Constitutional Court activism and European legal standards

Abstract

Ljudska i manjinska prava i slobode doživljavaju krajem dvadesetog i početkom dvadeset prvog stoljeća pravi procvat i sveukupnu afirmaciju svuda u svijetu, a osobito u Europi. Veliki doprinos tome dali su Europa i njezine asocijacije, zapravo Vijeće Europe svojom zakonodavnom aktivnošću te Europski sud za ljudska prava svojom jurisprudencijom, kojom je pokazao da uspješno izvršava svoju zadaću zaštite ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. U normativnoj djelatnosti Vijeća Europe kojom ona uređuje ljudska prava i temeljne slobode, svakako najznačajnije mjesto u nomenklaturi njezinih pravnih akata zauzima Konvencija za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. No ona, kao i mnogi drugi međunarodni pravni akti, pati od općenitih formulacija, načela i standarda kojima nije egzaktno i cjelovito određen sadržaj. Radi ostvarivanja ciljeva i svrhe same Konvencije, vezanih uz razvoj, ostvarivanje i zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda te na osnovi toga doprinošenja ostvarivanju zajedničkih vrijednosti i ciljeva koji proizlaze iz zajedničkog naslijeđa političke tradicije, ideala slobode i vladavine prava, Vijeće Europe nije moglo ostati samo na normativnoj razini, već je ustanovilo Europski sud za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Samu normativnu razradu ostvarivanja i zaštite ljudskih prava Konvencija je primarno uredila kao pravo i dužnost država ugovornica, a tek supsidijarno kao nadležnost Europskog suda. U obavljanju navedene zadaće Vijeće Europe je pred svoje članice i sam Europski sud postavilo imperativni cilj koji kvalitativno mora ispuniti zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, sadržan u zahtjevu da se ljudska prava i temeljne slobode ne mogu štititi samo formalno, već da se mora osigurati i njihova realna zaštita. U provedbi zaštite konvencijski utvrđenih ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda Europski sud se vrlo brzo susreo s čitavim nizom problema koji proizlaze iz općenitosti i nedovoljne određenosti pojedinih njezinih normi. Pritisnut zahtjevom da mora u svom postupanju osigurati djelotvornu, kako formalnu, tako i realnu zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, Europski sud je sam primjenom sudskog aktivizma i metode evolutivnog tumačenja konvencijskog sadržaja, polazeći od ideala i vrednota izraženih u samoj Preambuli Konvencije, počeo zauzimati stajališta u kojima je izražavao što on razumijeva pod sadržajem pojedinog prava i temeljne slobode što ih utvrđuje Konvencija. Takav njegov rad imao je i ima znatan utjecaj na rad svih, a ponajviše ustavnih sudova u razvoju kvalitete pružanja zaštite ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. U ovom radu nastoji se povući razlikovanje između diskrecijske ocjene u postupanju i odlučivanju upravnih tijela od metode slobodnog tumačenja pravnih normi i propisa, na jednoj strani te od sudskog aktivizma na drugoj. Naravno da se nastoji ukazati i na zajedničke karakteristike koje povezuju navedene načine postupanja upravnih i sudbenih tijela te tumačenja pravnih normi i pravnih propisa. Nadalje, nastojalo se u kratkim crtama prikazati razvoj sudskog aktivizma, zatim ukazati na najprezentnije oblike njegova ispoljavanja u praksi Europskog suda i Ustavnog suda za ljudska prava Republike Hrvatske te na neke aspekte međusobnog utjecaja. Također, rad se bavi prednostima i nedostacima sudskog aktivizma, posebice s aspekta očuvanja temeljne linije razdvajanja između zakonodavne i sudbene vlasti te opasnosti da se primjenom pretjeranog sudskog aktivizma ne prijeđe ova linija i da sudbena vlast ne počne zadirati pa i preuzimati zakonodavne prerogative.Human and minority rights and freedoms flourished and achieved overall affirmation at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century everywhere in the world, particularly in Europe. A significant contribution was made by Europe and its associations namely the Council of Europe with its legislative activity and the European Court of Human Rights with its jurisprudence by which it showed that it fulfilled its obligations regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the normative activity of the Council of Europe by which it regulates human rights and fundamental freedoms, certainly the most significant place in the nomenclature of its legal acts is held by its Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, this, like many other international legal acts, suffers in terms of general formulation, principles and standards by which its content is not precisely and entirely defined. To achieve the aims and goals of the very Convention which are linked to the development, achievement and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and on this basis contribute to achieving the common values and aims emerging from commonly inherited political tradition, ideals of freedom and rule of law, the Council of Europe could not rest at the normative level. Instead, it established the European Court of Human Rights. By this very normative formulation, the Convention has primarily regulated achieving and protecting human rights, setting itself as the law and obligations of member states, and then regulated subsidiarily through the supervision of the European Court. In the implementation of the mentioned tasks, Council of Europe has set its members and the European Court itself the imperative goal which must ensure quality protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This is contained in the demand that human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot only be protected formally, but their real protection mist be ensured as well. In implementing protection of the Convention established by human rights and fundamental freedoms, the European Court very quickly encountered a range of problems emerging from the general and insufficiently determined individual norms. The European Court was under pressure from the demand that it has to in its activity ensure effective, both formal and real protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. So, it applied court activism and methods of evolving interpretation of convention contents starting from the ideals and values expressed in the very preamble of the Convention. It thus began to take the stance which expressed what it understood to be the content of certain rights and fundamental freedoms established by the convention. Such activity by the Court had and has significant influence on everyone’s activities, in particular constitutional courts in the development of offering quality protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This paper attempts to differentiate between discretionary grades in procedure and decision making in administrative bodies from, on the one hand, methods of free interpretation of legal norms and regulations and, on the other hand, from judicial activism. Of course, it also attempts to demonstrate the common characteristics which link the mentioned procedures of administrative and judicial bodies, and the interpretation of legal norms and regulations. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to briefly demonstrate the development of judicial activism, and then to show the most present forms of its manifestation in the practice of the European Court and Constitutional Court for Human Rights in the Republic of Croatia and some of the aspects of mutual influence. Also, this paper deals with the advantages and disadvantages of judicial activism, particularly from the aspect of preserving fundamental lines of separation between legislative and judicial powers and the dangers that the application of exaggerated judicial activism does not overstep this line and that judicial powers do not begin to interfere with and begin to take the legislative prerogative

    Similar works