Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1 N. Y. 2d 530, 136 N. E. 2d 839 (1956)

Griffin, Richard F.

English

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Buffalo Law Review Volume 6 Number 2 Article 44 1-1-1957 Insurance Law—Presumption Against Suicide Richard F. Griffin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview  Part of the Insurance Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard F. Griffin, Insurance Law—Presumption Against Suicide, 6 Buff. L. Rev. 195 (1957). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol6/iss2/44 This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERMof the court agreed. The majority, however, refused to entertain such a strictinterpretation of the section and held that it was satisfied by any method wherebythere was a clear designation of the sex of the candidates. Furthermore, such aninterpretation, they felt, is fortified by the provision in the Election Law statingthat the order in which the names appear on the ballot is determined by lot.'5The majority's view is the more realistic approach. The provisions of theElection Law should be liberally construed to allow ballots in a form which couldcause no possible confusion or difficulty. 16 But in the present case it does notappear how clear the ballot was in fact. If there was no indication that the votershould vote for one male and one female, there could reasonably be votes cast fortwo males, for instance, and the ballot should have been made clearer. The Court,however, apparently found otherwise.INSURANCE LAWPresumption Against SuicideA very popular protective feature which is included in many life insurancecontracts is the so-called double indemnity clause.' In most instances, this providesfor payment of an additional sum equal to the face value of the policy uponreceipt by the insurer of due proof that the sole cause of the insured's death wasbodily injury and that bodily injury was produced solely by external, violent andaccidental means. 2 The insured's self-destruction, of course, is not death by acci-dental means, and double indemnity clauses expressly exclude this risk.3In Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,4 the insured's body was foundbeneath the window of his second-story hospital room; no one had witnessed theevents leading to his fatal injury; and investigation disclosed that the window wasup and the screen broken. There was some evidence that the insured who hadbeen suffering from various diseases was mentally depressed during the weeksimmediately preceding his death. In the death proofs submitted by the beneficiarydeath was attributed to certain head injuries, but copies of the death certificateand the medical examiner's report contained the added comment "Jumped or fellfrom window of Veterans Hospital 7/4/52."15. N. Y. ELECTION LAW §104. Order of names upon ballot... 2. The officeror board with whom or which is filed the designations for a public office or partyposition shall determine by. lot, . . . the order in which shall be printed on theofficial primary ballott, . . . the names of candidates for a party position ....16. Bellord v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70, 115 N. E. 2d 658 (1953).1. This protection is offered by most major life insurance companies. SeeTHE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER CO., WHO WRITES WHAT (1955) p. 82.2. See samples of company contracts set forth in CHILTON Co., THE SPECTATORHANDY GUIDE (1956).3. -Id.4. 1 N. Y. 2d 530, 136 N. E. 2d 839 (1956).BUFFALO LAW REVIEWThe beneficiary brought 'suit against the Insurance Company when it refusedto pay the double indemnity proceeds. The plaintiff's case consisted of the deathproofs which had been submitted to the defendant. The Company defended on thegrounds that (1) plaintiff's proofs of death failed to show that death resultedfrom accidental means and (2) the insured in fact committed suicide. TheAppellate Division 5 reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed thecomplaint-reasoning: a showing of accidental death is a condition precedent torecovery; proof containing the statements "jumped or fell" is not due proof ofaccidental death; any prima facie case which the plaintiff may have had by virtueof the presumption against suicide0 is overcome by defendant's evidence 7 showingcircumstances wholly inconsistent with accidental death. In reversing the AppellateDivision and ordering a new trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that it waserror for the Appellate Division to hold, as a matter of law, that the proofsubmitted was insufficient. To paraphrase the Court's holding on this defense:where the contract fails to spell out the elements, due proof is that from whicha reasonable person might infer accidental death, and since no one witnessed theevent the words "jumped or fell" do not conclusively show suicide.'As regards the defendant's affirmative defense of self-destruction the Court,in effect, decided that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the presumptionagainst suicide: "When death has resulted from violence, the presumption . . .does more than shift the burden of proof and upon having done so disappearsfrom the case; it continues to the end of the case and if a fair question of fact ispresented as to whether death was due to suicide or accident, then the jury shouldanswer accident. Wellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co."8 The Wellisch casedid not involve a suit on the double indemnity clause, but a defense of suicide toavoid paying the sum insured when death occurred during the first two policyyears.9 The decision in the instant case seemingly applies the dicta in Wlellisch toan action for double indemnity where the plaintiff not only must show the insured'sdeath but also has the burden of proving that his decease came about in theparticular manner described in the double indemnity clause. But for the fact that5. Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 285 App. Div. 961, 138 N. Y. S.2d 851 (2d Dep't 1955).6. Man is presumed not to take his own life. Mallory v. The Travelers" Ins.Co., 47 N. Y. 52, 7 Am. Rep. 410 (1871); Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual LifeIns. Co., 293 N. Y. 178 56 N. E. 2d 540 (1944).7. I.e., Insured's mental condition, the raised window and broken screen, andthe distance between the body when found and the base of the hospital building.8. 293 N. Y. 178, 56 N. E. 2d 540 (1944). The court there held that It waserror for the trial court to direct a verdict of suicide when the insurer's evidencewas not conclusive. In dicta the Court expounded upon the nature of the pre-sumption against suicide: it does not only shift the burden of proof, nor does ittake the place-of evidence so as to create a question of fact when all the evidenceis the other way--"it is really a rule or guide for the jury in coming to a con-clusion on the evidence."9. See N. Y. INSURANcE LAW §155(2).10. See Whitlatch v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 149 N. Y. 45, 43 N. E.405 (1896); Ostrander v. Travelers' rus. Co.; 265 N. Y. 467, 193 N. E. 274 (1934).COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERMthe Court ordered a new trial, this case would conclusively answer those who askwhether the presumption has the same force in a suit for double indemnity" andhave the effect of overruling cases which indicate that the presumption's onlypurpose is to assist the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case.12In this writer's opinion, the Court has gone too far in applying the presump-tion as outlined -in the Wellisch case to this kind of an action. Doubtless theCourt was influenced by the social opprobrium resulting from a decision implyingsuicide, but when the Court indicates that the jury should always find death wasaccidental where there is a question of fact it imposes an undue burden upon theinsurer when, as is 'the normal case, the only evidence of the cause of death iscircumstantial. Nor is the social policy favoring the payment of life insurancevery persuasive in this instance for life insurance needs are not dependent uponthe manner of death.Stafemenfs of Good HealfthIn Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt,l3 the plaintiff brought an action torescind a policy- of savings bank life insurance which it had issued to the deceasedapproximately three months before his death. The insurer contended that theinsured had falsely represented that he was in good health;14 and that thepolicy never took effect because the insured was not in good health when thepolicy -was delivered and the first premium paid. The defendant-beneficiary coun-terclaimed for the face value of the policy.The insured, who died as the result of injuries, had stated in the applicationthat he never had or been told that he had tuberculosis, and none was found bythe Bank's medical examiner. At the trial it was established that the deceased wassuffering from active tuberculosis of the spine at the time he applied for theinsurance, but it was not shown that he knew or had reason to know of hiscondition. Faced with the rule that a life insurance applicant's statements arerepresentations and not warranties' 5-hence rescission will not be granted unlessthere is a fraudulent misrepresentation' 6-the plaintiff argued that the Court will11. See a.g., MATHESON AND PRINCE, EVIDENCE, Foundation Press (1949) p. 35.12. Jahn v. The Commercial Travelers Mut. Assoc., of Am., 256 App. Div.835, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (2d Dep't 1939); Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,257 App. Div. 656, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (1st Dep't 1939).13. 1 N. Y. 2d 545, 136 X. E. 2d 848 (1956).14. These words appeared at the bottom of a page of the application:"Except as stated' above I am now in good health. The statements herein aretrue . . . and made for the purpose of inducing the Bank to issue insuranceon my life."15. N. Y. INSURANCE LAW §142(3). For definitions and explanations of thewords representations and warranties as regards life insurance contracts see37 WORDS AND PHRASES 40; BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) 1465, 1758.16. Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 281. N, Y, 508, 4 N, E. 2d 308 (1939).

Insurance Law—Presumption Against Suicide

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Insurance Law—Presumption Against Suicide

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