Downie, David Leonard

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Fairfield University DigitalCommons@Fairfield Politics Faculty Publications Politics Department 11-2014 Book Review: From Precaution to Profit by Brian Gareau David Leonard Downie Fairfield University, ddownie@fairfield.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/politics-facultypubs Copyright 2014 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press). Book review is archived here with permission from the copyright holders. Repository Citation Downie, David Leonard, "Book Review: From Precaution to Profit by Brian Gareau" (2014). Politics Faculty Publications. 17. https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/politics-facultypubs/17 Published Citation David Downie, Book Review: From Precaution to Profit by Brian Gareau, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2013), in Global Environmental Politics, 14(4):147-150 (November 2014). This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. Book ReviewsGareau, Brian J. 2013. From Precaution to Proﬁt: Contemporary Challenges to EnvironmentalProtection in the Montreal Protocol. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Reviewed by David L. DownieFairﬁeld UniversityThis interesting and well-researched book provides in-depth analysis of theongoing attempt to phase out methyl bromide (MeBr) under the Montreal Pro-tocol. It demonstrates how allowable exemptions, the inﬂuence of large andpredominantly California-based agricultural businesses, and expanding inﬂu-ence of neo-liberal economic and political paradigms have frustrated effortsto eliminate this toxic and ozone-depleting substance (ODS). Gareau arguesthat the success of economic interests in signiﬁcantly delaying the eliminationof methyl bromide in the United States and in the ozone regime is a worrisomeexample of the threat that neoliberalism poses for achieving the ultimate goal ofthe ozone regime and for effective global environmental politics in general.The book helps to ﬁll several important gaps in the secondary literature onthe ozone regime. MeBr is a powerful ODS used as a pesticide, as a fumigant inshipping containers and to sterilize soil, especially in commercial large-scalemonoculture settings. Its uses are different from, and have received far lessattention than, other ozone-depleting substances. The exemptions for MeBrare far broader and subject to far less review than for other substances within theMontreal Protocol process. These include a permissive “critical use exemption”for agriculture.Gareau provides the most detailed treatment to date of the political econ-omy of the MeBr issue and how agricultural lobbyists and their political allies,especially in the United States, have exploited the broader exemptions to keepusing MeBr in relatively large quantities despite the availability of effectivebut sometimes more costly substitutes. This analysis not only helps us under-stand the ongoing evolution of global ozone policy but also provides insightsregarding how to structure exemptions in international environmental treaties.From Precaution to Proﬁt also provides detailed discussions of other im-portant but understudied aspects of the ozone regime, including the domesticdebates that produced the US’ negotiating positions in the 1990s and 2000s;attempts by global civil society groups to inﬂuence policy in the US and EU;and the often-important roles of technical committees within the ozone regimein framing policy debates. As a sociologist, Gareau brings a different theoreticallens than most who have examined global environmental politics. Also, theGlobal Environmental Politics 14:4, November 2014, doi:10.1162/GLEP_r_00263© 2014 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology147book provides a useful counterpoint to the uniformly positive evaluations ofthe ozone regime. It is a valuable addition to the literature.The only potential issue is whether the book would beneﬁt from a betterunderstanding of the history of the ozone regime and global environmentalpolitics in general. Gareau argues that the ability of economic interests to exploitthe MeBr exemptions shows that the ozone regime is less effective now than in thepast, and that it has moved from an emphasis on precaution to one on proﬁt. Heviews this shift as evidence of increasing acceptance of neoliberal ideology, whichthreatens the ability of international actors to effectively manage global problemsand explains why the early ozone regime was more environmentally focused andeffective than it has become or than the climate regime is now.These observations have elements of truth, but they are sometimes pre-sented in what some might regard as an exaggerated fashion. Economic interestshave always compromised protection of the ozone layer, and there is really nodifference between how and why they do so now than they did in the past.European states essentially refused to discuss the possibility of coordinatingdomestic controls of chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) at the ﬁrst international meet-ings on the issue in the late 1970s. Europe (supported by Japan and Russia)prevented the 1985 Vienna Convention from including any control measures,rejecting arguments for taking precautionary action and stating that the lack ofscientiﬁc certainty did not warrant the cost to their domestic industries.1 Theheralded 50-percent cuts in the “precautionary” 1987 Montreal Protocol actuallyrequired only modest adjustment costs by the EU and Japan industries, as theirgovernments couldmeetmuch of the requirement through controls on CFC-aerosolsprays and other low hanging fruit.2 The 1990 agreements in London to eliminateall CFCs, while extraordinary, occurred after most major manufacturers announcedthey could substitute other chemicals. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Australia,China, the US, and others stated they could not support European argumentsthat a precautionary approach required accelerating the HCFC phaseout, in partbecause the proposed measures would be too expensive given the amount of envi-ronmental protection they would produce.In each case, countries pursued policies that favored particular domesticeconomic interests. The fact that this practice continues with MeBr exemptionsis not surprising, not a break from the past, and probably not indicative of somelarger issue or theoretical development. Some actors have always, and someactors likely will always, put private economic or other interests ahead of com-mon environmental interests. We should not be surprised to ﬁnd politics goingon in the ozone regime.The potential exploitation of critical use exemptions (CUEs) was foreseenwhen they were created. CUEs were designed by their backers to be easy to use.Gareau’s book contains too little discussion of the origins of the exemptions,1. Benedick 1998.2. Downie 1996.148 • Book Reviewsdetails that would have informed the overall discussion. CUEs were allowed forMeBr, in part because exemptions had already been allowed for CFCs andhalons. In the end, the EU and others decided that CUEs were an acceptableprice to pay for an agreement by the US, Kenya, and other countries to cutand eventually phase out MeBr. Was that compromise a mistake? Perhaps,perhaps not, but exemptions are a key tool in overcoming the lowest commondenominator problem.3 In any event, one can easily argue that the origins anddesign of the CUEs, which intentionally limited the ability of the treaty’sgoverning processes to reduce them without agreement by the country using them(despite the impression given by some people interviewed for the book), is anequally plausible explanation of whyMeBr use continues under the ozone regime.One does not need to believe that precaution has been rejected or that theozone regime has broken down to understand why actors continue to pursueCUEs and other exemptions—or why some developing countries might optout of the ﬁnal HCFC phaseout. Indeed, the success of the regime in slowingthe pace of ozone depletion allows these actors to argue that the economicbeneﬁts of the MeBr exemptions outweigh the environmental costs. This argu-ment is the same that some European countries made about CFCs in the 1970sand 1980s and that the US and others made regarding HCFCs for most of the2000s.Finally, the book sometimes overstates the importance of MeBr CUEson the ultimate success or failure of the ozone regime. MeBr emissions havedeclined dramatically since 1995 and the amount of MeBr used via CUEs hasdeclined signiﬁcantly as well.4 Indeed, the agreement to phase-out MeBr butallow CUEs, even with all the shenanigans that Gareau correctly details, haslikely produced a greater reduction in MeBr production and use than wouldhave occurred with a longer phase-out schedule and no allowance for CUEs.The millions of tons of CFCs, HCFCs, and halons leaking from foams andequipment no longer in use comprise the largest current source of ODS-weightedemissions of ozone-depleting substances,5 and their potential impact on theozone layer dwarfs that of MeBr. MeBr CUEs, and their quarantine and pre-shipment uses constitute important ODS emissions, but it is extremely unlikelythey will decide the fate of the ozone layer.The ozone regime has been remarkably successful. It is far from perfect,however, and humankind cannot yet be certain it has saved stratospheric ozonefrom serious deterioration. From Precaution to Proﬁt does an excellent job of re-minding us of this uncertainty by revealing important elements of the politicaleconomy of MeBr. It is an important story, and this is an excellent book. But weshould be careful about trying to build complex theoretical arguments whensimple and durable explanations are available.3. Chasek et al. 2014.4. United Nations 2013.5. WMO et al. 2011.David L. Downie • 149ReferencesBenedick, Richard. 1998. Ozone Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.Chasek, Pamela S., David Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown. 2014. Global EnvironmentalPolitics, 6th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Downie, David. 1996. Understanding International Environmental Regimes: The Origin, Creationand Expansion of the Ozone Regime. Ph.D. dissertation. Chapel Hill: University of NorthCarolina.United Nations 2013. Report of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Parties to the MontrealProtocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Bangkok, October 21–25,a2013. United Nations Document, UNEP/OzL.Pro.25/9.WMO, UNEP, NOAA, NASA, and European Commission Directorate-General for Research.2011. Scientiﬁc Assessment of Stratospheric Ozone: 2010. Geneva: World MeteorologicalOrganization.150 • Book Reviews

Book Review: From Precaution to Profit by Brian Gareau

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Book Review: From Precaution to Profit by Brian Gareau

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