Tiryaki, Sylvia

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When	  the	  Ball	  Comes	  to	  Our	  Court…	  |	  Sylvia	  Tiryaki	   	  1	  
	  
	  
	  
WHEN THE BALL COMES TO OUR COURT… 
SYLVIA TIRYAKI* 
Istanbul	  |	  17	  September,	  2012	  |	  #	  4	  No	  doubt,	   future	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  Turkey	  and	  Israel	  relies	  heavily	  on	  what	  the	  relations	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians	  will	  be.	  Yet,	  Turkey’s	  insistence	  on	  lifting	  of	  the	  Gaza	  blockage	  will	  hardly	  be	  enough	  to	  turn	  the	  tables	  in	  Gaza,	  at	  least	  not	  as	  of	  now.	  Turkey	  might	  gain	  some	  “persuasive	  leverage”	  however,	  when	  Assad’s	  regime	  in	  Syria	  is	  defeated,	   with	   the	   clear	   Turkish	   support.	   Without	   foreseeing	   whether	   Israel	   really	  apologises,	   Turkey	   should	   be	   ready	   for	   such	   a	   scenario.	   Bilateral	   relations	   between	  countries	   are	   never	   only	   bilateral.	   They	   always	   contain	   regional	   and	   even	   global	  dimension.	  If	   Israel	  satisfies	  two	  of	  three	  Turkey’s	  preconditions,	   few	  countries	  will	  be	  seeing	  the	  blockage	  of	  Gaza	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  normalization	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  in	  Turkey	  might	  find	  ourselves	  with	  the	  ball	  in	  our	  court.	  	   “We	   both	   [Israel	   and	  Turkey]	   have	   a	  border	  with	  Syria,	  and	  I	  am	  sure	  we	  both	  want	  to	  see	  a	  stable	  and	  peaceful	  Syria”,	  Israeli	   Prime	  Minister	   Binyamin	   Netan-­‐yahu	   said	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   the	  Jerusalem	  Post.	  	  Stable	  and	  peaceful	  Syria	  seems	  to	  be	  a	   key	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   region	   that	  for	   the	   time	   being	   is	   left	   volatile	   and	  unpredictable	   by	   the	   events	   of	   Arab	  Spring.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   it	  has	  become	  self-­‐evident	   that	   whatever	   will	   happen	  in	  the	  region	  from	  now	  on,	  its	  shape	  and	  even	  its	  structure	  will	  never	  be	  the	  same	  again.	   Even	   though	   there	   are	   not	   too	  many	   crystalized	   alternatives	   to	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad’s	   regime,	   few	  observers	  would	  argue	   that	   the	   Syria’s	   President	   is	   the	  one	  who	  could	  bring	  stability	  and	  peace	  to	  Syria	  and	  the	  region.	  As	   the	   fight	  of	  Free	  Syrian	  Army	  and	  the	   forces	   loyal	   to	   the	   Syria’s	   President	  Al-­‐Assad	   is	   far	   from	   over,	   regional	  players	  righteously	  question	  how	  to	  help	  to	  bring	  the	  human	  suffering,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   risks	   of	   this	   mayhem	   being	   incor-­‐
porated	   into	   their	   borders,	   to	   the	   end.	  And	   in	   the	   vacuum	   of	   concerted	  international	   response	   to	   the	   Syrian	  disaster,	   it	   is	   once	  more	   upon	   the	   local	  countries	   to	   re-­‐think	   the	   regional	  alliances.	  	  Israelis	   know	   very	   well	   they	   cannot	  take	   on	   the	   Syrian	   task	   on	   their	   own.	  They	   know	   that	   their	   assistance	   would	  not	   be	   welcomed.	   In	   the	   dramatically	  changed	   world	   where	   it	   has	   become	  important	   to	   what	   religion	   you	   belong	  to,	   sometimes	   more	   than	   what	   values	  you	  stand	  for,	  they	  would	  need	  a	  Muslim	  counterpart	   to	   act.	   Therefore,	   Netan-­‐yahu’s	  remarks	  can	  be	  read	  not	  only	  as	  a	  conciliatory	  message	  sent	  to	  Turkey	  but	  also	   as	   a	   decision	   to	   break	   the	   self-­‐isolationist	  policy	  his	  government	  impo-­‐sed	  on	  itself.	  	  Now,	  Netanyahu’s	  message	   is	  backed	  also	  by	  the	  public	  opinion.	  According	  to	  the	   polls	   conducted	   by	   an	   Israeli	   think	  tank	   MITVIM	   (The	   Israeli	   Institute	   for	  Regional	   Foreign	   Policies),	   54	   per	   cent	  of	   Israelis	   would	   favour	   apology	   by	  
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When	  the	  Ball	  Comes	  to	  Our	  Court…	  |	  Sylvia	  Tiryaki	   	  2	  
	  
