The EU has recently been pushing for legislation to strengthen the gender balance on company boards in its member states and indeed, the principle of gender equality is enshrined in the European treaties. Yet, as Vilde Renman points out, women are clearly underrepresented in top positions within EU institutions themselves. The upcoming European Parliament elections are an opportunity for the EU to appoint more women at the highest levels of administration and legislature, thereby setting an example for companies, member states and citizens alike

Renman, Vilde

English

Archive of European Integration

 EPIN Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues raised by the debate on the political integration of Europe. The European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) is a network of think tanks and policy institutes based throughout Europe, which focuses on current EU political and policy debates (see http://www.epin.org for more information). Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is associated.  Sonia Piedrafita is Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies. This paper is the first in a new series of Commentaries by EPIN researchers, aimed at examining  the  European  elections  in  May  2014  from  an  EU  perspective  and considering the outlook for the elections in various member states. Available for free downloading from the CEPS (http://www.ceps.eu) and EPIN (http://www.epin.org) websites © Copyright 2013, EPIN  Commentary No. 12 / 22 August 2013       Elections to the European Parliament and the trouble with vox populi  Sonia Piedrafita ecent evidence of declining support for the European Union (EU) in many member states is causing some disquiet  – not least about the possibility of an even lower voter turnout in the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections in May 2014. Discontent with the management and the impact of the euro crisis might well be exploited by populist anti-European parties and boost protest-vote participation, but this would pose a serious risk for EU decision-making and undermine the sense of common identity and any plans for further integration.  The surge of populist parties In Greece, the two main political parties (PASOK and New Democracy), which held 84% of the seats in the previous legislature, won only 149 out of 300 seats in the May 2012 general election. The Coalition of the Radical Left-Unitary Social Front (SYRIZA), which focused its electoral campaign on the  unilateral  cancellation  of  the  EU-IMF  memorandum,  became  the  second  largest  party  in  the parliament with 52 seats, ahead of the Socialists. Anti-European discourse also helped the extremist right-wing Golden  Dawn (XA) to  win 21 seats. In fresh  elections  held again in June  (due to the impossibility  of  forming  a  coalition  government),  PASOK  lost  even  more  votes  and  SYRIZA consolidated its role as the main opposition party, with 71 seats. In total, the number of seats won by political parties that  made staunch  objections to the EU’s  management  of the crisis and austerity measures amounted to 46%. In Italy, this year’s general elections swept former Prime Minister and EU ‘favourite’ candidate Mario Monti to fourth place and brought the populist anti-European Five Star Movement up to the third position (with 25% of the vote). In  France,  anti-European  discourse  also  yielded  rewards  for  the  far-right  National  Front  and  its candidate Marine Le Pen in the first round of 2012 presidential elections, winning over 6 million votes. In the last by-elections, the National Front beat the Socialist party to third place and, according to recent opinion polls, they will do so again in the next European elections. As a prelude to the electoral campaign, and in reference to the dispute between the French ruling party and the President of the Commission, Marine Le Pen is quoted as saying that José Manuel Barroso is a catastrophe for France and Europe and the symbol of “a European system gone mad that is supported by both the UMP and the Socialist party” (Financial Times, 24 June 2013). Populist anti-EU parties also made substantial gains in elections in Finland and the Netherlands. The True Finns party made important gains in 2011 elections, thanks to a campaign focused on staunch opposition to a Portuguese bailout. A recent poll suggests that the Cyprus bailout is also swinging Geert Wilder’s party back to leading positions in the Netherlands.  R  2 | SONIA PIEDRAFITA  Eurobarometer polls also show that support for the  EU  has  in fact  decreased almost  everywhere. Distrust in the EU increased from 32% in 2007 to 60% in 2012. Last year, opposition to the Economic and Monetary Union and the euro grew to 40%; 45% of the population felt pessimistic about the future of the EU and 29% had a poor view of the EU. This trend was particularly marked in southern member states, but not exclusively. Euroscepticism has also soared in the six largest member states, which elect half of the MEPs. Seventy-two per cent of Spaniards say that they do not trust the EU, compared to 24% six years ago. In the UK, the number is 69%, 58% in Germany, 56% in France, 53% in Italy, and 42% in Poland (compared to 18% in 2007). According to a recent Harris poll, 73% of Spaniards and 56% of Italians believe that Germany was wrong to impose tough austerity measures on them at a time when economic growth was weak. Concerns about the increasing influence of Germany in the EU were voiced not only in Spain and Italy, but also in France and the UK. The outlook for 2014 European Parliament elections The participation rate in EP elections has dropped steadily since the first call for a direct vote in 1979, with the most recent elections in 2009 showing a historically low turnout low of 43%. Turnout in the elections in Croatia last April  was below 21%. Eurobarometer surveys reveal that most European citizens (more than 50%) do not think that their vote is going to change anything; they think that the EP does not deal with problems that really concern them, they lack information about the elections and the EP and are not interested in EU affairs. For most potential voters, the EP elections lack the clear purpose  of  national  elections.  