito, while not a classicalsyllogism, is still a complex argument of a different sort. See,for example, Bernard Williams Descartes: The Project of PureEnquiry, (Penguin Books, 1978), chapter 3.3. Second Replies, CSM II 100,4. CSM II 17.5. Jaako Hintikka offers a non-inferential reading in "Cogito,Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?" The Philosophical Review,LXXI, (1962), 3-32. According to Hintikka, the sentence "I do notexist" is self-defeating, because anyone who uses it to persuadesomeone, even himself, of its truth, by so doing, defeats his ownpurpose. For Hintakka, the cogito marks not an inference but aperformance: the indubitability of "I am" results from the self-defeating nature of trying to think the contrary. For Hintikka,"I am thinking" does not express a premiss; rather "it refers toFootnotes13the 'performance' (to the act of thinking) through which thesentence 'I exist' may be said to verify itself." Severalcommentators have criticized Hintikka's account of the cogito(see, for example, Margaret Dauler Wilson Descartes, (Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1978), ch, II.) This essay is meant to offer analternative to Hintikka, not to add to that literature. I willnote only that the fact that a statement or sentence ispragmatically self-defeating hardly entails that it is false:consider Moore's example: "It is raining and I don't believe it."Consequently, even if thinking "I do not exist" is selfdefeating, as Hintikka maintains, recognizing this cannotestablish the indubitability of "I am."6. For more on constitution see this author, "Why PotentialityMatters," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, No.4(December, 1987), pp. 815-830.7. While I have no ontological theory of facts, it may be helpfulto construe facts as states of affairs that actually obtain.8. Of course, if B constitutes A, it follows that B is sufficientto constitute A.9. We are inclined to say that my thinking that I am thinkingentails "There exists an x such that x is a thought and mythinking that I am thinking = x" which entails "There exists an x14such that x is a thought." But note that the first conclusionreally is the conclusion we are after, for it involves the claimthat there is at least one thought; the inference to this was tobe explained.10.Descartes, Second Meditation, in CSM II 18.

Cogito Ergo Sum

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Cogito Ergo Sum

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