Maker, John

English

Histoire sociale / Social History (E-Journal, York University)

Histoire sociale – Social History, vol. XXXIX, no 78 (novembre-November 2006)Comptes rendus / Book Reviews 567PRIOR, Robin, and Trevor WILSON — The Somme. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2005.Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson’s book The Somme will certainly please a number ofhistorians, but will most likely rankle a good many others. This is probably the mostcomprehensively researched and detailed “ground-up” reconstruction of Britain’smost costly battle yet produced. However, the operational reconstruction is couchedin a more purposeful theoretical approach. The authors intend to test some well-entrenched myths by examining the battle, its planning and its execution, in minutedetail. In so doing, the authors also construct a top-down battle (and pre-battle) nar-rative. While the authors’ arguments proceed quite logically, they tend to paint thedecisions made — almost invariably viewed as political, strategic, and tactical blun-ders — in black and white. The resulting work is both engaging and often convinc-ing, especially regarding “sharp-end” operations, but it also suffers at times from arigidity that precludes any alternative interpretation of the sources.Prior and Wilson examine some well-worn myths that have recently come undergeneral assault concerning strategic leadership in the British army during the FirstWorld War. Probably the most enduring myth — and the one most directly engaged— is the “Lions Led By Donkeys” argument that presents British generals, especiallySir Douglas Haig, as insular, stupid, and wasteful of men’s lives. The result is not avindication of Haig, but a reaffirmation of the traditional line. Haig and 4th Armycommander General Sir Henry Rawlinson are soundly condemned for what theauthors consider their mishandling of the battle.The authors begin by suggesting that the War Committee’s decision to approve thecampaign was the first, and perhaps most serious, blunder. Thus Prior and Wilsonshift some of the blame to Britain’s political leaders. For the most part, however, thenarrative deals with both Haig and Rawlinson. Strategically and tactically these menare lambasted. There is a sense throughout the book — familiar to generations ofGreat War students — that where blame needs to be laid, it should be laid at the top.Of course, this all assumes that blame needs to be apportioned. The authors establishonly a scant argumentative framework for or against the relative wisdom of actuallyundertaking such a battle. It is assumed that the Somme was an unmitigated disaster.Thus the Somme is still folly and Haig is still to blame, but now the politicians mustshare some of the burden. The authors point out that some generals, notably Rawlin-son, saw the value of alternative tactical options. That these newer tactics were notundertaken in 1916, and had to wait until 1917, is ascribed to High Command’s men-tal torpor. The authors paint Rawlinson as being either strategically stultified (likeHaig) or, if showing promise, too acquiescent to Haig’s demands. In either case, themessage is clear: by acting like Haig, Rawlinson was ineffective. The clear implica-tion supports the now time-tested theory that Haig was obtuse, old-fashioned, andresistant to change.First World War historiography has taught us two main (but contradictory) lessonsabout the Battle of the Somme. The first is that the Somme was very costly and pro-duced minimal gains. It rightfully points out that minimal territorial gains were made,but also that the show was not worth the price of admission. The second lesson, spear-page511.fm Page 567 Thursday, April 5, 2007 12:06 PM568 Histoire sociale / Social HistoryHistoire sociale – Social History, vol. XXXIX, no 78 (novembre-November 2006)headed recently by Gary Sheffield, is that, both operationally and strategically, theSomme was, in fact, a British victory: “[it] should not be dismissed simply as a bloodydisaster” (Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 2002, p. 185). Sheffield points out that,whatever one says of Haig, Britain ended the war on the winning side. Contrary toPrior and Wilson’s “butcher bill” analysis, Sheffield suggests that, despite losingmore men, the British were better able to absorb the losses they sustained than werethe Germans. Operational military historians have also noted some of the benefits theBritish army derived from its Somme experience in terms of battle doctrine and trenchwarfare tactics. Indeed, Prior and Wilson anticipate this by pointing out that thesesame tactics and doctrine existed before the Somme, indeed Rawlinson advocatedtheir use, but they were not consistently applied during the battle, and this was Raw-linson’s failing. It is commonplace to say, but nevertheless true, that Haig and the pol-iticians did not have a “Somme” from which to draw any experience in June 1916.That they took the lessons learned in the Somme and subsequently applied demon-strably more successful tactics as a result should, on balance, count toward theircredit. Conversely, however, that Haig was at the head of the victorious army does not,or should not, mean that ipso facto he planned the war efficiently and effectively.Despite the fact that Prior and Wilson still level blame at Haig and Rawlinson,their detailed examination of the decisions made on a day-by-day basis tends to sup-port the old adage that, at the Somme, lions were led by donkeys. On the other hand,their evidence suggests that the common infighting between the higher commanders,the fact that Rawlinson often disagreed with Haig’s orders, and the fact that theseofficers repeatedly tried to come up with workable plans