These  elections  do  not  constitute  an  instrument  to  sanction  the incumbent  government  (largely  the  Commission  and  the  Council).  EP  elections  do  not  submit  a specific legislative programme for approval, since the right of initiative lies mostly with the European Commission  (and  exceptionally  with  the  Council).  Furthermore,  the  political  differences  across European  political  parties  are  not  easily  understandable,  which  makes  these  elections  even  less attractive  for  voters.  European  parties  are  more  of  a  confederation  of  national  delegations  with different ideologies, idiosyncrasies and interests, rather than a typical national party with a clearly defined political programme and strong internal discipline to implement this programme. It is national parties that select the candidates as MEPs and carry out the campaigns. Moreover, the main political groups in the EP tend to vote together  on  many legislative files to reinforce the EP’s position  in negotiations with the Council and the Commission. All this, together with the difficulties that many citizens  encounter in following EU affairs (not  helped by the  complexity  of EU  decision-making, multifarious  policies  and  poor  media  coverage),  tends  to  relegate  the  elections  to  the  European Parliament to second-order elections largely focused on domestic rather than European issues.  To counter this trend, a recent EP initiative urged the main European political alliances to name their candidates for the post of European Commission president well in advance so that they could run an EU-wide campaign focused on EU issues, in the assumption that this would encourage citizens to go and vote. It also calls upon national parties to make clear which European party they belong to and the candidate  they  will  support.  The  euro  crisis  has  also  made  citizens  all  over  Europe  (both  in  the ‘rescued’ and the ‘rescuer’ member states) much more aware of the consequences of EU decisions for their  daily  lives.  The  impact  of  ‘Brussels’  on  national  fiscal  and  economic  policies  is  being  felt directly by EU citizens, and not in a positive way. As a result, the debate about the EU has moved away from bureaucrats’ offices onto the street, and the divisions over EU affairs across national and European parties are becoming more marked.  However,  it  might be  eurosceptic rather than pro-European parties that reap the benefits  of these developments in the end. An increase in the number of votes for radical eurosceptic parties would quickly be mirrored in their representation in the EP, given the electoral systems operating in member states. Most of them use proportional methods in the distribution of seats and a single electoral district, which  increases the proportionality  of the system. Only 11  member states have a legal threshold, which  is  always  below  5%.  It  is  therefore  likely  that  these  parties  will  obtain  parliamentary representation should they manage to sweep up the protest vote against the EU and the ruling parties that backed its decisions. They might even try to form a big anti-European coalition. This could pose ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE TROUBLE WITH VOX POPULI | 3  an unprecedented risk for the functioning and identity of the EP. Since 1989, the number of EP parties has  increased  steadily,  due  to  EU  enlargements  and  the  2002  reform  of  the  electoral  law,  which established a more proportional system. However, the number of political groups has decreased. In the last two legislatures the two main groups (conservatives and socialists) held more than 60% of the seats. A wide representation of parties not belonging to the main pro-European parliamentary groups would make the majority of the component members required in many votes very difficult to reach. This would stall decision-making in the Chamber, and therefore in the EU, including the election of the president of the Commission itself. It could also hamper the EP’s firm stand on promoting the principles of democracy, human rights and EU integration.  Conclusions The nomination of candidates for the position of president of the European Commission by European political parties might not turn out to be such a brilliant idea after all. Some nominees currently being discussed are unknown in many countries and would therefore not inspire citizens to go out and vote. Others could simply underline dissatisfaction and boost the EU protest vote in some member states.   Moreover, the proposal of the Commission president by the EP might lead to a further politicisation of this EU institution, at a time when a strong and independent Commission is needed more than ever. Alternatively, what is needed is a campaign by European and national political parties and by EU institutions to extol the virtues of the European Union and expose the costs of less or no Europe. The main European parties should also reflect on the reasons behind this growing disenchantment with the EU and come up with actual political manifestos for the elections that respond to real concerns. They should explain their positions in the relevant legislative dossiers currently in the pipeline (e.g. banking union) and state which others they intend to push forward (for instance in the area of employment, or immigration).  In  parallel,  the  EU  should  adopt  a  sound  strategy  to  create  jobs  and  a  better communication strategy to justify its (economic) decisions. Citizens need to believe that both their votes and the European Union matter, and the EU undoubtedly has to show that citizens also matter.  

