Holwitt, Joel Ira

Wisecup, James P.

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 63Number 4 Autumn Article 202010Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision toConduct Unrestricted Submarine WarfareJames P. WisecupU.S. NavyJoel Ira HolwittFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationWisecup, James P. and Holwitt, Joel Ira (2010) "Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted SubmarineWarfare," Naval War College Review: Vol. 63 : No. 4 , Article 20.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/20Holwitt, Joel Ira. Execute Against Japan: The U.S.Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine War-fare. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,2009. 262pp. $37.50Joel Ira Holwitt is a lieutenant who hasjust completed the Submarine OfficerAdvanced Course and will soon reportto USS New Mexico (SSN 779), inGroton, Connecticut, as navigator. Thisbook was his PhD dissertation at OhioState University, where he studied un-der Dr. John Guilmartin. It is a seriouswork that is researched in the traditionof The Blue Sword (1982) by Dr. MikeVlahos, War Plan Orange (1991) by Ed-ward Miller, and the more recent Agentsof Innovation (2008) by John Kuehn, allof which deal with the interwar periodand the roles played by the War PlansDivision, the Naval War College, andthe General Board.This book is an in-depth historical lookat how the United States and the U.S.Navy’s decision-making process workedin the run-up to Pearl Harbor. It is awell documented and fascinating storythat brings to life some naval personali-ties perhaps not well known to today’sofficers. Most interesting for students atthe U.S. Naval War College and navalofficers who work in today’s inter-agency system, it is another look intohow the Navy’s leadership has func-tioned and the constructive role thatthe Naval War College has played in in-fluencing the thinking of the leadership.Students of history and policy too willfind this an interesting story, not onlybecause the German decision to imple-ment unrestricted submarine warfareactually was one of the major causes forthe American entry into the First WorldWar but also because there appears tobe no documentation indicating thatthose leaders whom we would today callthe “national command authority” everactually participated in the decision toimplement this policy.There exists a memorandum datedMarch 1941 from Admiral EdwardKalbfus (researched by Naval War Col-lege faculty and students), recommend-ing a strategy of unrestricted submarineand aerial warfare against Japan, thatwas clearly rejected by the GeneralBoard. The report, however, was re-tained by the Chief of Naval Operations(CNO), Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark,and it ultimately influenced his decisionto deliver the memo to the commanderof the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C.Hart.As a serving flag officer, I found it fasci-nating to see how real life worked in therun-up to the war. For example, for methe most interesting story was how theCNO transmitted his “commander’s in-tent” to Admiral Hart, a most experi-enced submariner. Stark knew that theState Department would never consentto unrestricted submarine warfare andso decided against raising the issue di-rectly before the United States enteredthe war. Instead, he sent a letter to Ad-miral Hart; Stark’s war planner, RearAdmiral Kelly Turner, also discussed itwith Captain James Fife, another highlyrespected submariner, who deliveredthe information to Admiral Hart andhis staff personally in the Philippines.There was no way that Admiral Hartcould mistake Stark’s intent. This putHart in a position to anticipate his or-ders, in a way the best commanderswill. Hart sent U.S. submarines to sea,ready for war patrol, immediately afterthe initial Japanese attack.B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 7NWCR_Autumn2010-BR.pSC:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vpThursday, August 19, 2010 1:29:12 PMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen1Wisecup and Holwitt: Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct UnrestrictedPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010The other interesting aspect of thiswork deals with the difference betweenprewar training of our submariners andwhat they actually did in combat. In asection called “The Accidental Com-merce Raiders,” Holwitt points out thatcommanders had been conditioned byarticle 22 of the London Naval Treaty—which many thought meant that if theytorpedoed merchants without warning,they would actually be held liable,“hunted down and captured or sunk aspirates.” So, according to this account,commanders were taught to be cautiousand were essentially trained for navalcombat against high-speed, heavily ar-mored combatants and not againstcommercial shipping. The result wasthat very few of the tactics eventuallyused were developed before the war.Execute Against Japan should be re-quired reading for naval officers (espe-cially in submarine wardrooms), as wellas for anyone interested in history, pol-icy, or international law. LieutenantHolwitt has already briefed some of ourNaval War College students. His re-search shows how and why our experi-ence in the First World War did notprepare us for the next one, and this isits essential lesson. It is a lesson worthsome reflection.REAR ADMIRAL JAMES P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVYNaval War CollegeMueller, Michael. Canaris: The Life and Death ofHitler’s Spymaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-tute Press, 2007. 320pp. $34.95Who was Wilhelm Canaris? The navalcadet from the Ruhr who rose to viceadmiral and directed the Abwehr,German military intelligence, for nineyears remains one of the most intrigu-ing figures in twentieth-century mili-tary history. German journalist anddocumentarian Michael Mueller unrav-els several of the mysteries that sur-round Canaris’s life, though manyremain.Mueller acknowledges the shortfall. De-spite solid research and fresh archivalmaterial, his account “neither answersall the questions, nor resolves all thecontradictions.” The paucity of primarysources and the tendency of intelligenceoperators habitually to brush theirtracks owe much to the circumstancesof Canaris’s arrest and execution. Onlyremnants survive of Canaris’s servicediaries, discovered by investigators inthe aftermath of the 20 July 1944 plot toassassinate Hitler.Mueller’s narrative informs, illumi-nates, and entertains. Canaris’s early ca-reer at sea was marked by escapades ofderring-do in South America andSpain. An officer of his time, Canarisabsorbed the credo of the sea service,and it served him well. He had a cleartalent for languages and social rapport,and his superiors noted the vitality ofhis wide-ranging networks. Before long,he became “too valuable to send tosea.”An astute and calculating observer,Canaris navigated multiple career-threatening crises that began as the de-feated German fleet returned to Kiel in1918. In the closing years of theWeimar Republic, Canaris again lever-aged his luck, evading a series of poten-tially devastating political scandals. Hedid not emerge unscathed, however; hisgrowing reputation made both naval of-ficials and politicians nervous.1 5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E WNWCR_Autumn2010-BR.pSC:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vpThursday, August 19, 2010 1:29:12 PMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen2Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 20https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/20

Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

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Execute Against Japan: The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

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