In WiFi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing a shared channel by
means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF). Although this protocol is in principle fair, since all the stations have
the same probability to transmit on the channel, it has been shown that unfair
behaviors may emerge in actual networking scenarios because of non-standard
configurations of the nodes. Due to the proliferation of open source drivers
and programmable cards, enabling an easy customization of the channel access
policies, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of random access schemes.
Assuming that each node is rational and implements a best response strategy, we
show that efficient equilibria conditions can be reached when stations are
interested in both uploading and downloading traffic. More interesting, these
equilibria are reached when all the stations play the same strategy, thus
guaranteeing a fair resource sharing. When stations are interested in upload
traffic only, we also propose a mechanism design, based on an artificial
dropping of layer-2 acknowledgments, to force desired equilibria. Finally, we
propose and evaluate some simple DCF extensions for practically implementing
our theoretical findings.Comment: under review on IEEE Transaction on wireless communication