Not Making the Lists: The Underrepresentation of Women in EU Politics and Business.  EPIN Commentary No. 12, 22 August 2013

 EPIN Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues raised by the debate on the 
political integration of Europe. The European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) is a network of think 
tanks and policy institutes based throughout Europe, which focuses on current EU political and policy 
debates (see http://www.epin.org for more information). Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed 
are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is 
associated.  
Sonia Piedrafita is Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies. This 
paper is the first in a new series of Commentaries by EPIN researchers, aimed at 
examining the European elections in May 2014 from an EU perspective and 
considering the outlook for the elections in various member states. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS (http://www.ceps.eu) and EPIN (http://www.epin.org) websites 
© Copyright 2013, EPIN 
 
Commentary 
No. 12 / 22 August 2013 
   
 
Elections to the European Parliament 
and the trouble with vox populi  
Sonia Piedrafita 
ecent evidence of declining support for the European Union (EU) in many member states is 
causing some disquiet  – not least about the possibility of an even lower voter turnout in the 
upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections in May 2014. Discontent with the management 
and the impact of the euro crisis might well be exploited by populist anti-European parties and boost 
protest-vote participation, but this would pose a serious risk for EU decision-making and undermine 
the sense of common identity and any plans for further integration.  
The surge of populist parties 
In Greece, the two main political parties (PASOK and New Democracy), which held 84% of the seats 
in the previous legislature, won only 149 out of 300 seats in the May 2012 general election. The 
Coalition of the Radical Left-Unitary Social Front (SYRIZA), which focused its electoral campaign on 
the unilateral cancellation of the EU-IMF memorandum, became the second largest party in the 
parliament with 52 seats, ahead of the Socialists. Anti-European discourse also helped the extremist 
right-wing Golden Dawn (XA) to win 21 seats. In fresh elections held again in June (due to the 
impossibility of forming a coalition government), PASOK lost even more votes and SYRIZA 
consolidated its role as the main opposition party, with 71 seats. In total, the number of seats won by 
political parties that made staunch objections to the EU’s management of the crisis and austerity 
measures amounted to 46%. In Italy, this year’s general elections swept former Prime Minister and EU 
‘favourite’ candidate Mario Monti to fourth place and brought the populist anti-European Five Star 
Movement up to the third position (with 25% of the vote). 
In France, anti-European discourse also yielded rewards for the far-right National Front and its 
candidate Marine Le Pen in the first round of 2012 presidential elections, winning over 6 million 
votes. In the last by-elections, the National Front beat the Socialist party to third place and, according 
to recent opinion polls, they will do so again in the next European elections. As a prelude to the 
electoral campaign, and in reference to the dispute between the French ruling party and the President 
of the Commission, Marine Le Pen is quoted as saying that José Manuel Barroso is a catastrophe for 
France and Europe and the symbol of “a European system gone mad that is supported by both the 
UMP and the Socialist party” (Financial Times, 24 June 2013). Populist anti-EU parties also made 
substantial gains in elections in Finland and the Netherlands. The True Finns party made important 
gains in 2011 elections, thanks to a campaign focused on staunch opposition to a Portuguese bailout. A 
recent poll suggests that the Cyprus bailout is also swinging Geert Wilder’s party back to leading 
positions in the Netherlands.  
R
  
