In this thesis I discuss how existing inequlity and discrimination has shaped the discourse on biomedical enhancement and how the bioenhancement project can potentially exasperate them. In chapter one I discuss the most common objections against bioenhancement which include issues pertaining to cheating, praisworthyness, altering the nature of activities, coercion, quick fixes, distributive justice and authenticity. I then turn to ask why bioenhancement is desirable. I argue that bioenhancement proponents uphold a narrow understanding of autonomy, namely as control and increased choices which becomes a criterion for a good life. As such, cognitive capacities are desirable to the extent that they increase autonomy and wellbeing. In chapter two I continue this thread to argue that bioenhancement advocates understand disability as inherently bad to the extent that it is incompatible with autonomy as they envision it. To assess this claim I discuss different models of disability and argue in favor of a model of disability as neutral simpliciter. In the final chapter I discuss the issue of moral status as it is a key way in which the bioenhancement literature envisions future challenges in terms of equality. I explore the similarities in how moral status is discussed within animal ethics and within the bioenhancement literature. I explore how disability and animality are constructed as problems that biomedical enhancement can address and I conclude that biomedical enhancement is inherently incompatible to disability justice
