Although Strawson’s main aim in “On Referring ” was to argue that definite descriptions can be used referentially – that is, “to mention or refer to some individual person or single object..., in the course of doing what we should normally describe as making a statement about that person [or] object ” (1950, p. 320) – he denied that def-inite descriptions are always used referentially. The description in ‘Napoleon was the greatest French soldier ’ is not used referentially, says Strawson, since it is used not to mention an individual, but only “to say something about an individual already mentioned ” (p. 320). This is an example of what we may call a predicative use of a definite description, though such uses might be better illustrated by considering the false sentence (1) Washington was the greatest French soldier and noting that, unlike (2) Washington met the greatest French soldier, (1) is not about both Washington and someone else, but like (3) Washington was very short, about Washington only. The description in (1) is not “used to men-tion an individual, ” but only to say something about Washington. Strawson thought that predicative uses of definite descriptions would require a different account from referential ones. His reason presumably was this: if the description in (1) is used just to say something about Washington – to attribute a certain property to him – then (1) is false just in case Washington lacks that property. One way for Washington to lack the property attributed to him in (1