would indicate that theywere not necessarily profligate with the lives of their men, but tried — albeit unsuc-cessfully — to undermine the German defence. The authors, however, do not reachsuch conclusions. Historians critical of Haig have paid too little attention to theexcellent German defensive system. As Prior and Wilson often point out, this systemconsisted of three lines and was often miles deep. That Haig and Rawlinson had trou-ble cracking the German defence seems understandable.Even where other historians have praised the British high command for its innova-tion — for example in regard to the September 15 battle of Flers-Courcelette inwhich tanks were first employed — the authors find the methods employed wanting.They admit that these novel weapons might have given a tactical advantage, but againthe commanders failed to plan properly. Simply put, Rawlinson was not sure of thetanks’ capabilities and so devised plans in which the creeping barrage would sport100-metre gaps so that the tanks could advance without fear of succumbing to Britishartillery. The problem was that 1916 tanks moved at about two miles per hour: slowerthan walking pace. If the infantry were to advance with the tanks, the men wouldneed to move more slowly than normal across No Man’s Land, toward an enemy thatwas unencumbered by the usual bombardment upon which British infantrymen hadcome to rely. The authors comment that the appearance of the tank “[i]ronically ...denied them the established sustenance of the creeping barrage and replaced it witha vulnerable substitute of doubtful efficacy” (p. 220). Here again, as in numerousother areas, the authors overstep the bounds of evidentiary support. They claim that,because Rawlinson decided the tank would “be substituted for the creeping barrage”page511.fm Page 568 Thursday, April 5, 2007 12:06 PMHistoire sociale – Social History, vol. XXXIX, no 78 (novembre-November 2006)Comptes rendus / Book Reviews 569at some points along the front, he now felt the tanks possessed the equivalence of “hismost powerful weapon — the artillery” (p. 221). Nowhere does this seem to be thecase, however. The creeping barrage, it was feared, would damage the tanks. Further,the authors point out that the barrage would be re-imposed once the attack reachedthe German third line, thereby acting in support of a deeper armoured and infantrypenetration. Neither the gaps in the barrage, nor its total re-imposition along thewhole front as the attack proceeded, suggest that the armour was seen as anything buta novel (although hopefully decisive) support weapon. Paradoxically, the authorsexplain that the New Zealand Division and the 41st Division made substantial gainson September 15 and that in fact the fire plan and the tanks, for the most part, per-formed well. Such evidence can, perhaps, point to the fact that Rawlinson’s plan foremploying the tanks was at least somewhat well-founded.The authors also attempt to dispel the “myth” that on the first day of the Sommethe infantry marched single-file like lambs to the slaughter. In fact, they point out thatonly a minority of the divisions involved acted in such a manner. Instead, some unitsmoved out into No Man’s Land under cover of darkness; some rushed the enemytrenches as quickly as possible; others worked in smaller groups to attack more easilyachieved objectives. But such tactics were employed only because lower command-ers — or maybe division and corps commanders — sanctioned their use, not becauseRawlinson or Haig had directed them. The two senior field commanders are thusawarded no credit for the employment of such tactics, even though Rawlinson hadsuggested their use. Instead, he is criticized for allowing his subordinates the flexibil-ity to choose how they should cross the battlefield based on local topographical con-ditions. Other historians might well label such flexibility “leadership”. Prior andWilson suggest that it was folly to come up with potentially battle-winning tacticaladvancements and then not to order the use of such innovations. Notwithstanding allthis, the authors argue convincingly that, whatever new tactics were employed onJuly 1, they were doomed to failure because the artillery programme (particularlyregarding counter-battery and wire-cutting shoots) was inadequate. Finally, theinfantry is comprehensively rehabilitated: “Whatever failings the Somme demon-strated in the British army, it is hard to argue that the performance of the combatinfantry was one of them” (p. 304).Overall, this book commends itself to people holding two diametrically opposedviews. There are those who argue that Haig and the British high command wereindeed poor generals that promiscuously flung human bodies against probably themost formidable defensive system ever devised. In this interpretation, despite daysand weeks spent planning, these generals simply could not crack the German wall —mainly due to their incompetence — and thus were failures. Others, like Sheffield,are more sympathetic to the generals’ plight. In this book both will find an impecca-ble and detailed operational reconstruction of the battle that, despite its negative crit-icism of the generals and its frequently inflexible analysis, reveals just what theBritish army and its commanders faced and why, therefore, they failed to defeat theKaiser’s army in the summer of 1916.John MakerUniversity of Ottawapage511.fm Page 569 Thursday, April 5, 2007 12:06 PM

Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson — The Somme

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Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson — The Somme

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Histoire sociale / Social History (E-Journal, York University)