Frank, Lily

Klincewicz, Michal

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttps://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uajb20The American Journal of BioethicsISSN: 1526-5161 (Print) 1536-0075 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20Genomic Obsolescence: What Constitutes anOntological Threat to Human Nature?Michal Klincewicz & Lily FrankTo cite this article: Michal Klincewicz & Lily Frank (2019) Genomic Obsolescence: WhatConstitutes an Ontological Threat to Human Nature?, The American Journal of Bioethics, 19:7,39-40, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2019.1618960To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2019.1618960Published online: 25 Jun 2019.Submit your article to this journal Article views: 3View Crossmark dataGenomic Obsolescence: WhatConstitutes an Ontological Threat toHuman Nature?Michal Klincewicz, Tilburg UniversityLily Frank, Eindhoven University of TechnologySparrow (2019) makes an argument concerning what hecalls the “ontological” consequences of genomic obsoles-cence through human genomic enhancement. The keyconsequence is a substantial (and negative, from a moralperspective) change to “our understanding of humannature” that includes a blurring of “the distinctionbetween people and products.” This consequence pro-vides a moral consideration that weighs against the useof genetic enhancement leading to obsolescence.There is an ambiguity in the ontological consequen-ces argument. Some of the consequences discussed focuson human beings’ own understanding of their nature: forexample, “enhancement … imputes a teleology to …human beings” (12, emphasis added). This consequencecould be problematic if it constitutes a misunderstandingof human nature, or if this way of thinking about humannature leads to other negative impacts. The other sort ofconsequence Sparrow discusses is directly tied to humannature itself: for example, “genetic enhancement wouldreduce the gap between people and products” (12). Notevery change to human nature is morally bad, but thechange that Sparrow has in mind is. This is because itwould be a type of change that would alter our funda-mental moral status, our ability to act as moral agentsand make demands as moral patients. Our target in thiscommentary is the latter type of consequence, the trulyontological consequence, rather than the consequence forour self-conception or our understanding ofhuman nature.We grant for the sake of argument two claimsendorsed Sparrow: (1) Human beings do not have ateleological nature—in other words, human beings areends in themselves, rather than things; (2) enhancementwill create generational genomic obsolescence. However,even if both (1) and (2) are true, this does not create amoral objection to genetic enhancement. A further prem-ise is required, (3), which states that introducing obsoles-cence will change or undermine our ontological status asends in ourselves—that is, it will undermine the funda-mental moral status of human beings. In the followingwe introduce two ways that one might understand (3)and argue that Sparrow does not make a convincing casefor either understanding.The first way to understand (3) is the essentialist ver-sion. Human beings derive their fundamental moral sta-tus from their genome. The second way to understand(3), the relationalist version, is that human beings derivetheir fundamental moral status from their embeddednessin relationships and communities, that is, the way thatthey are treated and treat others. There are passages inSparrow’s article that suggest both the essentialist andthe relationalist version of premise (3). Regardless ofwhich version Sparrow actually endorses, we do nothave evidence for thinking either version of moral statuswould be undermined by genetic enhancement and obso-lescence. This means that without further argument, themove from (1) and (2) to the conclusion that humansshould not be enhanced genetically is invalid.Let us look at the essentialist version first. There aretheorists who argue for the claim that having a genomeof the right natural kind makes one worthy of moral con-sideration on par with all members “of the kingdom ofends.” Francis Fukuyama, for example, argues thathuman beings possess “factor X,” which grounds humandignity and is unique to genetic humans: “Every memberof the human species possesses a genetic endowmentthat allows him or her to become a whole human being,an endowment that distinguishes a human in essencefrom other types of creatures” (Fukuyama 2003, 171).One could point out that, unlike H2O and water, there isnot a sufficiently sharp class of genetic sequences thatdelineate a natural kind for any species. There are span-drels, differences in expressivity of the same gene, atav-ism, the possible existence of “junk DNA,” and parallelevolution. Given this, biological taxonomies are the resultof a negotiation between functional and anatomical dif-ferences at the level of the phenotype and those found atthe level of the genotype. All this strongly suggests thatit is not clear which particular part of the genome andAddress correspondence to Lily Frank, Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, 5612AZ, TheNetherlands. E-mail: L.e.frank@tue.nlGene Editing to Produce ObsolescenceJuly, Volume 19, Number 7, 2019 ajob 39what sort of change to that part or other parts are onto-logically relevant to moral status.Arguably, the more convincing way to argue for theessentialist version of the missing premise is to say thatit concerns the part of the genome that is relevant to thefundamental capacities on which moral status is based,such as sentience, reason, or autonomy. We also takecapacities to be ideal targets for interventions for moralenhancement, since that approach allows to take individ-ual differences into account (Klincewicz, Frank, andSokolska 