Professionalizing Public Administration(s)? The Cases of Performance Audit in Canada and the Netherlands

Abstract

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS V ACRONYMS VII INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I – RESEARCH PROBLEM: THE PERFORMANCE AUDIT SYSTEM 15 PART ONE: THEORY 35 BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION 35 CHAPTER II – PERFORMANCE AUDIT LITERATURE REVIEW 41 CHAPTER III – PROFESSIONAL THEORIES 87 CHAPTER IV – THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 113 CHAPTER V – COINING AN EQUATION 143 PART TWO: CANADA 171 INTRODUCTION 171 CHAPTER VI – PROFESSIONAL POLITICS GOES DOWN TO OTTAWA 173 CHAPTER VII – ESCAPING THE AUDIT SOCIETY? 217 CHAPTER VIII – BACK TO THE FUTURE 253 PART THREE: THE NETHERLANDS 289 INTRODUCTION 289 CHAPTER IX – ISLANDS OF PERFORMANCE 293 CHAPTER X – THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARK 329 CHAPTER XI – VBTB: THE DEVIL LIES IN THE DETAILS 373 EPILOGUE – A SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE? 423 PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 435 INTRODUCTION 435 CHAPTER XII – VALUING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT ISSUES 437 CHAPTER XIII – CROSS-CASE COMPARISON 481 CHAPTER XIV – PROFESSIONALIZING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (S)? 507 ABSTRACTS 529 REFERENCES 535 TABLE OF CONTENTS 569 LIST OF TABLES 581 LIST OF FIGURES 583 DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN EN DOCTORATEN IN DE SOCIALE EN CULTURELE ANTROPOLOGIE IThis dissertation is the output of a deductive research into the emergence, in OECD's countries, of a performance audit system composed of three somewhat coordinated layers: performance audit, internal audit, and internal control. The objective is to anticipate the emergence of a debate as to the implementation of such a system in federal Belgium. Two research questions are derived: a theoretical one (how to explain the emergence of the research objects?) and an empirical one (do the research objects actually emerge in OECD countries?). Part one reviews the performance audit and sociology of professions literature in search for an explanatory hypothesis. The will of synthesizing the incommensurable but equally relevant hypotheses of functionalism (public audit fulfils a given policy objective) and monopolism (public audit results from the imperialism of the accounting profession) brought forward in both fields leads to adopt Andrew Abbott's System of Profession theory as main theoretical hypothesis. In order to falsify it empirically, it is translated into the equation "Y = ABC + ABcDeF". This means that a given public administration, in order to obtain a jurisdiction like performance audit, internal audit and internal control, should first, claim it ("A"). This claim should moreover fit in a public policy ("B"). Theoretically, these two conditions are sufficient for a jurisdiction to emerge, provided that no other public administration already performs it ("C"). If this jurisdiction is already occupied ("c"), the claimant group should moreover ambit the jurisdiction ("D"), the incumbent must be perceived as having failed to perform its work on a satisfactory way ("e"), and the local system of professions should allow such shifts occurring ("F"). It is proposed to systematically confront empirical evidence from Canada and the Netherlands with this theoretical hypothesis in order to assess its explanatory value. Part two analyses seven cases in Canada. Performance audit emerges shortly after another jurisdiction related to the scientific establishment of the budget. It carries with it another jurisdiction, related to the organization of the departmental production of effectiveness studies to be reviewed by the performance auditor. The latter even tries to federate both groups in a wider one of comprehensive auditors, but fails. Jurisdictions of internal audit and financial internal control are carved out of a more general management jurisdiction in the aftermath of a political scandal. Part three analyses nine cases in the Netherlands. Performance audit first fails in the absence of a professional provider. It is the delegation of the financial audit jurisdiction to public accountants that frees up the resources for developing performance audit. Internal audit is a remote consequence of this delegation: when a reform expands departmental reports to financial and management information beyond financial one, the public accountants are upgraded to internal auditors; internal control being the object of their work. In the current case study, departmental internal auditors are merging together. Aimed at sparing on financial audit work to develop consulting activities, this episode could threaten at term the performance audit jurisdiction. Part four bridges the gap between theoretical expectations and empirical evidence. After having re-examined the measurement decisions, it proceeds to the cross-case comparison. This confirms that the equation "Y = ABC + ABcDe" adequately explains the emergence of performance audit, internal audit and internal control in the public sector of OECD countries, with, however, two nuances. On the one hand, the within-case analyses have allowed deleting condition "F": theoretically suspending competition, it requires suppression because competition is an emerging phenomenon. On the other hand, the cross-case analysis indicates that conditions "C" and "c" could be deleted from the equation, with an eye on theoretical parsimony: they are somewhat implied by the relevance or not of conditions "D" and "e". But because conditions "C" and "c" allow observing the transition from a non-competitive to a competitive situation, they are kept in the equation in order to emphasize this transition. This finding that a growing share of public administrations tasks are organized in jurisdictions and that this leads over time to the emergence of a competitive system of professions inside the state is discussed as a conclusion: some further research needs on systems are identified, the insights this approach could deliver in Belgium are previewed, and the role of the discipline of public administration in this context of professionalization is considered.nrpages: 583status: publishe