The non bis in idem Principle Following the A. and B. V. Norway Judgment: the Possibility of Criminal Prosecution for an Offence for Which a Decision Has Already Been Rendered in Misdemeanour Proceedings

Abstract

U početnom dijelu rada analizira se poimanje načela ne bis in idem u praksi Europskog suda za ljudska prava prije presude A. i B. protiv Norveške, uz osobit osvrt na presude Maresti i Tomasović. Pojašnjavaju se kriteriji Engel i Zolotuhin. Na temelju ispitivanja teorijske održivosti kriterija Zolotuhin zaključuje se da je shvaćanje djela u toj odluci (idem factum) ispravno. Potom se opisuje judikatura Suda o elementu bis, pri čemu se naglašava da su jedno vrijeme postojala dva različita smjera njegova tumačenja. U nastavku se analizira sama presuda A. i B. protiv Norveške, a posebna se pozornost posvećuje kriteriju bliske povezanosti u naravi i vremenu, koji se u radu testira kroz prizmu hrvatskog pravnog sustava, sa zaključkom da je vođenje kaznenog postupka nakon pravomoćne prekršajne osude za isto djelo načelno moguće. U sljedećem se poglavlju daje osvrt na tzv. shvaćanje pro persona načela ne bis in idem, koje je danas odbačeno. Prikazuju se osnovne konture njemačkog prekršajnog postupka, a osobito mogućnost vođenja kaznenog postupka nakon pravomoćnosti prekršajnog naloga. U završnom dijelu rada analizira se domaća sudska praksa u tri različita stadija nakon presude Maresti. Na samom se kraju daju smjernice za postupanje de lege lata i prijedlozi de lege ferenda.The first section of the paper discusses the understanding of the non bis in idem principle in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights prior to the judgment A and B v. Norway, with particular reference to the Maresti and Tomasović cases. The Engel and Zolotukhin criteria are clarified. Based on an examination of the theoretical viability of the Zolotukhin criterion, it is concluded that the “idem factum” concept is correct. The Court’s case law on the “bis” element is described in the following section of the paper, while emphasising that two different interpretations have emerged. Further, the A and B v. Norway judgment is thoroughly analysed, with particular attention to the criterion of the close connection in substance and time, which is tested through the prism of the Croatian legal system. A conclusion is drawn that the conducting of criminal proceedings after a final misdemeanour conviction for the same act is possible in principle. The next chapter gives an overview of the so-called “pro persona” understanding of the principle of non bis in idem, which has recently been rejected. The basic outline of the German misdemeanour procedure and, in particular, the possibility of conducting criminal proceedings after a misdemeanour decision becomes final are presented and discussed. The last section of the paper analyses domestic case law at three different stages following the Maresti judgment. Finally, practical guidelines and legislative suggestions are given