2018). In similar vein, the particular sequencesof DNA that play a part in an organism having the mor-ally relevant capacities may be different across speciesand individuals. If we change whichever part of the gen-ome helps realize the fundamental capacities on whichmoral status is based, then we indirectly affect moral sta-tus. However, enhancing the relevant capacity shouldnot negatively affect moral status, especially on theKantian tradition within which Habermas’s argumentsagainst enhancement are rooted (Habermas 2014). If thisis how Sparrow understands moral status, then he mustalso accept that it is not a continuous variable that canbe manipulated up or down. Instead, once one has moralstatus, one’s relationship to norms is fixed, even if therelevant capacity is enhanced. By analogy, enhancing theengine in one’s car does not change whether that car orany other car can or cannot break the speed limit on ahighway or whether it can or cannot be stolen. Thisapplies similarly for interventions that by accident ordesign may damage the relevant capacity. It is clear thatthis would be a morally undesirable outcome, but it isdifficult to see how this outcome would have any effecton moral status. Having one’s ability to reason, beautonomous, and so on diminish through disability ordisease does not affect moral status, so it is not clearwhy it should in the case of a genomic intervention goneawry. In sum, the essentialist reading needs more argu-ment than is provided in the article to be convincing.The other way to support premise (3) is relationally,that is, as the claim that human beings derive their moralstatus from the way they are treated, how they are inte-grated into communities, and how they function in rela-tionships. This is the kind of position that, for example,Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel take when inves-tigating the idea of moral status of robots (Coeckelbergh2010; Gunkel 2012, 2018). This approach is suggested bySparrow’s concern with the way in which the project ofenhancement “will involve a technological or instrumen-tal mode of relationship with the embryo and, by impli-cation, the future person [as product].” On the relationalreading of (3) it is natural to take into account a person’sselfconception of their and others’ moral status and alsotheir understanding of human nature. If we adopt thisversion of (3), then the purported problem of geneticobsolescence will rest on speculative claims about theways in which future human beings will regard and treatthemselves and others given widespread geneticenhancement. We agree with Sparrow’s method here inthat good evidence for such speculation can be generatedby appropriate analogies as we elsewhere used ana-logical reasoning to model future risks of technologiesthat quantify human relationships (Frank and Klincewicz2018). However, Sparrow’s consideration of the analogyto aging, significant in his speculations, is mistaken in atleast two ways. Contrary to his claim that ageing is uni-versal and uniform, people age differently. Furthermore,many societies hold the elderly in esteem. Another rele-vant analogy to future widespread genomic enhancementis past use of assisted reproductive technologies. Thelatter may be said to create the appearance of a techno-logical or instrumental relationship between parents (orothers) and embryos. However, its widespread use didnot lead to those persons being treated as products or toundermining their moral status. This challenges the ideathat the genetically obsolescent will be excluded from themoral community or anyone would be treated merely asmeans, as Sparrow predicts. To make a case for a rela-tional reading of better analogies need to be provided.In summary, we agree with Sparrow that genomicenhancement is likely to cause changes, but are not con-vinced that Sparrow makes a sufficient case that thischange is morally troubling. Social and legal instrumentsthat can be used to address the interests of humans disad-vantaged relative to some other group already exist. Weshould use these instruments more effectively and extendtheir reach to cover the interests of unenhanced humans,if the need arises. If Sparrow is right, genomic enhance-ment could generate a pressing need to strengthen legaland economic instruments that ensure equal treatmentunder law and ensure socioeconomic parity. REFERENCESCoeckelbergh, M. 2010. Robot rights? Towards a social-relationaljustification of moral consideration. Ethics and InformationTechnology 12(3): 209–221. doi: 10.1007/s10676-010-9235-5.Frank, L., and M. Klincewicz. 2018. Swiping left on the quantifiedrelationship: Exploring the potential soft impacts. The AmericanJournal of Bioethics 18(2): 27–28. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2017.1409833.Fukuyama, F. 2003. Our posthuman future: Consequences of thebiotechnology revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Gunkel, D. 2012. The machine question. Cambridge, MA: MITPress.Gunkel, D. J. 2018. Robot rights. Cambridge, MA and London:MIT Press.Habermas, J. 2014. The future of human nature. Hoboken: JohnWiley & Sons.Klincewicz, M., L. E. Frank, and M. Sokolska. 2018. Drugs andhugs: Stimulating moral dispositions as a method of moralenhancement. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:329–350. doi: 10.1017/S1358246118000437.Sparrow, R. 2019. Yesterday’s child: How gene editing forenhancement will produce obsolescence—and why it matters.American Journal of Bioethics 19(7): 6–15.The American Journal of Bioethics40 ajob July, Volume 19, Number 7, 2019

Genomic Obsolescence: What Constitutes an Ontological Threat to Human Nature?

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Genomic Obsolescence: What Constitutes an Ontological Threat to Human Nature?

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