Israel	   to	   Turkey	   for	   the	   killings	   of	   nine	  aid	  activists.	  68	  per	  cent	  would	  welcome	  an	   action	   taken	   by	   the	   Israeli	   govern-­‐ment	   towards	   improvement	   of	   the	  bilateral	   relations	   and	   22	   per	   cent	  believe	   that	   their	   government	   is	   not	  doing	  enough	  in	  that	  direction.	  22	   per	   cent	   might	   be	   right.	   In	   May	  2010	   Israeli	   commandos	   boarded	   and	  raided	   Turkish-­‐flagged	   Mavi	   Marmara	  ship,	   en	   route	   to	   Gaza	   but	   still	   in	   the	  international	   waters,	   and	   killed	   nine	  activists	  of	  Turkish	  origin.	  Despite	  of	  the	  Human	   Rights	   report	   issued	   by	   the	  United	   Nations	   defining	   the	   raid	  disproportionate,	   Israel	   has	   sabotaged	  diplomatic	   efforts	   to	   resolve	   the	   row	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Moreover,	  it	  has	  been	  defending	  its	  position,	  unusual	  in	   the	   international	   politics,	   not	   to	  apologise	  to	  Turkey	  for	  the	  killings.	  	  The	  absence	  of	   the	   apology	   for	  more	  than	  two	  years	  has	  brought	  the	  Turkey	  -­‐	  Israel	  relations	  to	  the	  very	  bottom	  of	  the	  deterioration.	   Some	   say	   that	   Israel	   has	  not	  apologised	  as	  it	  saw	  little	  it	  could	  get	  in	   return	   from	   Turkey.	   Such	   a	   view	  might	   be	   correct.	   Turkish	   Prime	   Minis-­‐ter	   Recep	   Tayip	   Erdogan	   reiterated	  couple	   of	   days	   ago	   the	   three	   conditions	  Turkey	   has	   asked	   to	   be	   fulfilled	   before	  normalization	   of	   the	   bilateral	   relations:	  apology	   for	   the	   conduct	   on	   the	   Mavi	  Marmara	   ship,	   compensation	   to	   the	  families	  of	  nine	  people	  killed	  and	   lifting	  the	  Gaza	  blockade.	  	  “Too	   little,	   too	   late”,	   one	  might	   think	  about	  Netanyahu’s	  words.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  especially	   too	   late,	   since	   there	   was	   the	  time	  when	  Turkey	  was	  not	  fully	  focused	  on	   the	   main	   reason	   behind	   the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  former	  allies’	  ties.	  It	  was	  the	  time	  when	  Turkey	  was	  stricken	  by	  what	  happened	  on	  the	  Mavi	  Marmara	  as	   well	   as	   the	   refusal	   to	   apologise,	  seeking	   primarily	   an	   apology	   from	   the	  Israeli	  government.	  	  
Now,	   it	   has	   been	   “remembered”	   in	  Turkey	   that	   it	   was	   the	   operation	   “Cast	  Lead”	  in	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  that	  stroke	  the	  blow	   to	   the	   trust	   of	   the	   Turkish	  government	   to	   its	   Israeli	   counterpart	  during	  mediation	  between	  the	   later	  and	  Syria.	   This,	   followed	   by	   the	   “Low	   Sofa”	  incident	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   2010	  contrasted	  heavily	  with	   the	  atmosphere	  just	   couple	   of	   years	   before	   when	   the	  Turkish	   AKP	   government	   was	   signing	  with	  the	  Israeli	  government	  agreements	  on	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	  cooperation,	  and	  when	  and	  cooperation	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  military	  and	   intelligence	  was	  flourishing.	  Let	   aside	   political	   gains	   or	   losses,	  Israel	  should	  apologise	  to	  Turkey.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  say	  sorry	  is	  a	  morally	  right	  thing	  for	   a	   state,	   which	   Special	   Forces	   killed	  citizens	   of	   another	   state	   during	   the	  peacetime.	   Such	   an	   act	   of	   hostility	   had	  not	   happened	   since	   the	  WWII	   –	   till	   the	  Mavi	  Marmara	  event.	  It	   is	   also	   highly	   probable	   that	   Israel	  will	   do	   it,	   one	  way	  or	   the	   other.	   Paying	  financial	   compensations	   is	   not	   an	   issue	  either.	   Now,	   when	   Israel	   can	   get	   some	  sort	   of	   regional	   cooperation	   in	   return;	  something	  that	  is	  badly	  needed	  especial-­‐ly	  after	  the	  changes	  in	  Egypt,	  it	  might	  be	  also	   more	   marketable	   to	   those	   who	  oppose	  the	  apology.	  	  And	   if	   it	   really	  happens,	  what	  will	  be	  left	   then	   from	   the	   three	   Turkey’s	   pre-­‐conditions	   would	   be	   lifting	   the	   Gaza	  blockade.	  	  No	   doubt,	   future	   of	   the	   relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  relies	  heavily	  on	   what	   the	   relations	   between	   Israelis	  and	   Palestinians	   will	   be.	   Yet,	   Turkey’s	  insistence	  on	   fulfilling	   this	  precondition	  by	   Israel	  will	   hardly	   be	   enough	   to	   turn	  the	  tables	  in	  Gaza,	  at	  least	  not	  as	  of	  now.	  Turkey	   might	   gain	   some	   “persuasive	  leverage”	  however,	  when	  Assad’s	  regime	  in	   Syria	   is	   defeated,	   with	   the	   clear	  Turkish	  support.	  	  
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When	  the	  Ball	  Comes	  to	  Our	  Court…	  |	  Sylvia	  Tiryaki	   	  3	  
	  
Without	   foreseeing	   whether	   Israel	  really	   apologises,	   Turkey	   should	   be	  ready	  for	  such	  a	  scenario.	  Bilateral	  rela-­‐tions	   between	   countries	   are	   never	   only	  bilateral.	   They	   always	   contain	   regional	  and	   even	   global	   dimension.	   If	   Israel	  satisfies	  two	  of	  three	  preconditions,	  few	  countries	  will	  be	   seeing	   the	  blockage	  of	  Gaza	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  normalization	  of	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   two	  countries.	   In	  other	  words,	  we	   in	  Turkey	  might	  find	  ourselves	  with	  the	  ball	  in	  our	  court.	  	  I	  am	  sure	  that	  politicians	  see	  all	  these	  scenarios	  as	  possibilities	  on	  the	  table.	  	  
*Dr.	   Sylvia	   Tiryaki	   is	   the	  Deputy	  Direc-­‐tor	  of	  GPoT	  Center.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 


When the Ball Comes to Our Court...

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