Replication Data for: "The formateur's bonus in European constitutional monarchies, 1901-1999"

Abstract

The readme file and replication data for "The formateur's bonus in European constitutional monarchies, 1901-1999".In this paper, we examine bonuses garnered by government formateurs in all European democracies that began the 20th century as constitutional monarchies. Using a new dataset on how portfolios were allocated in each democratic coalition cabinet formed 1901-1999, we show that formateurs’ bonuses were positive and significant when the monarch still exercised discretion in choosing them but declined after the monarch’s role was constrained. Relatedly, Gamson’s Law was more strongly violated when monarchs played a larger role. After identifying the dates at which monarchs were constrained, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis, comparing formateurs’ bonuses in each reformed country with those in otherwise similar countries that did not reform at the same time. The results support the hypothesis that greater royal discretion engendered larger formateurs’ bonuses