Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf Wa

Cochran, Alexander S.

Marolda, Edward J.

Schneller, Robert J., Jr.

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 54Number 2 Spring Article 132001Review Essay—Official History, Not “InstantAnalysis”Alexander S. CochranEdward J. MaroldaRobert J. Schneller Jr.Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion inNaval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationCochran, Alexander S.; Marolda, Edward J.; and Schneller, Robert J. Jr. (2001) "Review Essay—Official History, Not “InstantAnalysis”," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 2 , Article 13.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/13Alexander S. Cochran is currently a visiting professor atthe National War College. From 1998 through 2000,Dr. Cochran held the Major General Matthew C. HornerChair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University.From 1990 to 1998, he was a professor of military historyat the Air War College and was awarded the status ofprofessor emeritus. Prior to that he served with the U.S.Army Center for Military History and taught at the Uni-versity of Notre Dame. Dr. Cochran received his Ph.D.from the University of Kansas. He has published severalbooks and numerous articles about World War II, theVietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. He is a gradu-ate of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College and theAir War College, and he served active-duty tours in Viet-nam and Europe.1Cochran et al.: Review Essay—Official History, Not “Instant Analysis”Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001REVIEW ESSAYOFFICIAL HISTORY, NOT “INSTANT ANALYSIS”Alexander S. CochranMarolda, Edward J., and Robert J. Schneller, Jr. Shield andSword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 544pp. $36.95Over the past decade, there has been an unfortunate trend in the publications byservice historical offices—a rush to historical judgment that rivals CNN’s insis-tence on, and the public’s appetite for, “instant analysis.” The Persian Gulf Warhas been subjected to this with such books as Air Force historian RichardHallion’s unofficial Storm over Iraq and Army general Robert H. Scales’s CertainVictory. At best, these “instant histories” are self-serving (with Quadrennial De-fense Review overtones); at worst, they are flawed by their single-service focus.Lest the U.S. Navy feel free of this, Norman Friedman’s Desert Victory, publishedwithin months of the conflict’s termination, led the parade.Fortunately for all, Dr. Dean C. Allard and Dr. William S. Dudley, successivedirectors of the Naval Historical Center, eschewed this approach, opting for timeto ensure detached analysis, adequate documentation, and historical perspec-tive. Their wise decision has been richly rewarded by this book, the work of twoof the Center’s historians, Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller, Jr. In the tradi-tion of the official histories of World War II, which allowed a “decent interval”before writing, Shield and Sword will be the starting place for all who are inter-ested in the U.S. Navy’s role in the Gulf conflict.The U.S. Navy’s role in the Persian Gulf (renamed the “Arabian Gulf ” byU.S. spokespersons during the war) over the past fifty years eclipsed those of theother services in both time and function. (For a wide-angle view, see MichaelPalmer’s Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the2Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 13https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/13Persian Gulf, 1833–1992. Palmer, now a historian at East Carolina University,had earlier worked at the Naval Historical Center.) Although the modern U.S.military first entered the Gulf during World War II, in conjunction with Lend-Leasearrangements to assist the Soviet Union, American military presence there after1945 rested solely upon the presence of a few U.S. Navy ships. The Middle EastForce, established in 1948 and for decades comprising a small seaplane tender asflagship and usually a pair of destroyers rotating into the Persian Gulf assign-ment, was the sole visible agent of American policy.Seaborne command and control capabilities remained throughout the ColdWar—indeed it was these platforms that provided the initial base when theTampa, Florida, headquarters of Central Command was projected forward inthe fall of 1990. Two carriers, a battleship, and their escorts had surged into thearea after the invasion of Kuwait, and the maritime prepositioning ships beganto arrive at al-Jubayl to equip two Marine expeditionary brigades on 15 August1990. Then, during DESERT SHIELD, the U.S. Navy led the coalition in enforce-ment of economic sanctions—an essential backdrop to U.S. maneuvering forworld backing as well as to UN nonmilitary alternatives. For offensive DESERTSTORM planning, aircraft from the three carriers of Battle Force Yankee in theRed Sea and the three carriers of Battle Force Zulu in the Gulf, and Tomahawkcruise missiles fired from battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,formed collectively a critical part of the air campaign. Once the air and groundwars were launched in early 1991, naval contributions more than adequatelymet expectations. Equally important were naval presence in the Gulf and Ara-bian Sea, and maritime support to the final ground operations. Overlooked bymuch of the public and news organizations throughout both DESERT SHIELDand DESERT STORM was the sea lift that provided the critical logistical support.While some writers are quick to note that 90 percent of the personnel whomoved in and out of theater were transported by aircraft, far more importantwere the equal percentages of vastly greater tonnages of equipment and suppliesthat moved over sea-lanes secured by the U.S. Navy.Marolda and Schneller handle these myriad elements of the Navy “Gulf Warstory” in superb fashion. One has grown to expect such scholarly thoroughnessand professional detachment from Dr. Marolda, a longtime member of the Na-val Historical Center, author or editor of five official histories about the Navy inVietnam, and currently the Center’s senior historian. Coauthor Dr. Robert J.Schneller, Jr., has