For psychologists, the problem of induction has to do with distinguishing between generalizations people are likely to make and those that they are not. Similarity, an important construct in categorization, analogy, and problem solving, has been proposed as a constraint on induction. Feature models have been used to define the role played by similarity in influencing inductive inference. This thesis focuses on similarity of relational structure as an inductive constraint, as well as on overlap of features, which has been the focus of much previous work on the role of similarity in induction. In Experiment 1, inductive inferences were more likely to the extent that two concepts shared commonalities, and were less likely to the extent that concepts had differences. These results are consistent with predictions of feature models of similarity. Using novel concepts as stimuli, subjects either (1) rated the probability of conclusions for arguments that varied in the number of commonalities and differences between concepts contained in the premise, or (2) rated the similarity of the same set of concepts. Both likelihood judgments and similarity ratings increased with the number of commonalities between the two concepts. Experiments 2-4 evaluated a structural view of similarity that distinguishes between attributes and relations as an inductive constraint. This distinction is not made by feature models of similarity. In these experiments, similarity was decomposed into attributes and relations. Results show that for a relation to influence the perceived similarity between base and target concepts, it must be shared. Conversely, for a relation to influence the inductive strength of an argument, it must connect an attribute shared by the base and target concepts to the attribute being mapped from base to target. In other words, shared attributes and relations matter for similarity; shared attributes and the connectivity of mapped to shared features matters for induction. Experiments 5-7 extended results of Experiment 2-4, which used a causal relation, to arguments involving a relation of developmental precedence. A final experiment generalized results of earlier studies to familiar natural categories.Ph.D.PsychologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/104162/1/9500978.pdfDescription of 9500978.pdf : Restricted to UM users only