2 | SONIA PIEDRAFITA 
 
Eurobarometer polls also show that support for the EU has in fact decreased almost everywhere. 
Distrust in the EU increased from 32% in 2007 to 60% in 2012. Last year, opposition to the Economic 
and Monetary Union and the euro grew to 40%; 45% of the population felt pessimistic about the future 
of the EU and 29% had a poor view of the EU. This trend was particularly marked in southern member 
states, but not exclusively. Euroscepticism has also soared in the six largest member states, which elect 
half of the MEPs. Seventy-two per cent of Spaniards say that they do not trust the EU, compared to 
24% six years ago. In the UK, the number is 69%, 58% in Germany, 56% in France, 53% in Italy, and 
42% in Poland (compared to 18% in 2007). According to a recent Harris poll, 73% of Spaniards and 
56% of Italians believe that Germany was wrong to impose tough austerity measures on them at a time 
when economic growth was weak. Concerns about the increasing influence of Germany in the EU 
were voiced not only in Spain and Italy, but also in France and the UK. 
The outlook for 2014 European Parliament elections 
The participation rate in EP elections has dropped steadily since the first call for a direct vote in 1979, 
with the most recent elections in 2009 showing a historically low turnout low of 43%. Turnout in the 
elections in Croatia last April was below 21%. Eurobarometer surveys reveal that most European 
citizens (more than 50%) do not think that their vote is going to change anything; they think that the 
EP does not deal with problems that really concern them, they lack information about the elections and 
the EP and are not interested in EU affairs. For most potential voters, the EP elections lack the clear 
purpose of national elections. These elections do not constitute an instrument to sanction the 
incumbent government (largely the Commission and the Council). EP elections do not submit a 
specific legislative programme for approval, since the right of initiative lies mostly with the European 
Commission (and exceptionally with the Council). Furthermore, the political differences across 
European political parties are not easily understandable, which makes these elections even less 
attractive for voters. European parties are more of a confederation of national delegations with 
different ideologies, idiosyncrasies and interests, rather than a typical national party with a clearly 
defined political programme and strong internal discipline to implement this programme. It is national 
parties that select the candidates as MEPs and carry out the campaigns. Moreover, the main political 
groups in the EP tend to vote together on many legislative files to reinforce the EP’s position in 
negotiations with the Council and the Commission. All this, together with the difficulties that many 
citizens encounter in following EU affairs (not helped by the complexity of EU decision-making, 
multifarious policies and poor media coverage), tends to relegate the elections to the European 
Parliament to second-order elections largely focused on domestic rather than European issues.  
To counter this trend, a recent EP initiative urged the main European political alliances to name their 
candidates for the post of European Commission president well in advance so that they could run an 
EU-wide campaign focused on EU issues, in the assumption that this would encourage citizens to go 
and vote. It also calls upon national parties to make clear which European party they belong to and the 
candidate they will support. The euro crisis has also made citizens all over Europe (both in the 
‘rescued’ and the ‘rescuer’ member states) much more aware of the consequences of EU decisions for 
their daily lives. The impact of ‘Brussels’ on national fiscal and economic policies is being felt 
directly by EU citizens, and not in a positive way. As a result, the debate about the EU has moved 
away from bureaucrats’ offices onto the street, and the divisions over EU affairs across national and 
European parties are becoming more marked.  
However, it might be eurosceptic rather than pro-European parties that reap the benefits of these 
developments in the end. An increase in the number of votes for radical eurosceptic parties would 
quickly be mirrored in their representation in the EP, given the electoral systems operating in member 
states. Most of them use proportional methods in the distribution of seats and a single electoral district, 
which increases the proportionality of the system. Only 11 member states have a legal threshold, 
which is always below 5%. It is therefore likely that these parties will obtain parliamentary 
representation should they manage to sweep up the protest vote against the EU and the ruling parties 
that backed its decisions. They might even try to form a big anti-European coalition. This could pose 
ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE TROUBLE WITH VOX POPULI | 3 
 
an unprecedented risk for the functioning and identity of the EP. Since 1989, the number of EP parties 
has increased steadily, due to EU enlargements and the 2002 reform of the electoral law, which 
established a more proportional system. However, the number of political groups has decreased. In the 
last two legislatures the two main groups (conservatives and socialists) held more than 60% of the 
seats. A wide representation of parties not belonging to the main pro-European parliamentary groups 
would make the majority of the component members required in many votes very difficult to reach. 
This would stall decision-making in the Chamber, and therefore in the EU, including the election of 
the president of the Commission itself. It could also hamper the EP’s firm stand on promoting the 
principles of democracy, human rights and EU integration. 
 Conclusions 
The nomination of candidates for the position of president of the European Commission by European 
political parties might not turn out to be such a brilliant idea after all. Some nominees currently being 
discussed are unknown in many countries and would therefore not inspire citizens to go out and vote. 
Others could simply underline dissatisfaction and boost the EU protest vote in some member states.   
Moreover, the proposal of the Commission president by the EP might lead to a further politicisation of 
this EU institution, at a time when a strong and independent Commission is needed more than ever. 
Alternatively, what is needed is a campaign by European and national political parties and by EU 
institutions to extol the virtues of the European Union and expose the costs of less or no Europe. The 
main European parties should also reflect on the reasons behind this growing disenchantment with the 
EU and come up with actual political manifestos for the elections that respond to real concerns. They 
should explain their positions in the relevant legislative dossiers currently in the pipeline (e.g. banking 
union) and state which others they intend to push forward (for instance in the area of employment, or 
immigration). In parallel, the EU should adopt a sound strategy to create jobs and a better 
communication strategy to justify its (economic) decisions. Citizens need to believe that both their 
votes and the European Union matter, and the EU undoubtedly has to show that citizens also matter.  


http://aei.pitt.edu/46348/1/No_12_EPIN_Commentary_EP_elections_2014.pdf

Not Making the Lists: The Underrepresentation of Women in EU Politics and Business. EPIN Commentary No. 12, 22 August 2013

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