The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect.

Abstract

Practice theory provides important insight into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited however by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm / normative theory (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). Building on existing critiques (Duval and Chowdhury 2011; Schindler and Wille 2015) we argue that analyzing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s (2014) practice based account Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of 'ethical competence' (Frost 2009), we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence – e.g. ‘penholding’ – can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, UK and US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement R2P. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the P3’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of R2P-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm / normative theory