Dr Simon Hale-Ross, Lecturer in law at Leeds Law School and counterterrorism expert, questions the validity of Theresa May’s four-point plan, and illustrates that the current counterterrorism structure in the UK is more than adequate at dealing with the current terror threat posed

Hale-Ross, SA

Leeds Beckett Repository

6/29/2017Do we need more counter-terrorism powers? Why TheresaMay’s ‘four-point’ plan is redundantblogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy/counterterrorism-four-point-plan/Following the London Bridge attack in June 2017, the Prime Minister announced a four-pointplan to tackle terrorism. Simon Hale-Ross questions the validity of this plan, and illustrateshow the current counter-terrorism structure in the UK is more than adequate.Do we need more counter-terrorism powers? The short answer is no, we do not: the HumanRights Act 1998 is not the enemy, and the Prime Minister’s four-point plan is meaningless interms of dealing with the present terrorist threat. The current threat takes two forms, both ofwhich appear to be covered by recent reports that suggest up to 23,000 potential terrorists arecurrently in the UK.Countering radicalisationFirstly, there are those who have been radicalised at home and learn how to commit acts of terror through readingthe vast amounts of information on the Internet, disseminated by the Islamic State (IS) in their online magazine‘Dabiq’ and other dedicated websites. These citizens can potentially remain under law enforcements’ radar until themoment of an attack.Secondly, there are those who have left the UK to fight with terrorist groups such as IS, Al-Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda,and then have returned to the UK. The likelihood that these citizens are on a security list somewhere is increased,given that such travel is unlikely to be missed by UK and other international law enforcement agencies. Both formspose their own specific dangers and have been legislatively addressed. To counter the first form, the UK passed theInvestigatory Powers Act 2016.Whilst this is not a counter-terrorism power per se, it does introduce greater powers of online surveillance,specifically electronic communications data surveillance, and a section that allows for the decryption of messagingapplications and electronic devises.To deal with the second form, the UK enacted the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA), whichintroduced new pre-emptive specific powers aimed at stopping UK citizens from travelling to areas of conflict, to jointhe ranks of the IS, and to engage in terrorist military training. This law permits law enforcement agencies to seizepassports and travel documents from persons suspected of involvement in terrorism. Although a temporarymeasure, they were debated heavily during the enactment stages and led Lord Carlile, an ex-independent reviewerof UK counter-terrorism laws to state:Suppose a suspicious travel agent who is public-spirited telephones the police and says, ‘I have justsold an air ticket in suspicious circumstances’, and the authorities decide it is worth following theperson who has bought the air ticket. That kind of incident can occur within an hour, and it does notleave the time to go off to a judge to get permission to seize that passport. We have to allow theauthorities to deal with the urgent provisions made.Following this example and given that according to Mark Rowley, the Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner,at the very least a total of 700 UK citizens have travelled to Syria, with an estimated 400 having returned.1/3At this point, you would be forgiven for asking if there should be new counter-terrorism powers introduced to stopthose IS fighters from returning to the UK. Again, the short answer is no. Part of the CTSA allows the UKGovernment to temporarily exclude hardened military trained terrorist from returning to the UK, despite being UKcitizens.There are of course other types of pre-emptive legislative powers available for law enforcements’ use, subject to theSecretary of State’s authorisation. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM)represents another pre-emptive legalised measure, by prohibiting and restricting a suspected terrorist fromperforming certain tasks, and placing that individual under heavy surveillance. Such special executive orders areutilised when the state lacks the sufficient evidence to arrest and bring formal criminal charges. The measuresavailable are vast and range from an overnight residence restriction; travel and location exclusions; association andaccess to electronic information restrictions; movements monitored; and full financial and property transactionsdisclosure.Despite the fact that the counter-terrorism framework within the UK allows for such pre-emptive powers, their useappears to have been either non-existent, ineffective and/or simply sporadic.  In 2016, only six citizens weresubjected to a TPIM order. In relation to the amount of citizens returning from areas of conflict, this figure appears tobe extremely low.Removing online ‘safe spaces’In response to the ferociousness and the devastating nature of recent terrorist acts in London and Manchester, earlystate intervention is essential. This of course is what Theresa May meant in her first point, made following the attackin London on 3 June 2017. The second point however, focuses on the need for international agreements in order toremove the online ‘safe spaces extremism needs to breed’ .It is true that many Internet and application service providers are located overseas, and thereby not subject to UKlegislation. However, it is unlikely that any international agreement will alter the fact that law enforcement agencies,both national and international, are currently unable to monitor the Internet live. This capabilities gap was highlightedthe evening of the Manchester terror attack on the 22nd May 2017, where an Islamist supporter by the username of@owys663 tweeted ‘#ISLAMICSTATE #manchesterarena #UK #British WE HAVE MORE…..’ at 6:28pm, aroundfour hours prior to the event.2/3Dealing with segregated communitiesThe third point is intrinsically linked to the second where May suggests the safe spaces in the ‘real world’ are alsoremoved, by dealing with segregated communities. This would potentially be much more effective, empowering thepublic to be actively involved in challenging extremist views, thereby preventing terrorism. However, Muslimconverts, rather than those who have grown up within Islamic tradition, carry out the overwhelming majority ofterrorist attacks. So again, the effectiveness of tacking community segregation may not have the desired outcome,but rather drive a larger wedge, as the Muslim community is increasingly placed under suspicion.Imposing tougher sentencesThe fourth point simply suggests that prison terms be extended, specifically for criminalised pre-emptive measures,such as the collection of data likely to be useful to a terrorist under the Terrorism Act 2000, the dissemination of suchdata under the Terrorism Act 2006, and the encouragement to commit an act of terrorism also located under the2006 Act. Although such a measure would essentially stop the would-be-terrorist from committing an act, in thelonger term it may not achieve the desired result given the current problems of radicalisation in UK prisons.To conclude, the current counter-terrorism and surveillance framework is robust and more than adequate at dealingwith the current terrorist threat. It is simply a matter of utilising the powers more often and efficiently. However, inorder to achieve this, law enforcement agencies will undoubtedly require additional funding and resources, ratherthan an ineffective four-point plan created with the electorate in mind._____About the AuthorSimon Hale-Ross is Lecturer in Law at Leeds Beckett University.   Featured image credit: Pixabay/Public Domain3/3

The Prime Minister Theresa May’s ‘Four-Point’ Plan: Do we need more counterterrorism powers?

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