been with the Center since 1991. Their book’s four-page ac-knowledgment section is essentially a list of names of key participants and otherresearchers; Marolda and Schneller are good historians.Focusing on the theater level in general, and on its naval component spe-cifically, Shield and Sword argues a clear thesis: the Persian Gulf War was an1 3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W3Cochran et al.: Review Essay—Official History, Not “Instant Analysis”Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001enormously complex undertaking, and the U.S. Navy contributed to every as-pect, from diplomacy and sanctions to combat and logistics. To highlight spe-cific contributions, the authors have organized their book in both functionaland chronological fashion. The opening chapter deals with Cold War presencein the Gulf and on the early buildup phases after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.The second and third chapters focus upon Operation DESERT SHIELD, and thefourth, fifth, and sixth discuss DESERT STORM. The seventh chapter examinespostwar events, such as mineclearing, redeployment of forces and equipment,Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the homecoming receptions, maritime intercep-tion and sanctions enforcement operations, the establishment and conduct ofno-fly zones north of the thirty-sixth parallel and south of the thirty-second,and punitive Tomahawk strikes through 1993. Chapter 8 is a thirty-page summary,concluding with the 1995 establishment of the U.S. Fifth Fleet.While their emphasis is upon U.S. Navy and Marine planning and operations,Marolda and Schneller have done a masterful job of integrating not only theArmy and Air Force aspects of the war but also maritime contributions by sev-eral members of the coalition. They have moved beyond other official servicehistories, demonstrating sensitivity to mutually supporting functions and capa-bilities. Further, by waiting for the publication of earlier official histories, theywere able to mine their sources and integrate their interpretations.The text is complemented by fourteen maps and six tables, as well as a judi-cious collection of photographs and artwork—almost all of it by the Navy’sleading combat artist, John Charles Roach—providing a visual portrayal of thevaried naval contributions to the war. Such an approach suggests new directionsfor future official histories, as an increasing number of readers will come from abackground of MTV. One cannot review these photographs without being con-scious of the cultural and gender mix of today’s deployed naval forces.Marolda and Schneller’s bibliography reveals an extensive list of primarysources—documents and oral histories accumulated during the Naval HistoricalCenter’s research effort. Just as impressive is the authors’ list of secondarysources. Anyone who has attempted to survey the massive amount of publishedmaterial on the Gulf War will welcome their brief annotations on each entry.To be sure, there were glitches in the U.S. Navy’s performance. To mention afew, lack of mine-warfare resources, as well as outdated doctrine, provedembarrassing. Traditional U.S. naval testiness at tight command and controlprocedures ran counter to Central Command’s demands at both the joint andcombined levels. Also, the Navy’s tradition of rotating commanders of unitsand organizations led to at least one difficult episode—during the relief of ViceAdmiral Henry H. Mauz by Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur as commander of theSeventh Fleet and Naval Forces, Central Command, late in the planning phase.R E V I E W E S S A Y 1 3 74Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 13https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/13Dissemination of intelligence, particularly satellite imagery, to forces afloat wasabysmal due to the ships’ lack of communications and processing capability, aswell as to bureaucratic problems due to “an Army general and an Army J-2 [in-telligence staff head] fighting an Army war.” Service rivalries affected air opera-tions as well, particularly with the notorious air tasking order and the Air Forcecontrol of the joint force air component commander role, although Battle ForceYankee and Battle Force Zulu had different levels of friction with Air Force prac-tices. Likewise, the Navy’s insistence on holding back air assets from the overallcampaign for carrier protection took its toll on joint and combined relation-ships. The authors explain these issues, and others, in light of the Cold War focusupon the Soviet Union and its navy.The Persian Gulf War may have been the last conflict of the Cold War. Others,however, have suggested that it was the first of the post–Cold War period. Pro-fessional officers concerned about insights with future implications would dowell to dwell upon the concluding chapter, blandly entitled “Summary.” HereMarolda and Schneller highlight major insights, yet in the manner of consum-mate historians, laying out past issues without presuming future solutions. Eventhe busiest naval professional should find an hour to read this chapter of Shieldand Sword.In sum, Shield and Sword is first-rate history—solid in research, comprehen-sive in coverage, and insightful in analysis. It will be useful to academic and serv-ing professionals alike. Those who wish to research and write in greater depth onspecifics of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf War must begin with this book. More im-portantly, as the authors conclude, “the Gulf War stimulated the U.S. Navy tomake the transition . . . from the Cold War to a new era of regional conflict.” Ifthey are correct, every professional naval officer, and all others who expect tocommand, employ, or work with U.S. naval forces in the future, also need to starthere.1 3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W5Cochran et al.: Review Essay—Official History, Not “Instant Analysis”Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001

Review Essay—Official History, Not “Instant Analysis”

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2497&context=nwc-review

Review Essay—Official History, Not “Instant Analysis”

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons