Charters, David A.

English

University of New Brunswick: Centre for Digital Scholarship Journals

Winter 2006160Book ReviewsByman, Daniel.  Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005. For the past quarter-century the issue of state-sponsorship of terrorism hasbeen a thorny diplomatic problem and a challenge for the scholarly study of ter-rorism. The debate over the subject, particularly over the alleged Soviet role insponsoring terrorism, became mired in strident rhetoric colored by ideologicaldifferences and exacerbated by the absence of hard evidence. What terrorismscholars failed to provide to the debate at the time was a comprehensive and dis-passionate analysis of the issue. With his book, Deadly Connections: States ThatSponsor Terrorism, Georgetown University professor Daniel Byman has recti-fied that failure and in doing so has performed a great service to the academicstudy of terrorism. He brings to the subject impressive academic and profession-al qualifications, including staff work on the 9/11 Commission. The result is aclear-eyed analysis that will be of benefit to every scholar who studies terrorism.It also should be taken seriously by those in government service who have towrestle with this complex problem.Byman opens with the obligatory nod to the debate over definitions of ter-rorism. To the relief of this reader he does not dwell on it at length. He effectivelyadopts Bruce Hoffman’s definition, adding only a caveat limiting the term to thedeliberate targeting of non-combatants. Thus, in his view, al-Qaeda’s attack onthe USS Cole was not terrorism. This standpoint might be challenged by someterrorism scholars, but it does not detract from the central argument of the book.Indeed, Byman provides the clearest explanation this reviewer has seen on whatstate sponsorship of terrorism means. He defines it as “a government’s inten-tional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its politicalactivities, or sustain the organization.” (p. 10) The forms of help may includeproviding weapons, training, funding, sanctuary, strategic direction, and politicalsupport. His ‘model’ distinguishes between those states that sponsor terrorismwittingly and those that do so indirectly or simply because they are too weak tooppose the terrorists. He goes on to explain the different reasons why states offersponsorship, the impact it has on the terrorist groups and their sponsors, and theconstraints it imposes on counter-terrorism. The author uses seven case studies to illustrate the effects — both positiveand negative — state support has on terrorist groups and the sponsors them-selves. These include four active sponsors:  Iran, Syria, Pakistan, andAfghanistan; and three passive: Saudi Arabia, Greece, and the United States (thelatter in respect of the Provisional IRA). The Soviet role in supporting terrorists,which is now a matter of documented record, is mentioned only in passing. (p.The Journal of Conflict Studies1611) That subject would benefit from the application of Byman’s approach, if onlyto finally clear the air after the rancorous debates of the 1980s. But, apparently,that will have to wait for another scholar.     The cases show that training assistance is the most common form of sup-port. They also indicate that funding is the most important. But, Byman argues,it is by providing sanctuary that state sponsors permit groups to become morepowerful, since it allows them to recruit, organize, train, and plan safely beyondthe reach of their enemies. Nevertheless, he makes it clear that sponsorship is asymbiotic ‘two-way street’ for terrorists and their sponsors, and not simply a uni-directional benefit for the terrorists. Sponsors support terrorism to advance theirown goals and usually impose constraints on the terrorists’ activities, if onlybecause those activities can rebound against the sponsor. This is where Byman’s study makes a truly original contribution: examin-ing critically the benefits and costs to sponsors. Iran and Syria were able to usetheir sponsorship of terrorism to further their strategic or ideological goals withsome success. But this practice was not risk-free. It led Syria into disastrous con-frontations with Israel, and Syria was blamed for Abu Nidal’s attacks in 1985-86simply for hosting the group on its territory. Likewise, Iran’s support forHezbollah while scoring successes against the United States, but at the price ofdiplomatic isolation and economic hardship. But nothing illustrates the ‘downmarket’ side of the terrorist/sponsor equation better than the case of the Talibanregime’s support for al-Qaeda. That relationship was so unbalanced in terms ofrelative power and resources that the roles became reversed. Sanctuary inAfghanistan gave al-Qaeda the secure base it needed to prepare for its globaljihad, a clear benefit to the group. But the Taliban were so dependent on al-Qaeda for funding and fighting capabilities that they could not afford to shed thatalliance even when al-Qaeda escalated its attacks against the United States. Ofcourse, it is not clear that they wished to do so anyway, and after 9/11 that sealedtheir fate.Byman also offers a penetrating analysis of the problems that state spon-sorship poses for those countries that wish to defeat or deter sponsored terrorists.A state’s protection, support, and sanctuary make it difficult for the terrorists’enemies to deliver a ‘knockout’ blow against the group, bring them to justice, orde-legitimize their cause. Furthermore, although the Libyan case suggests thatstates can be persuaded or coerced into abandoning their terrorist clients, it alsoshows that the process is by no means easy. The instruments available to gov-ernments and the international community — political or economic pressure,engagement, using force, or supporting opposition groups — have limited utili-ty; indeed, they can prove to be ‘two-edged swords.’ States which support ter-rorism primarily for strategic reasons may change their policies when the costsof sponsoring terrorism exceed the benefits. But radical regimes, such as Iran andthe Taliban, have been particularly difficult to dissuade because much of theirWinter 2006162domestic legitimacy is invested in and rests on supporting like-minded revolu-tionary movements. Byman feels that such regimes will abandon that supportonly when their ideological fervor is superceded by pragmatic concerns, such aseconomics. Byman closes the book by suggesting some guidelines for governmentswishing to persuade state sponsors to abandon their clients. First, he emphasizesthat they need to understand what the state gets from sponsorship, as this willdetermine the most effective tools of dissuasion. Second, they must offer spon-sors a way out that provides incentives for change without appearing to rewardpast support for terrorism. Third, governments must set priorities and stick tothem. Byman favors a multilateral approach and creating a strong norm againststate sponsorship. Finally, he urges governments to adopt realistic expectationsabout what can be achieved. They must be willing to settle for degrees ofprogress over time rather than expecting and requiring complete success.   The book may be criticized on several fronts. As suggested earlier,Byman’s choice of definition is likely to leave him open to attack, but that wouldbe the case no matter which definition he chose. It is not an argument he couldever win. Critics might be on stronger ground questioning his heavy reliance onofficial and secondary sources and the lack of original documents. The author hashad to infer motives and other assumptions from less than authoritative sources,which leave his conclusions open to challenge. Yet, given the secretive nature ofterrorist groups and their sponsors, and of the security organizations that workagainst them, it is hard to suggest what other sources he might have used. He hasmade good use of material in the public domain to develop solid analysis andsound judgements that do not go beyond the evidence. Nor has he suggested thathis is the last word on the subject. Rather, Byman has provided an analyticalmodel for understanding the phenomenon of state sponsorship of terrorism thatshould encourage other scholars to revisit the cases he discussed as well as thosehe did not explore. That is the major contribution of this work, and it is no smallachievement.David A. Charters is a Professor in the Department of History at the Universityof New Brunswick.Martel, William C.  Victory in War:  Foundations of Modern Military Policy.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.In an era that is dominated by the global war on terrorism and persistent“post-war” violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no more relevant and per-tinent question for scholars and policy makers than what constitutes victory in

Byman, Daniel. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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Byman, Daniel. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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