Stephens, William O.

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empirical testability and predictive success of modern science. It is also true thatmodern science has had this success even as it has dispensed with Aristotle’sexplanation through formal and final causes. However, we need not infer thatAristotelian science, and in particular the science of being qua being, has nothingto add to what we have learned from modern science. Modern cosmology andsome sorts of theoretical physics are no more testable and can have no moreclaim to predictive success than does Aristotelian science. These same studiesattempt to understand the origins and nature of things studied (through observa-tion and testing) in the empirical sciences. Where prediction is involved, we haveidentified processes and directions of change, but not the sources or ultimatedirections of those changes. It is here that an investigation of the forms invokedby modern science could be enlightening. Bell’s book is important not leastbecause it brings up such large and crucial questions.Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science is fittingly produced in an edition ofexcellent quality. It includes a bibliography, an index of names, and an index ofpassages from Aristotle. Unfortunately it does not include a subject index, posingdifficulties for the reader who consults it for research on a particular topic, orwho would like to navigate stages of an argument that is spread out through thebook. The book is a revised and expanded dissertation. At this early stage of hiscareer, Bell has developed a remarkably nuanced understanding, a striking philo-sophical maturity, a deep and broad facility with the texts and secondary litera-ture, and a truly fine fluency in explicating Aristotelian passages and ideas. Manyreaders will opt for different interpretations, and many will take different pas-sages as their guides, but all will benefit from exploring Bell’s reasoning and thechallenges it poses to their own. This book is an auspicious start to what willsurely be a highly distinguished career.Department of PhilosophyGeorge Mason UniversityFairfax VA 22030Don’t Worry, Be Stoic: Ancient Wisdom for Troubled Times. By Peter J.Vernezze. Lanham: University Press of America, 2005. Pp. xxiii + 117.$24.00. ISBN 0761830146.William O. StephensReaders of this journal are not the intended audience of this modest, little book.As the title implies, it targets a popular, American audience totally unfamiliarwith Stoicism. The ‘ancient wisdom’ Vernezze imparts includes selected ideasfrom the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, and Zen Buddhism. Quips from Carl Jung (Jung452Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007)©Mathesis Publications1971), Emerson (uncited), Thoreau, Victor Frankl (Frankl 1959), the DalaiLama, Daniel Goleman (Goleman 1995), and Albert Ellis (Ellis 1998) also findtheir way into Vernezze’s reflections. The principal texts discussed are fromSeneca, Epictetus, and—the author’s favorite—Marcus Aurelius. Vernezze dis-dains recent translations of Marcus and Epictetus by opting to use the antiquatedLong 1864, rather than either Hays 2002 or a translation of the last century, andthe aging Loeb edition (Oldfather 1925 and 1928) rather than Gill 1995 or, forbook 1 of the Discourses, Dobbin 1998.The book consists of a two-page preface, a thirteen page ‘Introduction: Sto-icism: The Path to Personal Liberation’, and thirty-three, two to four page ser-monlike reflections, which the author accurately enough calls ‘essays inspired byStoic thought’, collected into three chapters (vii). Endnotes and a paltry index areincluded. Absent are any references to other scholars who have written on theStoics. Consequently, since the author evidently makes no pretense of offering acontribution to serious scholarly work on Stoicism, it seems out of place to criti-cize this book on the basis of the usual scholarly standards. Perhaps Vernezzeintends that some teachers of introductory philosophy courses could use hisinspirational mini-essays with students unprepared to study primary Stoic texts.But even supposing this special audience, it would not seem churlish to evaluatethe accuracy of Vernezze’s portrait of Stoic wisdom and the quality of the book’sproduction. The former is decent. The latter is wanting.In the introduction Vernezze describes the Homeric warrior ethic, the PlatonicTheory of Forms, and the Aristotelian ethic of the aristocratic good man as locat-ing the normative standard of behavior as external to the individual. In contrast,Vernezze says that Stoicism searches for an internal code of behavior. He has nointerest in discussing how the Theory of Forms is challenged and refined in whatmost scholars take to be the later Platonic dialogues. Nor does he discuss theinfamous tension in the Nicomachean Ethics between the life of theoria and thelife of the phronimos. Historians of philosophy who would cringe at paintingwith such broad, sloppy brush strokes could be excused for setting the book asidebefore reading further. Nevertheless, Vernezze’s interest is to emphasize thatStoicism is ‘the great democratizer of ethics’ (xv) since it imposes no theoreticalconstraints on who may achieve the human good, whereas the Homeric, Platonic,and Aristotelian views are all elitist in that these theories restrict the good life tothe few. Vernezze then discusses two groups of critics of Stoicism. The firstfaults Stoicism by insisting that life is simply too chaotic and stressful to be livedin a state of constant tranquility. The second group sees the Stoic goal as attain-able but undesirable, since it robs us of the emotional highs and lows that enrichlife and make it worth living (xviii). Vernezze responds to the first criticism bynoting that Stoics insist that the life of tranquility is not achieved without great,sustained effort over a lifetime. He upholds the disposition of joy and gentlespirit characteristic of the Stoic in reply to the second criticism.Vernezze’s brief discussion of critiques and criticisms of Stoicism provides thepoint of departure for what follows. He aims ‘to utilize Stoic wisdom in order to453transform our troubles and deal effectively with disappointment, difficulty, anddestructive emotions’ (xx). Our afflictions as Americans, he argues, stem fromthe American dream, according to which we can have it all, i.e., we can be spiri-tually fulfilled, physically fit, financially successful, and sexually satisfied. Sto-icism offers a sober remedy to this pernicious American ‘cult of optimism’, asVernezze calls it, and the crushing disillusionment it inevitably brings. The firstchapter of mini-essays, ‘Difficulties and Disappointments’, illustrates how toapply Stoicism to problems encountered in the external world. These problemsare cars, money, vacations, obstacles on a jogging path, marriage, suicide, oldage, and illness. The second chapter, ‘Destructive Emotions’, contains essays onhow to apply Stoicism to mental disturbance, ranging from petty inconvenienceswhen traveling, waiting in line, house cleaning, doing automotive maintenance,and mundane stresses of workplace and relationships, to dealing with severehardship from being maimed, debility arising from self-hatred, grief over the lossand suffering of loved ones, and anger management. The reflections in the thirdchapter explore connections between Stoicism, eastern and western religious tra-ditions, and spiritual practices.How effective are these mini-essays at articulating Stoic wisdom for thesetroubled times? The quality is a bit uneven. Vernezze’s welcome acquaintancewith the Philoctetes (xxi) on the one hand is offset by his neglecting to identify‘the mythical beast that sprouted several new heads for each one that was cut off’(9) as the Hydra defeated by Heracles, who, of course, was an important exem-plum for the ancient Stoics.Vernezze is a bit careless when he writes that ‘Stoics believed they had respon-sibilities to all creatures’ (90), since the Stoics denied that nonhuman animalswere rational creatures deserving of justice. More worrisome is his interpretationof the Stoic view of romantic love. One can certainly challenge his denial thatthere is anything to suggest that the Stoics ‘would disagree with the Greek viewthat love is a God (Eros)’ (17). Equally misleading is his assertion that the Stoics‘do not so much condemn romantic love as ignore it’ (17). Reydams-Schils 2005,Inwood 1997, and Stephens 1996 all argue against Vernezze’s glib assertion onthis point.The plethora of printing errors that pepper the book is extremely distracting. Icounted thirty-three mistakes in spelling, punctuation, paragraph indentations,and grammar in 140 pages. Many of these errors damage the meaning intended.For example, confusing ‘imminent’ with ‘immanent’ yields: ‘What are we to doin the face of such obvious evidence that death can always be immanent?’ (18),and ‘many Christians diverge from Church teaching, believing that, when deathis immanent, the sort of prolonged suffering we see all too often today in hospi-tals and nursing homes can in no way be intended by a benevolent Deity’ (21).The proofreader also confused ‘descrying’ with ‘decrying’ (60), ‘proceeded’with ‘preceded’ (64). Such sloppy production does nothing to improve the repu-tation of the University Press of America.The author’s use of the adjective ‘transcendent’ is troublesome. For example,454one could take issue with his characterization of the Tao as a transcendent force(77). Similarly problematic is his ascription to the Stoics of ‘the notion of an eter-nal, transcendent force governing the universe’ (43). Gratefully, this inaccuracyis corrected a few sentences later when he notes that ‘the Stoic God is not, likethe Judeo-Christian God, a separately existing Being, but is instead best under-stood as a rational ordering principle infused throughout the cosmos’ (43).Vernezze’s desire to underscore similarities between Stoicism and Christianityleads him to misread Marcus. Vernezze claims that ‘Forgiveness is an importantconcept in Stoicism. Like Positive Psychology, Stoics recognize the profoundspiritual truth embedded in Christ’s counsel to love your enemies and to pray forthose who persecute you…’ (68-69). To support this misinterpretation, Vernezzequotes Meditations 4.7: ‘Take away the opinion “I have been harmed” and thecomplaint itself is taken away. Take away the complaint and the harm as welldisappears’ (68). But Stoic magnanimity is not the same as Christian forgiveness.Forgiveness entails three stages: A wrongfully harms B; A and B recognize thatA wrongfully harmed B; B releases A from moral condemnation. In contrast, themagnanimous person judges the misdeed perpetrated against her to be too trivialto constitute any real harm at all. The magnanimous Stoic makes no complaintagainst the putative offender, and thus the putative harm evaporates. The Stoicdoes not pray for those who persecute her, nor does she love them in the sensethat Christ counsels. The Stoic does what she can to cooperate with and assistother human beings as fellow members of the social community of rationalbeings, but praying for those hostile toward her is a practice of Christian spiritu-ality that is alien to a Stoic’s sensibility.Vernezze’s eagerness to highlight parallels between the story of Job and theStoic attitude towards misfortune yields the objectionable claim that ‘by accept-ing the totality of what occurs with placid resolve, Stoicism approaches some-thing akin to faith’ (84). If by this Vernezze means simply that the Stoicsbelieved in divine providence and that the cosmos operates according to rightreason, which is the same as Fate, which is the same as Zeus’ will, then his claimis innocent enough. But if by ‘faith’ he means instead belief in an otherworldly,supernatural justice that rests on scriptural revelation rather than on logical proofor material evidence, then such a notion is squarely at odds with the this-worldlynaturalism, physicalism, and rationalism of Stoicism. The placid resolve of theStoic in accepting events does not resemble faith in a salvific afterlife.Despite these flaws, overall Vernezze does a decent job of explaining the basicappeal of Stoic thinking about everyday problems. The concise essays are wellwritten and generally succeed in easing the worries of the kind of reader who,like Vernezze himself, can find solace in Stoicism.Department of Philosophy and Department of Classical and Near Eastern StudiesCreighton UniversityOmaha NE 68178455BIBLIOGRAPHYDobbin, R.F. 1998. Epictetus. Discourses. Book 1. Translation with an introduction and commentary.Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ellis, Albert. 1998. A Guide to Rational Living. No. Hollywood: Wilshire Press.Frankl, Victor. 1959. Man’s Search for Meaning. New York: Washington Square Press.Gill, Christopher. 1995. Epictetus. The Discourses, the Handbook, Fragments. Translation revised byRobin Hard. London: Everyman.Goleman, Daniel. 1995. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam.Hays, Gregory. 2002. Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. A new translation with an introduction. NewYork: The Modern Library.Inwood, Brad. 1997. ‘Why Do Fools Fall in Love?’ Aristotle and After. Richard Sorabji ed. Bulletinof the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement 68. University of London.Jung, Carl. 1971. The Portable Jung. New York: Viking.Long, George trans. 1864. The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Boston: Ticknorand Fields.Oldfather, W.A. 1925, 1928. Epictetus. The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Frag-ments. Translation with Greek text. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress.Reydams-Schils, Gretchen. 2005. The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.Stephens, William O. 1996. Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves. Oxford Studies in Ancient Phi-losophy 14: 193-210.The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions. By JohnPeter Kenney. Routledge, 2005. Pp. xv + 160. $29.95 (paper). ISBN 0-415-28833-9.Phillip CaryApart from scholars with a specialized interest in mysticism, among whomthere is a great deal of disagreement, the dominant understanding of mysticismtoday is a simplified version of William James’ picture in The Varieties of Reli-gious Experience (1902), according to which a private and ineffable experienceof transcendence is expressed superficially and inadequately in the language ofthe mystic’s theology or ‘over-beliefs’. John Peter Kenney is among a growingnumber of scholars of Christian mysticism who follow instead BernardMcGinn’s view, according to which the theology of the mystics is more funda-mental to the phenomenon of mysticism than James’ picture makes it out to be.Kenney’s new book extends and deepens McGinn’s portrait of Augustine as thefounding father of the tradition of Western mystical theology, whose writings—more than his experience—originated several distinctive features of what wehave since come to call ‘mysticism’. To this task Kenney brings expertise notonly in Augustine but also in Augustine’s philosophical background, in particular456Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007)©Mathesis Publications

Don’t Worry, Be Stoic

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Don’t Worry, Be Stoic: Ancient Wisdom for Troubled Times, by Peter J. Vernezze

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